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The Supreme Court of Canada has continuously held that the underlying purpose of section 35(1) 
of the Constitution Act, 1982, is the reconciliation of Crown sovereignty with pre-existing 
Indigenous societies. This judicial testament has paved the way for continual Indigenous 
demands for consent in resource development especially where Aboriginal lands are impacted. 
The need to seek and obtain Indigenous consent prior to commencement of major developments 
on their territorial lands, therefore, flow from the Crown’s role as a fiduciary to Indigenous 
peoples and Canada’s reconciliation objective as guaranteed under the constitution. 
The thesis examines the current domestic requirement of consent when dealing with Aboriginal 
title in resource development. It explores ways of obtaining Indigenous consent from an 
Indigenous perspective. It seeks to contribute to the on-going discussion regarding the 
importance of Indigenous consent in resource development in Canada. It argues that although, 
highly useful, consultation is apparently insufficient in fulfilling the ultimate goal of 
reconciliation as held by the Supreme Court of Canada. Therefore, Indigenous consent to major 
projects on their lands appears to be the next reasonable step in the advancement of the Crown’s 
reconciliation goal.  
An examination of Aboriginal title as it engages resource development is undertaken. It also 
discusses the current regime of consultation with indigenous peoples through a critique of the 
jurisprudence on the legal duty to consult. Further, Indigenous decision-making processes using 
the Gitxsan Nation as a point of reference will be examined with a view to charting a model for 
obtaining consent in resource development.  
Finally, this thesis concludes by making recommendations to existing consultation frameworks 
and policies on the legal and procedural standards for obtaining consent from Indigenous people 
in a manner that is consistent with their existing governance structures. This thesis is timely and 
relevant as it proposes to enhance stability in Canada’s natural resource sector by advocating for 
the use of a model legal standard for consent rather than consultation when dealing on 
Aboriginal title lands. It also offers practical contributions to how consent can be obtained from 
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1. Introduction and Context of Research Problem 
Many Indigenous groups across the world view the doctrine of consent as a concept that 
advances their right to choose freely how their lands and resources should be used. Because any 
major resource development taking place on Indigenous land has the potential to impact their 
rights, there is the need to ensure that such development is carried out within the confines of 
applicable laws, regulations, and guidelines. Today, Indigenous consent is clearly required in 
certain circumstances. For example, international jurisprudence provides that consent would be 
required during large-scale development.1 It would also be required when major dealings 
affecting Indigenous lands or traditional territories are contemplated by government.2  
In Canada, Indigenous rights and title are affirmed and fully protected under section 35 of the 
Constitution Act, 1982. Also, the need for Indigenous consent was affirmed by the Supreme 
Court of Canada (SCC) decision in Tsilhqot’in Nation v British Columbia3. For the first time in 
Canadian legal history, the SCC declared in Tsilhqot’in Nation that the claiming Indigenous 
group had established title to land. The decision in Tsilhqot’in Nation makes it clear that 
Indigenous title-holders have a right to give or withhold their consent to any development or use 
that affects their lands.  
                                                          
1 Saramaka People v Suriname, (Judgment of November 28, 2007), IACHR Series C no 172, IHRL 3046 (IACHR 2007) 
at para 134 pdf online: <http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_172_ing.pdf>. According to the 
Court, although States must consult with Indigenous peoples when involved in resource development projects on 
their traditional territories, there are some situations where a higher obligation may arise, for example, in a large-
scale construction, warranting the need to obtain their free, prior and informed consent in accordance to their 
customs and traditions. 
2Article 32(2) of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), Resolution 61/295 
adopted by the General Assembly, 61st Session, Supplement No. 49 (September 13, 2007).  
See also, Tara Ward, “The Right to Free, Prior and Informed Consent: Indigenous Peoples’ Participation Rights 
within International Law” 2011 Vol 10:2, Northwestern Journal of International Human Rights at 56 [Ward]. See 
further, Paul Joffe “Veto” and Consent” – Significant Differences” (13 July 2015) at 4, pdf online: 
<http://www.afn.ca/uploads/files/2015_usb_documents/veto-and-consent-significant-differences-joffe-final-july-
31-15.pdf>. 
3 Tsilhqot’in Nation v British Columbia, 2014 SCC 44, [2014] 2 SCR 257 [Tsilhqot’in Nation]. 
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This research proposes free prior and informed consent as the proposed legal standard for 
consent in resource development in Canada. This will be discussed in greater detail under 
chapters three and four of this thesis. Endorsed in 2010,4 Canadian courts have been quite 
reluctant to embrace the full provisions of UNDRIP.5 As such, some writers have come to 
believe that FPIC is a mere aspirational concept.6 However, the objective of the thesis is to 
propose FPIC as the legal standard for consent in resource development and argue that where 
liberally and judiciously interpreted, section 35 protections can achieve FPIC in Canada.  
With 171.0 billion barrels of crude oil in proven reserves, Canada has the third largest oil reserve 
in the world, following Venezuela and Saudi Arabia.7 The exploration, exploitation and 
development of these resources have continued to interfere with the constitutionally-protected 
rights of Indigenous peoples of Canada. This interference has resulted in delays in the process of 
obtaining the requisite Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity (“CPCN”) and other 
regulatory approvals. Indeed, this phenomenon has been identified by the industry as “First 
Nations issues” in the scheme of resource development.8 In essence, if not properly addressed, 
the regulatory delays associated with Indigenous engagement could discourage investment in 
resource development in the Canadian economy. 
                                                          
4 Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada, “Canada’s Statement of Support on the United Nations Declaration on 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples”, online: <http://www.aadncaandc.gc.ca/eng/1309374239861/1309374546142>.  
5 Dwight Newman, Revisiting the Duty to Consult Aboriginal Peoples, (Saskatoon: Purich Publishing, 2014) at 146 
[Dwight Newman, Revisiting the Duty to Consult Aboriginal Peoples]. The learned author said that “it is highly 
unusual for parties to attempt to make arguments based on customary international law, partly because of the 
difficulties of proving its contents and partly because Canadian courts are simply not used to those arguments.” 
See also, Nunatukavut Community Council Inc. v Canada (Attorney General), 2015 FC 981 260 ACWS (3rd) 651. 
6 Ken S. Coates and Blaine Favel, “Understanding FPIC: From assertion and assumption on ‘free, prior and informed 
consent’ to a new model for Indigenous engagement on resource development” (April 2016), Macdonald-Laurier 
Institute Publication at 14 [Coates and Favel]. 
7 Natural Resources Canada “Oil Resources” (February 19, 2016) online: <http://www.nrcan.gc.ca/energy/oil-
sands/18085>. According to Natural Resources Canada, Canada accounts for 10% of the world’s proven oil reserves 
and it is predicted that this could grow even larger as technology evolves. 
8 Dawn Farrell, CEO of Trans Alta, while commenting on the delays associated with project development in Canada 
referred to “First Nation Issues” as one of such delays. She compares how, in Australia, it was easy to sign a deal in 
July as well as secure all permits by December of the same year “without cutting corners. See, Yadullah Hussain, 





In addressing the research goal, an examination of the meaning of Aboriginal title in Canada will 
be undertaken. As such, free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) as it relates to Aboriginal title 
lands will be the only focus of this research. As a unique right in land, Aboriginal title grants the 
right-holders the use of the land in a manner that is different from other land ownership in 
Canada. As a result of this special right in land, the Crown is constitutionally and legally bound 
to consult with the right and title holders, and where necessary, accommodate their interests.  
Section 35(1) of the Constitution Act provides that “the existing aboriginal and treaty rights of 
the aboriginal peoples of Canada are hereby recognized and affirmed.” Also, the 2004/2005 
trilogy cases of Haida Nation v British Columbia (Minister of Forests)9, Taku River Tlingit First 
Nation v British Columbia (Project Assessment Director)10, Mikisew Cree First Nation v Canada 
(Minister of Canadian Heritage)11, fully entrench the legal duty of the Crown to consult with 
Indigenous peoples in Canadian jurisprudence. According to case law, all that is required to 
trigger consultation duties regarding Aboriginal rights and title is threefold: (1) that the Crown 
should have real or constructive knowledge of those rights or title;12 (2) that the Crown is 
contemplating a project on Aboriginal land; and (3) that the contemplated project may adversely 
affect Aboriginal claim or right on the land.13  
Further, this research will examine the role that the duty to consult plays in obtaining Indigenous 
approval to developments taking place on their lands and the deficiencies inherent in stopping at 
consultation (as required by law), as opposed to seeking Indigenous free, prior and informed 
consent. For illustrative purposes, this research will be examining Indigenous consent from the 
lens of the Gitxsan Nation of British Columbia.  
                                                          
9 Haida Nation v British Columbia (Minister of Forests), 2004 SCC 73, [2004] 3 SCR 511. 
10Taku River Tlingit First Nation v British Columbia (Project Assessment Director) 2004 SCC 74, [2004] 3 SCR 550, 
245 DLR (4th) 193 [Taku River]. 
11 Mikisew Cree First Nation v. Canada (Minister of Canadian Heritage), [2005] SCC 69, [2005] 3 SCR. 388, [2005] 
SCJ. No. 71. [Mikisew Cree 2005]. 
12 Dwight Newman, Revisiting the Duty to Consult Aboriginal Peoples, supra note 5 at 39. The learned author and 
foremost authority on the duty to consult doctrine in Canada stated that when the Crown has constructive 
knowledge of an action that may be in breach of an Aboriginal right, the knowledge element is met; and at p 48; 
that real or constructive knowledge does not include a reorganization of governance structure since this is 
dependent on what the new governance structure chooses to do. 
13 Haida Nation, supra note 9 at 36. 
4 
 
The Gitxsan people have a long history of demanding the recognition of their rights and making 
claims to their traditional territories. As such, sufficient past research work exists that the present 
project can rely upon.14 By looking at consent from the perspective of the Gitxsan peoples, it 
becomes evident that consultation is no longer sufficient, rather; obtaining their informed 
consent prior to any major development taking place, is the most assured means of legitimately 
maximizing Canada’s resource wealth, as well as conforming to international standards on 
Indigenous peoples’ rights to give or withhold their consent. 
Chapter one of this research will lay a foundation for a broader understanding of the meaning of 
Indigenous consent by examining the instances where agreements are reached in resource 
development and ways that the free, prior and informed consent of Indigenous title holders have 
become more broadly important. This chapter is highly significant as it discusses existing 
standards of seeking Indigenous approval to projects and how they compare to proposed FPIC 
standard later in chapters four and five. 
As a proposed standard, this thesis discusses FPIC as a way of fulfilling the Crown’s obligation 
to Indigenous peoples especially when a contemplated project is likely to have a profound impact 
on Indigenous lands. The duty to consult is discussed in chapter three, however, the discussion of 
FPIC as articulated under the UNDRIP, is highly relevant to chapters one, four and five since 
this thesis proposes that absent Indigenous consent during consultation, projects should not 
proceed on their lands.  
The need to obtain Indigenous peoples’ consent in the absence of an agreement or established 
title arises from the recognition of the need to respect Aboriginal rights to self-governance, 
cultural rights, and religious rights, and it may well also be a good business practice that supports 
smooth execution of projects taking place on their lands.15 Although at least somewhat effective 
in opening up dialogues and relationship-building avenues between the Crown and Indigenous 
                                                          
14 Gitxsan, Gitxsan History of Resistance, online: < http://www.gitxsan.com/culture/culture-history/gitxsan-history-
of-resistance>.  
15 Cathal Doyle & Jill Cariño “Making Free, Prior & Informed Consent a Reality, Indigenous Peoples and the 
Extractive Sector” (2013), at 19, online: < http://solutions-network.org/site-fpic/files/2012/09/Making-Free-Prior-
Informed-Consent-a-Reality-DoyleCarino.pdf> [Doyle and Carino]. 
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peoples, consultation without consent is likely to be insufficient in fulfilling the ultimate goal of 
reconciliation described by the SCC in Delgamuukw.16  
It is important to clarify that reference to “consent” throughout this thesis is in the nature of 
consent as described by the SCC in the Tsilhqot’in Nation decision.17  The concept of “FPIC” is 
that articulated by the UNDRIP provisions. This distinction is important because FPIC has not 
yet gained legislative acceptance in Canada, whereas its consultation counterpart has. This area 
of law is in flux and the existing FPIC literature is mostly derived from the Declaration which in 
turn is not legally binding in Canada. For example, In Sackaney v. R,18 the court held that 
because UNDRIP has not been ratified in any manner by Parliament, it does not give rise to any 
substantive rights in Canada. As such, the implementation of UNDRIP provisions in Canada can 
be achieved only through the parliamentary process. However, the decisions in Nunatukavut 
Community Council Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General)19 and Elsipogtog First Nation v. Canada 
(Attorney General),20 show that the courts are leaning towards an interpretation that embodies 
the values of the Declaration. If Canada decides to implement the Declaration, it will be bound to 
obtain the consent of Indigenous groups prior to commencing resource development projects on 
their territorial lands. This thesis argues that this is the most assured means of fulfilling the 
Crown’s fiduciary obligations to Indigenous peoples.  
The issue of implementing FPIC within domestic laws is easier said than done because it has 
been interpreted as giving Indigenous peoples the right to veto and control resource 
developments on their traditional lands. However, some writers, such as Mauro Barelli, are of the 
view that FPIC should not be considered by States as restrictive but rather simply as “imposing a 
stringent obligation on States” to obtain indigenous consent.21 
                                                          
16 Delgamuukw v British Columbia, [1997] 3 SCR 1010 at para 165, 153 DLR (4th) 193 [Delgamuukw]. 
17 Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra note 3 at 76. 
18 Sackaney v. R, 2013 TCC 303. 
19 Nunatukavut, supra note 5 at para 96. 
20 Elsipogtog First Nation v. Canada (Attorney General), 2013 FC 1117 at para 121. 
21 Mauro Barelli, “Free Prior and Informed Consent in the Aftermath of the UN Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples: Developments and Challenges Ahead”. (2012) The International Journal of Human Rights, Vol. 
16, No. 1 at 21. 
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Other writers have analyzed how FPIC should be interpreted in light of the literal meaning of its 
components. According to S.J. Rombouts, “free” means the ability of indigenous peoples to have 
discursive control over a dialogue while making decisions related to their lands; “prior” means 
having the ability to make decisions before development is commenced and that consent to such 
development should be on-going and should last throughout the duration of the project.22 This 
interpretation is also endorsed by Cathal Doyle and Jill Carino, where after interviewing some 
Indigenous representatives in Canada, these scholars identified that some communities expect 
and require that consent should be maintained throughout the duration of the project and even 
renewed yearly and until the end of the project.23 As such, it is hard for project proponents to 
make investment decisions if Aboriginal consent could be obtained in the first few years but later 
denied when resource development have commenced. Further, S.J. Rombouts refers to 
“informed” as a sine qua non with regards to the validity of the entire process, while “consent” 
requires that it must have been given by the lawfully delegated authority.24 
In support of the view that FPIC does not amount to a veto power, Sébastien Grammond has 
argued that Article 32 of UNDRIP should be pursued as a goal rather than perceived as a “veto 
power” reposed in Indigenous peoples.25 As the goal of consultation, it is more likely to achieve 
the objectives of section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. Perhaps making a related point, 
Dwight Newman has said that it is possible for Canadian courts to gradually accept the 
provisions of the Declaration if it is treated as an aspirational document.26 
In the extractive industry, the International Council on Mining and Metals (ICMM) has taken 
positive steps towards adopting FPIC. In their 2013 Position Statement (the “Statement”), the 
body outlines its commitment to working with indigenous peoples in order to obtain their 
consent where projects are located on traditionally owned lands.27 Particularly, their fourth 
                                                          
22 S.J. Rombouts, Indigenous Peoples, International Law and Free, Prior and Informed Consent (Wolf Legal 
Publishers, Oisterwijk, Netherlands: 2014) [Rombouts]. 
23 Doyle and Carino, supra note 15 at 47. 
24 Rombouts, supra note 23 at 65. 
25 Sebastian Grammond, Terms of Coexistence: Indigenous Peoples and Canadian Law, (Carswell, Toronto: 2013) at 
165. 
26 Newman, supra note 5 at 151. 
27 International Council on Mining and Metals (ICMM), May 2013. “Indigenous Peoples and Mining” Position 
Statement at 4. [the “Statement”] online at: <http://www.icmm.com/document/5433>. 
7 
 
commitment sheds more light on their understanding of FPIC. It provides that “consent processes 
should focus on reaching agreement on the basis for which a project should proceed.” Also, it 
provides that FPIC does not confer a veto power on Indigenous groups nor does it mandate 
companies to agree to “aspects not under their control.” Rather, FPIC should enable Indigenous 
peoples to be aware of projects on their lands and how it would impact and benefit them as a 
community or group. On this, Sauer, Chiodini and Duong note that the ICMM’s Statement still 
presents uncertainties in resource development because of the lack of understanding of FPIC by 
industry.28 The different interpretations given to the term “consent” by industry, government and 
indigenous peoples also make it difficult to fully grasp the legal implication of the adoption of 
the doctrine in Canada and abroad.  
Currently in Canada, the SCC jurisprudence on consent is that it is required when title to land has 
been established since this constitutes a judicial acknowledgement of Indigenous people’s rights 
as owners of the land “to proactively use and manage the land.”29 Consent is also required when 
any amendment to an existing treaty right is proposed. Further, accommodation of Indigenous 
rights may be reached through negotiated agreements when contemplated projects are likely to 
infringe on Indigenous treaty rights in view of Crown’s honourable dealings expectation.30 
According to the Court in Haida Nation v British Columbia (Minister of Forests), “the effect of 
good faith consultation may reveal a duty to accommodate,”31 and accommodation may take the 
form of negotiating Indigenous approval through contractual agreements leading to the signing 
of Impact and Benefit Agreements (IBAs). 
IBAs have been used and found to be efficient in ensuring that certain economic benefits accrue 
to Indigenous groups impacted by resource development projects on Indigenous lands.32 Through 
IBAs, the consent of Indigenous communities is sought and obtained. This is further discussed in 
pages 15 and 97-99 of this thesis. IBAs are utilized as a freestanding agreement or under the 
                                                          
28 Luke Sauer, Jaclynn Chiodini and Christine Duong, (July 2015) “Consent within Consultation: Incorporating New 
Business Practices in the Extractive Industry” Policy Brief, CIGI Graduate Fellows (CGF) Series, No 3 at 44. 
29 Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra note 3 at 94. 
30 Haida Nation, supra note 9 at para 19. 
31 Ibid,. at 47. 
32 Ken J. Caine & Naomi Krogman, “Powerful or Just Plain Power-Full? A Power Analysis of Impact and Benefit 
Agreements in Canada’s North” (2010) Organization & Environment, Vol. 23, Issue 1, pp. 76 - 98 at 77. 
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requirements of modern treaties, which are in turn protected under sections 25 and 35 of the 
Constitution Act, 1982. An example of where a modern treaty explicitly demands consent 
through the use of IBAs can be found under Article 26 of the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement 
which provides that an Inuit Impact and Benefit Agreement (IIBA) must be concluded prior to 
any major development taking place. This provision exists in order to ensure that any proposed 
project, on one hand, accounts for the environmental externalities on the Inuit people, and, on the 
other hand, to ensure that the people enjoy economic and financial benefit therefrom.  
Further, chapter one will examine other areas where consent is mandated by regulatory bodies 
and statutes, for example, the National Energy Board and the British Columbia Environmental 
Assessment Act.  Finally, consent as required under international instrument, such as the United 
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) will be discussed. 
Chapter two will discuss in detail the meaning of Aboriginal title in Canada. Because Indigenous 
title is “a right to the land itself,”33 it allows Indigenous peoples an uninterrupted use and control 
of their lands. Therefore, it is more prudent to seek Indigenous consent prior to infringement. 
According to the SCC, failure to obtain Indigenous consent can result in cancellation of projects 
unless justified by a compelling and substantial public purpose in line with the Crown’s fiduciary 
obligations to the Aboriginal people of Canada.34 
Chapter three examines the laws relating to consultation with Indigenous peoples in Canada. 
Because of their status as foremost dwellers in Canada, the law requires the Crown to consult 
and where necessary, accommodate concerns raised through the consultation process. In chapter 
four, consultation processes of the federal government, British Columbia and a birds-eye-view of 
Indigenous governance structure is examined. In particular, chapter three examines how consent 
may be obtained from Indigenous groups by looking at the meaning and importance of consent 
to a select group of the Gitxsan Nation of British Columbia. In providing answers to the task in 
chapter four, the discussion will pivot around the following issues: which institution should 
dictate the forms in which consultation with Indigenous groups should take - the government, the 
courts or Indigenous title-holders/decision-makers? This question will foreground my discussion 
                                                          
33 Delgamuukw, supra note 16 at 140. 
34 Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra note 3 at para 2. 
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on the consultation duties of the Crown leading to consent from title-holders/claimants in 
resource development.  
An examination of the decision-making process and the political structure of the Gitxsan Nation 
of British Columbia is undertaken in order to shed light on how their cultural practices and legal 
traditions may be instrumental in fashioning policies and practices on consultation leading to 
acquiring consent. In the years after the Delgamuukw v British Columbia action was brought by 
the Gitxsan and Wet’suwet’en communities, the Gitxsan Nation has developed and implemented 
a more structured political government which reflects their historical practices as well as infusing 
a modern political administration, thereby, giving a new meaning to Indigenous traditional 
governance. These infused governance structures, although not without their problems, will 
highlight how agreements are achieved within Indigenous communities. 
With a focus on British Columbia, existing consultation policies in the Province will also be 
examined. These policies were primarily drafted by government officials taking cues from court 
decisions, with minimal consideration of traditional Indigenous perspectives on consultation. 
Rather than addressing this apparent conflict issue, the Court in R v Sparrow35 devised the 
“override provision” which allows the Crown to proceed with development on title lands without 
the consent of Indigenous title holders, as long as the conditions set out in Sparrow are met.36 
The implication of Crown exercise of this power translates to an absence of legitimacy from 
Indigenous groups, and this fails to meet the international standards expressed in the UNDRIP 
with regards to Indigenous peoples’ consent in resource development. 
The research concludes in Chapter five after discussing how Indigenous decision-making process 
(using the Gitxsan people in British Columbia in chapter four) can be utilized in obtaining 
consent as the goal of Crown-Aboriginal consultation. With freely obtained, informed consent, 
the government is assured that it has obtained approval to a third-party incursion on Aboriginal 
title lands.  
                                                          
35 R v Sparrow, [1990] 1 SCR 1075, 70 DLR (4th) 385 [Sparrow]. 
36Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra note 3 at para 76.  
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1.1. Consent of Indigenous Communities in Resource Development: Existing 
Standards in Canada 
After several decades of litigating Indigenous title rights in Canada, it is now recognized that 
Indigenous peoples have a right to freely consent to the use of Aboriginal title land stemming 
from sufficient, continuous and exclusive occupation of the land.37 This right stem from the fact 
that they have been occupying the lands prior to the arrival of European settlers. As a result, 
there are recognized instances where consent is required from Indigenous people in Canada, and 
this Chapter will examine some of those instances for the purpose of understanding existing 
Canadian jurisprudence on the requirement of consent on Indigenous lands. The aim is to 
highlight the existing practices on obtaining consent of Indigenous communities in resource 
development. In executing this objective, its failings would also be identified. 
The existing standards, such as statutory and regulatory requirement, and the common law duty 
to consult, although, highly effective, lack the legitimacy that consent confers since it is subject 
to Crown override as laid down in Sparrow.38 For instance, in the case of treaty lands in Canada, 
even though the jurisprudence in Haida Nation mandates the Crown to consult with Indigenous 
treaty right holders before taking any action that could impact their treaty rights, government is 
still not bound to stay developments on such lands while waiting on Indigenous right holders for 
consent.39 As such, existing jurisprudence that requires the government to consult with 
Indigenous peoples fail to ensure stability in Canada’s resource industry. Unfortunately, several 
projects continue to suffer from the repercussions of proponents’ inability to proceed due to lack 
of Indigenous consent.40  
                                                          
37 Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra note 3 at para 25. 
38 Sparrow, supra note 35 at 111. 
39 JoAnn P. Jamieson and William M. Laurin, “Aligning Resource Development with the Interests of Aboriginal 
Peoples of Canada” (2015) 53 Alta L. Rev at 55 [Jamieson]. 
40 An example of a recent project cancelled for lack of Indigenous consent is Limestone Quarry Project on the Bruce 
Peninsula; see Jean Levac, “Ontario Court halts quarry project over lack of consultation with First Nations” 
(National Post: July 18, 2017) online: <http://nationalpost.com/news/national/ontario-court-halts-quarry-project-
over-lack-of-consultation-with-first-nations>.  
See also, James Anaya, Extractive Industries and Indigenous Peoples: Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Rights 




In order to reduce the chances of government and third-party infringement of Indigenous treaty 
and title rights, both private and public-sector industries are beginning to accept and indeed, 
entrench the requirements of FPIC in various other sectors where Indigenous lands are being 
utilised for development. An easily identifiable example is the Forest Stewardship Council which 
has partnered with the National Aboriginal Forestry Association to engage in discussions on how 
FPIC with Indigenous groups would strengthen forest certification requirements in the forest 
industry.41 
This research will primarily focus on title lands due to the importance of the Tsilhqot’in Nation 
decision on the issues of Indigenous consent in title lands. This will lead to a broader discussion 
of consent within Canadian jurisprudence and international standards of Indigenous consent in 
resource development under the UNDRIP provisions. Ultimately, the goal is to generate 
suggestions in response to questions raised by stakeholders in resource development, as well as 
to show how Indigenous consent is preferable to justifying an infringement in accordance with 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
15/14 UN document A/HRC/24/41, (July 1, 2013), at 4, online: <http://unsr.jamesanaya.org/study/report-a-hrc-24-
41-extractive-industries-and-indigenous-peoples-report-of-the-special-rapporteur-on-the-rights-of-indigenous-
peoples>.  James Anaya’s Report shows that Indigenous people worldwide are beginning to own companies 
engaged in resource development worldwide. This means that several Indigenous groups are no longer satisfied 
with sitting on the side-lines and waiting for the government to recognize their rights to dictate how their lands 
would be used in resource development. Rather, they now own several companies that allow them to “engage in 
oil and gas production, manage electric power assets, or invest in alternative energy.” Indeed, this is preferable 
because it allows the resource developer the advantage of gaining knowledge of Indigenous peoples’ traditional 
laws and beliefs that affects their land and in turn, it minimizes the possibility of an infringement of their 
internationally recognized rights. In essence, his report summarizes that Indigenous peoples’ participation in 
extractive industry is a plus for any government looking to ensure stability in its resource industry as this is more 
likely to ensure that the consent of affected Indigenous communities is obtained all through the life of the project. 
For example, an Ontario Court recently stopped T & P Hayes Ltd., from proceeding with a limestone quarry project 
on the Bruce Peninsula because the Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources and Forestry failed to properly fulfil its 
constitutional duty to consult with the Saugeen Ojibway First Nation.  
41 Monika Patel, “Free, Prior and Informed Consent”, Forest Stewardship Council, online: <https://ca.fsc.org/en-
ca/our-work/forest-management-standard-revision-01/free-prior-and-informed-consent>.  See also, Monika Patel 
“Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) launches leading initiative to Strengthen Aboriginal Peoples' Rights in Canadian 





the Sparrow-Tsilhqot’in Nation justification test which is discussed in chapter two of this 
thesis.42 
 
1.2. Domestic Standards of Consent of Indigenous Communities in Resource 
Development  
In seeking to obtain Indigenous support for a resource development project on their lands, 
regulatory and statutory requirements, as well as the constitutional duty to consult, have been 
devised. While free, prior and informed Indigenous consent remains the ideal goal, resource 
developers and Indigenous groups have often utilized contractual agreements as one of the 
means of negotiation in order to negotiate some of the terms in which exploitation, exploration, 
and production proceed on Indigenous lands.43 For example, IBAs are one of such ingenious 
negotiating instruments. 
An IBA is “a negotiated, private agreement that documents in a contractual form the benefits that 
a local community can expect from the development of a local resource in exchange for its 
support and cooperation.”44 IBAs often contain detailed information as to what affected 
Indigenous land claimants demand in exchange for their consent to projects that would entail 
                                                          
42 In Sparrow, the SCC laid out a test for how government may be justified in infringing existing Aboriginal and 
Treaty rights that are protected under section 35 of the Constitution. Under the test, an infringement might be 
justified if 1.) It serves a valid legislative objective; and 2) the government’s actions must be consistent with its 
fiduciary duty towards Aboriginal peoples. Where the government decided that a valid legislative objective exists, 
it is required to further ensure that a) there has been as little infringement as possible; b) fair compensation has 
been paid in the case of expropriation of lands, and c) the affected Aboriginal groups were consulted. 
43 Ibironke T. Odumosu-Ayanu, “Indigenous Peoples, International Law, and Extractive Industry Contracts” (2015) 
109 AJIL Unbound 220 at 221. 
44 Irene Sosa & Karyn Keenan, “Impact Benefit Agreements between Aboriginal Communities and Mining 
Companies: Their use in Canada” for Canadian Environmental Law Association (CELA: 2001) at 2 [Sosa & Keenan], 
where IBAs are defined simply as a tool used for establishing formal relationships between mining companies and 
the local communities. Further, see Dwight Newman, Natural Resource Jurisdiction in Canada, (Markham: 




exploitation and development on their land.45 Often, this comes in the form of financial 
compensation to the Indigenous groups impacted by the project.46 
Today, IBAs are used in several ways to obtain Indigenous consent often before any resource 
development taking place. For example, the provisions of a land claim agreement may require 
that an IBA or a “Participation Agreement” be negotiated prior to resource development taking 
place on Indigenous lands.47 Alternatively, governments may have specific regulatory 
requirement that IBAs must be made so as to ensure that governmental fiduciary obligations 
towards Indigenous peoples are met.48  
There are some circumstances where IBAs are required in Canada, some of which will be further 
discussed in this chapter.49 According to the court in Haida Nation, the Crown may be required 
                                                          
45 Isabella Pain & Tom Paddon, “Negotiating Agreements: Indigenous and Company Experiences: Presentation of 
the Voisey’s Bay Case Study from Canada,” a paper delivered at the International Seminar on Natural Resource 
Companies, Indigenous Peoples and Human Rights: Setting a Framework for Consultation, Benefit-Sharing and 
Dispute Resolution at Moscow (December 3-4, 2008) at 5. See also, Ibironke T. Odumosu-Ayanu, “Indigenous 
Peoples, International Law, and Extractive Industry Contracts”, supra note 43 at 223. 
46 The Labrador Inuit Land Claims Agreement, (the “Agreement”). Part 6.7.3 of the Agreement provides that an 
Inuit IBA “may provide for any matter connected with a Major Development in the zone…that could have a 
detrimental impact on Inuit or could reasonably confer a benefit on Inuit. See Indigenous and Northern Affairs, 
“Land Claims Agreement between the Inuit of Labrador and Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Newfoundland and 
Labrador and Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada”, online: <www.aadnc-
aandc.gc.ca/eng/1293647179208/1293647660333>.  
47 Indian and Northern Affairs Canada “The Western Arctic Claim, Inuvialuit Final Agreement”, online: 
<http://webarchive.bac-lac.gc.ca:8080/wayback/20071125181720/http://www.ainc-
inac.gc.ca/pr/agr/inu/wesar_e.pdf>. See Chapter 10(2) of the Western Arctic Claim, Inuvialuit Final Agreement 
requires proponents to conclude a Participation Agreement with the Inuvialuit Lands Administration except 
otherwise agreed to.  
48 Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada “Land Claims Agreement between the Inuit of Labrador and Her 
Majesty the Queen in Right of Newfoundland and Labrador and Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Canada” online: 
<https://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1293647179208/1293647660333#chp6>.  Specifically, Part 6.7 Inuit Impact 
and Benefits Agreement in the Zone provide that except under enumerated instances, IBAs must be entered with 
the Nunatsiavut Government prior to any development on their lands. See also, Sosa and Kenan, supra note 16 at 
7-8. 
49 IBAs are statutorily required in some land claims agreements, for example, the Nunavut Land Claims Agreements 
and the Inuvialuit Final Agreement. For more, see Sandra Gogal, Richard Riegert & JoAnn Jamieson, “Aboriginal 




to enter into an IBA based on the nature of the rights held by the Indigenous community.50 In 
essence, the Crown may need to accommodate the concerns of Aboriginal title claimants by 
minimizing the impact of a proposed action through accommodation which could be in the form 
of IBAs. Further, IBAs are required under certain land claims agreements, for example, the 
Labrador Inuit Lands Claims Agreement and the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement as mentioned 
earlier. Indigenous community approval arrived at by negotiated agreements, (such as 
Impact/Mutual Benefit Agreement) can also be a conditional requirement by some regulatory 
bodies, e.g., the National Energy Board, prior to issuing the requisite CPCN for a project on 
Aboriginal title lands.51 
 
1.2.1. When Indigenous Approval may be Obtained as a Result of 
Accommodation During Consultation  
The principle of the Crown’s duty to consult and where appropriate, accommodate Indigenous 
peoples’ interest is examined in more detail in chapter three of this thesis; therefore, only a brief 
discussion will be undertaken in this chapter. For the purpose of examining the requirement for 
IBAs arising from the duty to consult, it is sufficient to recognize that its origin can be traced to 
the Crown’s section 35 constitutional duties to Indigenous peoples of Canada. This constitutional 
duty exists in recognition of the fact that Indigenous people have occupied Canada before any 
other group arrived. As such, the duty to consult is imposed both as a matter of law,52 as well as 
protected by section 35 (1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, whereby “existing aboriginal and treaty 
rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada are recognized and affirmed.” Ipso facto, what this 
means is that where title has not been claimed or where treaties have not been finalized, the duty 
to consult doctrine will fill in the gap and ensure that Indigenous groups occupying the land are 
                                                          
50 Haida Nation, supra note 9 at 42-45. 
51 The National Energy Board Panel (established by virtue of NEB Act R.S.C., 1985, c N-7) that reviewed the Trans 
Mountain Project Application recommended 157 conditions, including several economic and financial benefit to be 
accorded to affected Indigenous community, should the project proceed. These economic benefits were delivered 
to the affected community by means of contractually negotiated benefit agreements. See also, Gogal, Riegert & 
Jamieson, at 140. 
52Beckman v Little Salmons/Carmacks First Nation, 2010 SCC 53 at para 69, [2010] 3SCR 103, 326 DLR. (4th) 385 
[Little Salmons/Carmacks First Nation].  
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protected whenever resource development is proposed on their lands. This protection may take 
the form of a Land Claim Agreement with IBA provisions embedded therein.53 
Although the fulfilment of the duty to consult is primarily the government’s obligation,54 it can 
be argued that perhaps, it is easier to delegate this duty to third parties because of the multiple 
hats that government wears in terms of protecting both its Indigenous and non-Indigenous 
citizens. As such, in R v Sparrow, the court recognized the “increasingly complex” role that 
government plays in society; therefore, it provides a means for government to infringe 
“recognized and affirmed” Aboriginal rights by justifying such infringement.55 Again, this is no 
easy feat for the government since there can be several and multiple intersecting rights to 
consider prior to making a decision to infringe any Indigenous groups’ rights. The Sparrow 
decision however provides that an infringement can be justified if there is a valid legislative 
objective and it goes ahead in providing certain questions as a guide to help the government in 
determining whether or not such valid legislative objective exists.56 Ultimately, Indigenous 
interests will still have to be taken into consideration resulting from consultation with the 
government, while the accommodation aspect are usually negotiated between affected 
Indigenous groups and industry, which in turn may take the form of an IBA.57  
In some cases, when parties enter into IBAs as a result of fulfilling the government’s duty to 
consult with Indigenous groups, they are assuring one another that they agree under the terms of 
the contract to firstly, on the part of the Indigenous groups, provide their approval to the project 
proceeding on their lands and secondly, for the project proponents to make available financial 
benefits or compensations to the affected Indigenous groups for making use of their lands. As 
such, IBA is one of the most assured means of obtaining Indigenous approval. It also allows the 
                                                          
53 Gogal, Riegert & Jamieson, supra note 49 at 134. 
54 Haida Nation, supra note 9 at 53. 
55 The Sparrow test requires the government to consider the following: 1. whether the legislation in question has 
the effect of interfering with an existing aboriginal right; and if yes, 2 (a). Whether there is a valid legislative 
objective; (b) whether that objective can be justified, which will include considerations as to whether there has 
been as little infringement as possible; whether in situation of expropriation, fair compensation is available and 
whether aboriginal groups affected had been consulted. See generally, sparrow, supra note 17 at paras 67-83. 
56 Ibid., at 111. 
57 Grammond, supra note 25 at 277.  
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government to rest assured that affected Indigenous groups have been consulted and that they 
were fairly engaged in reaching the negotiated agreement. 
Accommodation of Indigenous rights is not always imposed in every situation since the need 
may not arise after consultation has taken place.58 However, parties are enjoined to act in good 
faith during consultation so that it can be meaningful and productive to allow Indigenous groups 
and other stakeholders to bring forward their concerns. These concerns are usually addressed in 
the form of accommodation taking the shape of agreements. According to the Haida Nation 
Court, “honourable negotiation implies a duty to consult with Aboriginal claimants and conclude 
an honourable agreement reflecting the claimants’ inherent rights”59 As a result of good faith 
consultation, the parties could reach an agreement which enables the Crown to accommodate the 
affected Indigenous group’s interests.60 Also, the court in Nunatsiavut v Canada (Department of 
Fisheries and Oceans),61 gave judicial recognition to how honourable negotiation between the 
Crown and Indigenous communities can lead to agreement as a result of consultation.62 
What this means to project proponents is that if the duty to consult is not properly carried out in a 
manner that reflects the honour of the Crown, the project could be delayed or even cancelled 
until proper consultation have been done reflective of Indigenous interests at stake. However, 
where consultation does not lead to accommodation, the courts have held that at the very least, 
the process should provide an explanation why the Indigenous people’s position was not 
accepted. In essence, it should be a meaningful process yielding reasoned results and not a 
ground for Indigenous peoples to “blow off steam.”63 This is why the government strongly leans 
                                                          
58 Haida Nation, supra note 9 at para 10. See also, Taku River, supra note 10 at para 193, where the court held that 
“where consultation is meaningful, there is no ultimate duty to reach an agreement.” Further, see Tzeachten First 
Nation v. Canada (Attorney General), 2008 FC 928 at para 75, 297 DLR (4th) 300. 
59 Haida Nation, supra note 9 at para 26. 
60 Little Salmon, supra note 52 at para 61. The Court held that “consultation can be shaped by agreements of the 
parties…” Therefore, because of good-faith consultation, the honour of the Crown, in certain circumstances, can 
compel the government to reach an agreement with the Indigenous groups for the purpose of accommodating 
their concerns in a proposed natural resource development project. See also, Tom Isaac and Anthony Knox, 
“Canadian Aboriginal Law: Creating Certainty in Resource Development” (2004) 3 UNBLJ 53 at 13 [Isaac & Knox]. 
61 Nunatsiavut v Canada (Department of Fisheries and Oceans) 2015 FC 492, 2015 CF 492 [Nunatsiavut]. 
62 Ibid., at para 125. 




towards an agreement being reached between resource developers and Indigenous groups, 
usually in the form of an IBA, prior to commencement of a project on Indigenous lands.64 
 
1.2.2. Statutory Requirement to Obtain Indigenous Consent under Modern 
Treaties 
Statutory requirement to reach an agreement derives its source from the honour of the Crown and 
“infuses the processes of treaty making.”65 In Haida Nation, the court held that the honour of the 
Crown ultimately “requires negotiations leading to a just settlement of Aboriginal claims.”66 This 
could lead to the negotiation of agreements, such as the land claims agreement between Canada 
or provincial/territorial government and Indigenous groups. Currently, there are 26 signed 
comprehensive land claim agreements and 100 more are being negotiated across Canada.67 
Land claim agreements, also described as modern treaties under section 35(3) of the Constitution 
Act, 1982,68 often contain some provisions which would compel or require project proponents to 
enter into a form of agreement with Indigenous groups before proceeding with natural resource 
exploitation on their lands. Examples of such obligations to finalize an IBA can be found in Part 
6.7.1 of the Labrador Inuit Lands Claims Agreement,69 and Article 26.2.1 of the Nunavut Land 
Claims Agreement.70 An example of such agreements was signed by Baffinland and the 
Qikiqtani Inuit Association (QIA) for the Mary River Project in September 2013.71 
                                                          
64 Grammond, supra note 25 at 277.  
65 Haida Nation, supra note 9 at para 19. 
66 Ibid., at 20. 
67 Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada, “Comprehensive Claims” online: <https://www.aadnc-
aandc.gc.ca/eng/1100100030577/1100100030578>.  
68 Nunatsiavut, supra note 61 at para 124. 
69 Labrador Inuit Land Claims Agreement Act, S.N. 2004, c. L-3.1. 
70 Article 26.2.1. of the “Agreement between the Inuit of the Nunavut Settlement area and Her Majesty the Queen 
in Right of Canada” online: <http://webarchive.bac-lac.gc.ca:8080/wayback/20051222235906/http://www.ainc-
inac.gc.ca/pr/agr/pdf/nunav_e.pdf>.   




Land Claims Agreements impose a duty to enter into IBAs with Indigenous communities before 
any major development can take place on their land. In essence, it sets out the circumstances 
under which Indigenous consent to any major development is legally mandated.  
Further, the requirement for consent would also arise when government proposes to amend or 
extinguish Aboriginal rights protected under a modern treaty. An example is the James Bay and 
Northern Quebec Agreement (JBNQA) which was the subject of judicial interpretation in Corp. 
Makivik c. Quebec (Procureur general).72 In this case, the Court of Appeal for Quebec held that 
the rights protected under the JBNQA could not be amended or extinguished absent Indigenous 
consent or notwithstanding actions of both federal and provincial legislature.73 This is because 
the rights in the JBNQA is constitutionally protected by virtue of sections 25 & 35 of the 
Constitution Act, 1982 and therefore, constitutes a modern treaty.  
Statutory requirement for Indigenous approval on a project can also take the form of government 
legislation such as the Canada Oil and Gas Operations Act.74 The Act provides that some form 
of benefit plan must be approved or waived by the Minister before a development plan may be 
granted. Although, not comparable to the nature of consent obtainable with FPIC, this benefit 
plan ensures that the impacted community have been consulted, and that they contractually agree 
to the project proceeding under certain (usually confidential) terms and conditions. Usually, 
monitoring bodies such as the National Energy Board or Ministries will mandate the fulfilment 
of a requirement prior to approving any resource development plan.75 Examples of pre-approval 
clauses could take the form of minister’s approvals, provision for employment, training and 
                                                          
72 Corp. Makivik c. Québec (Procureur général), 2014 QCCA 145, referred to in Gogal, Riegert & Jamieson, supra 
note 49 at 136. 
73 Ibid., at para 53. The court however, recognized that the only means of justifying an infringement of these rights 
under the JBNQA would be by meeting the justification test laid out in Sparrow supra note 19 at para 1109. 
74 Section 5 (2) of the Canada Oil and Gas Operations Act, (RSC 1985 c 0-7), provides that “no approval of a 
development plan shall be granted under subsection 5.1(1) and no authorization of any work or activity shall be 
issued under paragraph 5(1)(b), until the Minister has approved, or waived the requirement of approval of, a 
benefits plan in respect of the work or activity.” 
75 Gogal, Riegert & Jamieson, supra note 49 at 137. 
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education for affected Indigenous communities and youths or the opportunity for a fair playing 
ground to bid as suppliers of raw materials used in the project.76  
Another mandatory statutory requirement for project proponents to obtain consent prior to 
commencing a project can be found under section 8.1 of the British Columbia Environmental 
Assessment Act, 2002,77 which provides that: 
 
Despite any other enactment and whether or not an environmental assessment 
certificate is required, a reviewable project may not proceed on treaty lands 
without the consent of the treaty first nation if the final agreement requires this 
consent. 
 
Section 6(2) of the Act defines reviewable project to mean “one for which an 
environmental assessment certificate is required.” As such, statutory provisions such as 
these would ensure that proponents obtain the consent of Indigenous nations who have 
entered into final agreements with the government containing such consent provisions.  
IBAs also contain provisions that list the negative effects, including environmental and 
change of lifestyle, on the Indigenous community impacted by the proposed project, as 
well as the steps both parties would take to mitigate these negative impacts.78 This 
ensures that there has been adequate consultation with the affected Indigenous 
community leading to a contractual agreement to adhere to each other’s’ promises as 
listed in the agreement. 
Also, Indigenous Nations that have signed modern treaties also have law-making 
authority in relation to for example, the protection of local air quality or environmental 
                                                          
76 Ibid., at 138. 
77 British Columbia Environmental Assessment Act, (SBC 2002), Chapter 43. See also, the Tsawwassen First Nation 
Final Agreement online: <https://www2.gov.bc.ca/assets/gov/environment/natural-resource-
stewardship/consulting-with-first-
nations/agreements/tsawwassen_first_nation_final_agreement_printed_in_2010.pdf>.  




emergency response. For example, under Chapter 13, paragraph 9 of the Tla’amin Final 
Agreement, the Tla’amin Nation may make laws applicable to Tla’amin lands with 
regards to environmental assessment and protection.79 However, in the case of a conflict, 
the federal or provincial law prevails.80  
Further, as custodians of the lands, Indigenous peoples’ knowledge of the land is 
invaluable in making these arrangements as they constitute the group that would 
potentially be mostly affected by any changes that are proposed to be made by the 
project. 
 
1.2.3. Power of Regulatory Bodies to Mandate the Approval of Affected 
Indigenous Peoples Prior to Approving Resource Development Projects 
Because of its fiduciary obligations to Indigenous peoples, government, through regulatory 
bodies, may require resource developers to enter agreements with Indigenous communities 
before commencing resource explorations on their lands.81 Regulatory requirements are used by 
the government to compel project proponents to enter agreements with Indigenous communities 
where there is a strong claim to title. An example is the socio-economic agreement entered 
between BHP Billiton and the Government of the Northwest Territories in 1996 regarding the 
Ekati Diamond Mine.82  
Although, these regulatory requirements do not expressly mandate that consent must be sought, 
they however require project proponents to address Indigenous environmental, social or 
                                                          
79 Tla’amin Final Agreement, Effective Date, April 5, 2016, online: https://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/DAM/DAM-
INTER-HQ-LDC/STAGING/texte-text/tla_1397237565325_eng.pdf>.  
80 Ibid., Paragraph 12 at 160. 
81 Ibid., at 140. 
82 Natural Resource Canada (NRC) website (archived page) for more information about the four IBAs signed with 
Aboriginal communities online: <http://www.nrcan.gc.ca/mining-
materials/publications/aboriginal/bulletin/8822>. According to the NCR website, the Ekati mine is Canada’s first 
underground and surface diamond mine. In 2013, BHP Billiton completed the sale of its interests in the Ekati mine 





traditional concerns that can be reached via agreements as a precondition to granting government 
licenses, approvals or permits. On the part of project proponents, it makes it easier for them to 
obtain the requisite licenses and permits to commence work.  
An example is the National Energy Board (NEB), Filing Manual 2015. According to Chapter 
3.4.1 of the Filing Manual which makes provisions for the “Principles and Goals of the 
Consultation Program,” an overview of the company’s consultation philosophy should include “a 
copy of the Aboriginal consultation protocol, if established, along with any documented policies 
and principles for collecting traditional knowledge or traditional use information, if 
applicable.”83 Further, Chapter 3.4.3 of the Filing Manual also provides that project proponents 
are required to demonstrate “those potentially affected by the project have been consulted and 
that any concerns raised have been considered and addressed as appropriate.”  
In the decisions of Clyde River (Hamlet) v Petroleum Geo-Services Inc.,84 and Chippewas of the 
Thames First Nation v Enbridge Pipelines Inc.,85 the SCC held that the Crown always owes the 
duty to consult while regulatory processes can partially or completely fulfil this duty. In essence, 
the NEB as a regulatory body may, through its functions, ensure that Indigenous concerns are 
addressed, but they may or may not necessarily fulfil the duty to consult obligations of the 
government.  However, these tribunals may in some instances require project proponents to 
demonstrate Indigenous approval as part of the process.  
An example of how the government has intervened when parties fail to reach an agreement is by 
deferring the issuance of a permit pending the conclusion of an agreement between resource 
developers and First Nations; this occurred in British Columbia (B.C.) within the Tahltan 
territory. In 2015, the B.C. government bought back 61 coal licences from Fortune Mineral Ltd. 
and POSCO Canada Ltd. due to the inability of the mining company to reach an agreement with 
the First Nations in the territory.86 Clearly, the government is able to intervene by suspending or 
                                                          
83 For further readings on the consultation and accommodation requirement of the NEB, see, the National Energy 
Board, Filing Manual (June 2015) < https://www.neb-one.gc.ca/bts/ctrg/gnnb/flngmnl/flngmnl-eng.pdf>.  
84 Ibid. 
85 Chippewas of the Thames First Nation v Enbridge Pipelines Inc., (2017) SCC 41. 




cancelling a project when both parties are unable to reach agreements or obtain Aboriginal 
support. 
It is important to know that although, the NEB can direct project proponents to address issues 
prior to granting requisite licences and permits, the SCC nevertheless has held that the 
“substance of the duty does not change when a regulatory agency holds final decision-making 
authority in respect of a project.”87 The NEB’s decision could be a reflection of the Crown’s 
exercise of the constitutional duty to consult but ultimately, the Crown has to ensure that affected 
Indigenous groups have been adequately consulted in accordance with the required level of 
consultation that was laid down in Haida Nation.  
 
1.2.4. The Requirement of Consent on Aboriginal Title Lands  
The 1997 Supreme Court of Canada decision in Delgamuukw laid the background for the 
landmark decision of Tsilhqot’in Nation. The significance of Tsilhqot’in decision to Canadian 
legal jurisprudence and Indigenous law is that for the first time, title to land was declared for the 
Tsilhqot’in people, with the implication of paving the way for other Indigenous land claimants to 
bring forth their claims of title to their traditional territories.  
Indigenous title is a unique type of right in land because it differs from other types of land 
holding in Canada.88 The SCC in the Tsilhqot’in Nation decision held that the rights conferred by 
Aboriginal title means that anyone seeking to use the land must obtain the consent of the 
Aboriginal title-holders.89 Another important aspect of Aboriginal title with respect to resource 
development is that title owners cannot use, nor consent to the use of their land in a manner “that 
would substantially deprive future generations of the benefit of the land,”90 although the courts 
                                                          
87 Clyde River (Hamlet) v Petroleum Geo-Services Inc., (2017) SCC 40 at 1. 
88Delgamuukw, supra note 16 at 114 where the Court held that what makes aboriginal title unique or “sui generis” 
is that “it arises from possession before the assertion of British sovereignty, whereas normal estates, like fee 
simple, arise afterward.” 
89 Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra note 3 at 76. 
90 Delgamuukw, supra note 16 at para 111. The Court held that this inherent limit to the use of the land makes it 




have said that “permanent changes may be possible.”91 Further, the court left for future 
determination, the issue of whether certain types of resource development on the land, (such as 
exploitation of non-renewable natural resources), which is a form of permanent change to the 
land, can be said to be inconsistent with use of Aboriginal title lands. This is an area where even 
consent to the use of the land may not cure and could expose resource developers to future 
litigation. Thus, government might want to consider seeking the opinion of the Supreme Court of 
Canada by way of reference questions, before proceeding with such projects where title has been 
declared. 
Also, the significance of Tsilhqot’in Nation to resource development in Canada lies not in the 
type of rights conferred upon Aboriginal title owners, as that was made clear in Delgamuukw, 
but in the scope and content of the right, which has been described to be similar to a fee simple 
right.92  By virtue of their interest and rights in land, Indigenous title claimants have a stronger 
say. In addition to the rights conferred by Aboriginal title, some people, for example, Ron 
Tremblay, Grand Chief of the Wolastoq Grand Council, also believe that Canada’s adoption of 
the UNDRIP would give his community a veto.93 Resource developers are therefore, legally 
required to obtain consent prior to the commencement of projects on title lands. 
 
1.2.5. Agreements reached with Indigenous Peoples by Third-parties  
In Haida Nation, the Court held that the Crown alone remains legally responsible to consult with 
Indigenous peoples, but that some procedural aspects of consultation could be delegated to 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
note 29 at 3, where the authors write that the “inclusion of mineral ownership in Aboriginal title does not 
necessarily mean that First Nations may develop those resources.” 
91 Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra note 3 at 74 
92 Ibid., at para 73. 
93Julianne Hazlewood “UN Declaration will allow pipeline veto: N.B. Aboriginal leaders” CBC News, (May 11, 2016), 
online: <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/new-brunswick/un-declaration-energy-east-pipeline-veto-1.3576710>.  
See also, Paul Joffe “Veto” and Consent” – Significant Differences”, supra note 2 where he writes that in Haida 
Nation, supra note 6 at para 48 the Court used the term “veto” only with regards to how it is inapplicable to 
Aboriginal groups “pending final proof of claim” and clarifies that consent referred to in Delgamuukw is applicable 
to cases where title has been proved. Further, he said that “veto” is described as “an absolute power, with no 
balancing of rights.”  
24 
 
project proponents.94 This means that even though the Crown cannot delegate its constitutional 
duty to consult, third parties wishing to do business on claimed title lands can still negotiate and 
enter into agreements with title claimants prior to proof of claim. This is irrespective of whether 
title has been established or not.95 As such, where title is merely asserted and not yet established, 
it is highly recommended for project proponents to enter into agreements with Indigenous 
communities in order to avoid future litigation arising from breach of title rights. Corporations 
generally try to avoid litigation because it could take years or sometimes decades, to establish 
rights and obligations while the projects remain in limbo. Best practice will be to obtain 
Indigenous consent prior to the commencement of a project which could be in the form of an 
IBA. Because extensive consultation and negotiation usually occurs prior to entering into an 
IBA, it demonstrates that third-parties have consulted as required by the government in fulfilling 
its legal duty to consult.96 
The issue of whether Indigenous communities are entitled to the recognition of yet unproven 
Aboriginal right came up before the court in Saik’uz First Nation and Stellat’en First Nation v 
Alcan Inc.97 In this case, the Saik'uz and Stellat'en First Nations (the “Nechako Nation”) claimed 
private and public nuisance, as well as interference with their riparian rights based on their claim 
to title. However, the chambers judge struck out the claims and held that no reasonable cause of 
action exists until Aboriginal title and other Aboriginal rights were proven. On appeal, the 
British Columbia Court of Appeal held that it would be inconsistent with the principle of 
                                                          
94 Haida Nation, supra note 9 at para 25. The Court held that “the potential rights embedded in these claims are 
protected by s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. The honour of the Crown requires that these rights be 
determined, recognized and respected.” 
95 Taku River, supra note 10 at para 25. 
96 Isaac & Knox, supra note 60 at 22. IBA’s differ from project to project, because the impact on the affected 
community are not always the same. However, some basic components of an IBA would include labour provisions, 
economic development provisions, community provisions, environmental provisions, financial and commercial 
provisions. For more, see Ibironke T. Odumosu-Ayanu, “Indigenous Peoples, International Law, and Extractive 
Industry Contracts”, supra note 43. See also, Miningfacts.org, “What are Impact and Benefit Agreements?” online: 
<http://www.miningfacts.org/Communities/What-are-Impact-and-Benefit-Agreements-(IBAs)/>. 
97 Saik’uz First Nation and Stellat’en First Nation v Rio Tinto Alcan Inc., 2015 BCCA 154, [2015] 3CNLR 263. 
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equality under the Charter of Rights and Freedoms to require the Nechako Nation to first obtain 
a court declaration for title, before they can maintain an action against another party.98 
The significance of this case to obtaining prior consent is that following Tsilhqot’in Nation, the 
courts may be more willing to entertain claims to Indigenous title based on the recognition of for 
example, riparian and similar rights. In fact, the respondents advanced the argument that it will 
be “unprecedented to allow unrecognized Aboriginal right to ground a common law claim in 
tort”99 but the court dismissed this argument, again relying on the principles of equality, and held 
that it would be unfair to require Aboriginal rights to be first “recognized” before allowing them 
to advance a claim.100 
It therefore makes good business sense for resource developers to seek the consent of Indigenous 
communities affected by their projects when a title claim has been made. Also, the Saik’uz 
decision echoes the 2014 Report of the former Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous 
peoples, James Anaya. In this report, James Anaya expressed the view that “as a general rule, 
resource extraction should not occur on lands subject to aboriginal claims without adequate 
consultations with, and the free, prior and informed consent of the Indigenous peoples 
concerned.”101 
 
1.2.6. The Need for Indigenous Approval when Contemplating Any Changes 
to Historic Treaties 
Treaty lands are lands where title has been granted to the Crown in exchange for rights over the 
lands, for instance, hunting, trapping and fishing rights. Treaties are solemn agreements that are 
entered into between the Crown and Indigenous peoples and aimed at encouraging peaceful 
                                                          
98 Ibid., at paras 66-68. 
99 Ibid., at para 69 
100 Ibid,. 
101 James Anaya, The Situation of Indigenous Peoples in Canada: Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights of 
Indigenous peoples, submitted to the Human Rights Council, UN document A/HRC/27/52/Add.2, (July 4, 2014) at 
22 online: < http://unsr.jamesanaya.org/docs/countries/2014-report-canada-a-hrc-27-52-add-2-en.pdf>.  
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relations between the parties.102 These relations are described as diplomatic in nature, and the 
treaty negotiation process has a modern form in the context of comprehensive land claims 
agreements.103 Historic treaties were made between 1701 and 1923, and they are located in nine 
provinces and three territories which amount to almost 50% of Canada’s land mass.104 Historic 
treaties are different from modern treaties in that they were mostly negotiated orally while 
modern treaties are more legally sophisticated and detailed. Modern treaties are also different 
from historic treaties because they deal with areas where Aboriginal rights had not previously 
been addressed. Modern treaties105 have been briefly discussed in section 1.2.2 of this thesis.  
The Crown owes a constitutional duty to consult with Indigenous treaty right holders prior to 
infringing on their treaty rights. This duty to consult has been held to exist even when there is a 
“taking up” clause under a treaty, and the Supreme Court decision in Grassy Narrows First 
Nation v Ontario (Minister of Natural Resources)106 confirms that the right of the Crown to take 
up land under Treaty 3 is subject to the duty to consult with the Grassy Narrows First Nations’ 
rights. Further, the Court held that the duty to consult under Treaty 3 is grounded in the honour 
of the Crown.107 As such, if treaty lands are to be taken up for development, the nature of 
consultation required will depend on the strength of the claim of the Indigenous treaty 
signatories. By necessity, consultation could require accommodation of their rights and this 
could be by way of obtaining their approval (and/or consent) before such a project can 
proceed.108 
                                                          
102 R. v Sioui, [1990] 1 SCR 1025 at para 96 & 1044, [1990] 3 CNLR. 12, 70 DLR (4th) 42. See also, Indigenous and 
Northern Affairs Canada “Treaties with Aboriginal People in Canada” online: <http://www.aadnc-
aandc.gc.ca/eng/1100100032291/1100100032292>.      
103 Ibid., 
104 Ibid., Altogether, there are 70 recognized historic treaties namely, the Douglas Treaties (14); the Numbered 
Treaties (11); the Robinson Treaties (2); the Williams Treaties (2); the Upper Canada Land Surrenders (30); the 
Peace and Neutrality Treaties (3); and the Maritime Peace and Friendship Treaties (8). 
105 Ibid., 
106 Grassy Narrows First Nation v. Ontario (Minister of Natural Resources) 2014 SCC 48, [2014] 2 SCR 447, 372 DLR. 
(4th) 385. 
107 Ibid., at para 51. 
108 Mikisew Cree 2005, supra note 11 at para 54, where the court held that “consultation that excludes from the 




1.3. Proposed Legal Standard, (Consistent with International Standards) for 
Consent in Canada 
1.3.1. Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) in Canada  
This research proposes FPIC as the proposed legal standard for consent in resource development 
in Canada and this will be discussed in detail under chapter three and four of this research work. 
Endorsed in 2010,109 Canadian courts have been quite reluctant to embrace the full provisions of 
UNDRIP.110 As such, some writers have come to believe that FPIC is a mere aspirational 
concept.111 However, this research will show that where liberally and judiciously interpreted, it 
will be safe to conclude that the protections that section 35 of the Constitution affords 
Indigenous peoples can achieve the entrenchment of FPIC in Canadian laws.112  
Some of the obstacles to domesticizing UNDRIP is that it appears to give too much prerogative 
power to Indigenous people as the requirement of FPIC appears too stringent. Further, FPIC 
removes some of the Crown’s ability to infringe on Indigenous treaty rights, except in justifiable 
circumstances, while at the same time it places Indigenous peoples in a position that allows them 
to withhold their consent to resource developments on their lands.113 This is because the doctrine 
of FPIC dictates that consent of Indigenous people must be sought and obtained. In essence, the 
Crown’s duty to consult would translate to a duty to consult and to obtain Indigenous community 
approval in the form of consent.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
be with the aim of accommodating their interests, where necessary. Again, this could be by way of obtaining their 
consent to proceed with the project at hand. 
109 Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada, “Canada’s Statement of Support on the United Nations Declaration on 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples”, online: <http://www.aadncaandc.gc.ca/eng/1309374239861/1309374546142>.  
110 Dwight Newman, Revisiting the Duty to Consult Aboriginal Peoples, supra note 5 at 146, where in discussing the 
effect of international law on Canadian domestic law, the author states that “it is highly unusual for parties to 
attempt to make arguments based on customary international law, partly because of the difficulties of proving its 
contents and partly because Canadian courts are simply not used to those arguments.”  
111 Coates and Favel, supra note 6 at 14. 
112 For a fuller understanding of each word in the FPIC acronym, see Ginger Gibson MacDonald and Gaby Zezulka, 
“Understanding Successful Approaches to Free, Prior, and Informed Consent in Canada. Part 1: Recent 
Developments and Effective Roles for Government, Industry, and Indigenous Communities” (September 2015:  
Boreal Leadership Council) at 8, [MacDonald]. 
113 Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra note 3, at 92. 
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In reality, Canadian jurisprudence is moving towards the subtle adoption of FPIC, especially 
when title to land has been declared, as can be seen in the case of Tsilhqot’in Nation. Also, 
Indigenous groups and organizations are beginning to promote FPIC principles through Band 
Council Resolutions and land use planning laws and policies.114 However, more work needs to 
be done to ensure that the FPIC provisions under UNDRIP are adopted in Canada as the standard 
for obtaining consent, as opposed to stopping at the current legal requirement of consultations. In 
order to bring Canada up to speed with international requirement articulated under UNDRIP, 
Canada needs to set as a goal in consultation, the need to obtain Indigenous consent. Otherwise, 
any opposition to such major projects by Indigenous right and title-holders should be considered 
as a “No” to the project. 
The implication of avoiding the existence of FPIC in Canadian natural resource industry can be 
costly to the government, project proponents and even affected Indigenous communities.115 
Likewise, the continued stance of the courts that the current law on the duty to consult does not 
give a “veto over what can be done with land pending final proof of a claim”116 is bound to 
remain a thorny issue that stands between resource developers and Indigenous communities. It is 
suggested that resource developers should heed the hint aptly provided by the Supreme Court of 
Canada in the Tsilhqot’in Nation case. The court held that “governments and individuals 
proposing to use or exploit land, whether before or after a declaration of Aboriginal title, can 
avoid a charge of infringement or failure to adequately consult by obtaining the consent of the 
interested Indigenous group.”117 
 
 
                                                          
114 Tsleil-Waututh Nation, Treaty, Lands and Resources Department, “Assessment of the Trans Mountain Pipeline 
and Tanker Expansion Proposal” online: <https://twnsacredtrust.ca/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/TWN-
Assessment-Summary-11x17.pdf>.  The Tsleil-Waututh Nations have successfully implemented laws to be used in 
conducting environmental assessments on projects. This was successfully utilised in the case of the Kinder Morgan 
Trans Mountain Pipeline Expansion Project.   
115 Jamieson, supra note 39 at 56. 
116 Long Plain First Nation v Canada (Attorney General), 2012 FC 1474 at para 68. 




All over Canada, there is the continued demand for the recognition of Indigenous and treaty 
rights as recognized under international law. The duty to consult and accommodate as 
established in Haida Nation has been the spotlight for this new stage where Indigenous people 
require that their consent be sought and obtained prior to dealings on the lands.  Realistically, not 
every consultation process will lead to Indigenous consent to a proposed project; hence, 
government may have to exercise its override powers under Sparrow. Such instance was 
recognized by the Court in the Tzeachten First Nation case where it was held that “at some point 
government decisions will have to be made.”118  
It is proposed that the ultimate solution to achieving stability in resource development is to seek 
and obtain the free, prior and informed consent of the affected Indigenous communities to any 
large scale project that is likely to impact them. Also, government and third parties should be 
alert and alive to the needs of the community where a project is proposed to be built. Indigenous 
peoples want to decide how their lands would be used to generate wealth, and they want to 
participate in the enjoyment of the fruits their lands yield. Some of the land disputes attached to 
resource development are mainly peripheral to other issues that run deeper than those raised in 
most land claims disputes. It is suggested that, perhaps, if those other issues such as early 
involvement in consultation processes, resource revenue sharing and poverty alleviation 
measures are identified and addressed, it may be easier to obtain consent to resource 






                                                          





2. Aboriginal Title in Canada 
Defined in its simplest form, Aboriginal title is “a right to the land itself.”119 It allows Indigenous 
peoples an uninterrupted use and control of their lands. As a constitutional right, incursions 
would only be permitted if Indigenous consent is first sought and obtained. Failure to obtain 
Indigenous consent to the use of Aboriginal land could result in projects being cancelled or 
suspended, unless it is justified by a compelling and substantial public purpose in line with the 
Crown’s fiduciary obligations to the Aboriginal peoples of Canada.120 This chapter will examine 
Aboriginal title in detail since this research discusses consent as it relates to Aboriginal title 
lands. 
Indigenous peoples’ cultural beliefs are highly centred on, and connected to their lands and its 
components. They have names which reflect this connection and they consider themselves to be 
stewards of their land, and stewardship entails an ethical obligation to protect, manage and 
preserve resources on behalf of others. This ethical obligation explains the personal attachment 
that Indigenous people feel towards their traditional lands and the cultural strings that pull the 
connection even closer. However, the inherent limitations121 over the use of title lands threatens 
this connection by dictating to title-holding communities, how their culture should evolve in 
order to retain a right to Aboriginal title, and what manner of use they may consent to or refuse 
to give their consent.122 According to Dwight Newman, the uncertainties associated with the 
                                                          
119 Delgamuukw, supra note 16 at para 140. 
120 Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra note 3 at para 2. 
121 Ibid., at 74. The inherent limitation discussed here means that Aboriginal land “cannot be alienated except to 
the Crown or encumbered in ways that would prevent future generations of the group from using and enjoying it.” 
122 One of the ways in which Aboriginal title is different from a fee simple is that it has an internal limit, namely, 
that it cannot be used in a manner that will prevent future generations of the use of the land, (Delgamuukw, supra 
note 16 at para 124 and 154). Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra note 3 at para 94. See, also Kent McNeil, Defining 
Aboriginal Title in the 90’s: Has the Supreme Court Finally Got It Right? Presented at the Annual Robarts Lecture: 
12th at York University (March 25, 1998) at 12. The writer said that the inherent limits of Aboriginal title is 
consistent with the responsibilities they have over their lands. He concludes at pages 12-14 that self-government is 
the solution to the inherent limitation problem that was placed on Aboriginal title in Delgamuukw, and that 
Indigenous peoples should be allowed to determine for themselves how they wish to preserve their culture.  
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scope of Aboriginal title could add more layers of uncertainties to third parties as well as, 
Aboriginal communities lacking the understanding of what they can do with their own land.123 
It is easy to mistake Aboriginal title for fee simple title.124 However, they are different in several 
ways. For instance, proprietary rights entail the right to permit interference on the good 
enjoyment and use of land, as well as, the right to exclude third parties from the land. However, 
for Indigenous peoples of Canada, their proprietary right is further entrenched in the constitution, 
and this makes it paramount above any provincial or federal laws.125 This constitutional 
protection reflects the legal reasoning behind the obligation of Indigenous peoples to protect 
their lands for future generations. However, despite the constitutional protection of Aboriginal 
title, Indigenous peoples of Canada have had to litigate their rights to consent to use of land on 
their traditional territories. In the process, they have been subjected to tremendous hardship at the 
hands of third parties, including the government. Their plight through the decades was 
summarized by Peter H. Russell, when he describes Indigenous people as “the group of people 
living in a fourth world, under third world conditions but within first world countries.”126 
This chapter explores the origin, nature and content of Aboriginal title in Canada before and after 
the Tsilhqot’in Nation decision, and this will set the stage for a broader discussion of the 
implication of this decision on Aboriginal title and resource development in chapter four. Despite 
the abundance of jurisprudence recognizing Aboriginal title as well as the provision of section 
35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, Canada continues to resist Indigenous peoples’ claim to title 
because of the fear that it confers ownership to Aboriginal title holders, often described as veto 
                                                          
123 Dwight Newman, “The Economic Characteristics of Indigenous Property Rights: A Canadian Case Study” (2016) 
Nebraska Law Review, Vol. 95. No 2 at 461. 
124 Fee Simple was described by Oosterhoff and Rayner as "the largest estate or interest known in law and is the 
most absolute in terms of the rights which it confers. It permits the owner to exercise every conceivable act of 
Ownership upon it or with respect to it. A.H. Oosterhoff & W.B. Rayner, eds., Anger and Honsberger Law of Real 
Property, 2d ed. (Aurora: Canada Law Book, 1985) at 98-99. 
125 Like most rights, Aboriginal rights is not absolute. These rights may be infringed if justifiable reasons are given 
by the government as laid out in the Sparrow test for infringement. For instance, federal regulations and public 
interest, and valid legislative purposes may be reasons to infringe on Aboriginal rights if the government is unable 
to find an alternative measure for protection. 
126 Peter H. Russell, The Mabo Case and Indigenous Resistance to English-Settler Colonialism, (University of Toronto 
Press: 2005) at 17. 
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power.127 Initially, it was argued that the Crown’s obligations toward Indigenous people were of 
a political character,128 and this allowed the Crown to shirk its fiduciary role for several decades. 
However, it is widely believed that the Calder decision propelled the government into 
acknowledging Aboriginal rights and title enough to seek negotiation and consultation talks 
concerning developments on their lands.129 
 
2.1 Origin of Aboriginal Title 
Aboriginal title generally, can be traced to several sources. Firstly, it is recognized and affirmed 
by section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982. This constitutional protection sets it apart from 
other proprietary interests in land. Section 35(1) provides that “[t]he existing aboriginal and 
treaty rights of aboriginal peoples of Canada are hereby recognized and affirmed.” Therefore, it 
is important to note that the rights protected by this section are those rights that were in existence 
as of 1982 since it does not create or protect newly discovered rights.130 
Prior to its affirmation under the Constitution, Aboriginal title was simply recognized as a right 
in land afforded to Aboriginal peoples of Canada. This was recognized by the Supreme Court in 
Calder when it held that prior to the arrival of European settlers, Indigenous peoples inhabited 
Canada, and they were organized in societies and occupied the land as their ancestors had done 
                                                          
127 Haida Nation, supra note 9 at paras 48-9, the Court held that even where an Aboriginal right or title has been 
established, it does not confer a veto power on the title holders, rather, what is expected is that the Crown 
balances all interests in a “give and take” manner through a process of accommodating Aboriginal interests in good 
faith. For more, see, Shin Imai, “Consult, Consent and Veto: International Norms and Canadian Treaties (Draft 
Chapter), (2016) Osgoode Legal Studies Research Paper No. 23 Vol. 12/Issue. 5/ at 12-3, online: 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=2726091>.  
128 R v Sparrow, supra note 35 at para 2. 
129 In 1973, Canada issued a statement (the “1973 Claims Policy”), later followed by another claims policy issued in 
1981, inviting First Nations that were pressed by demands for natural resources on their traditional territories to 
present their claims for quick and effective settlement so that development could offer them better lifestyles of 
their choice.  Since then, government of Canada has signed 26 comprehensive land claims agreement (“LCA”), and 
there are currently about 100 LCA being negotiated all through the country. See, Indigenous and Northern Affairs 
Canada, “Comprehensive Claims” online: <https://www.aadncaandc.gc.ca/eng/1100100030577/1100100030578>.  
See also, Taku River Tlingit First Nation v Canada, (2016) YKSC 7, [2016] DLR (4th) 340 at 7-9. 
130 Ibid., at 133; see also, R v Sparrow, supra note 35. 
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for centuries.131 This reasoning appears logical and has been accepted as the correct source of 
Aboriginal title by the courts, while other theories such as the doctrine of terra nullius has been 
rejected as inapplicable to Canada.132 In Delgamuukw, the Court stated that Aboriginal title “is 
based on the continued occupation and use of the land as part of the aboriginal peoples' 
traditional way of life.”133  
Further, Aboriginal title has also been traced to the Royal Proclamation of 1763. In St. 
Catharines Milling & Lumber Co. v. R,134 the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council traced the 
origin of Aboriginal title to the Royal Proclamation and held that Aboriginal possession “can 
only be ascribed to the general provisions of the Proclamation.”135  
 
2.1.1. Nature and Content of Aboriginal Title 
Aboriginal title is a distinct category of Aboriginal right that crystalized at the time that the 
Crown asserted sovereignty over Canada.136 This cut-off date was arrived at because it is easier 
to determine the date of assertion than the time of first contact with Aboriginal people.137 
Generally, the underlying assumption is that the Crown holds a “pure legal estate, to which 
beneficial rights may or may not be attached.”138  
Before the Supreme Court of Canada decision in Calder, Canadian governments refused to 
acknowledge the existence of Aboriginal title, while the Court hesitated in giving proper 
                                                          
131 Calder v. Attorney General of British Columbia, [1973] SCR 313; 34 DLR (3d) 145 at para 26 [Calder]. 
132 Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra note 3 at para 69. 
133 Delgamuukw supra note 16 at para 190. 
134 St. Catharines Milling & Lumber Co. v R. (1889) L.R.14 App. Cas, 46. 
135 Ibid., at 7. See also, Calder, supra note 131 at para 12. 
136 Ibid., at 2. 
137 Ibid., at 145. For further discussion on the threshold date, see Brian Slattery, “Some Thoughts on Aboriginal 
Title”, (1999) 48 U.N.B.L.J. 19 at 26. According to Slattery, the explanation for the “threshold date” is “ambiguous” 
because it is unclear whether it is the date when Crown first asserted sovereignty or rather, the date when it 
actually acquired sovereignty. Depending on how this is construed, the threshold date could be centuries apart 
because the date that Crown actually acquired sovereignty could be long after the date that it first asserted it. 
138 Amodu Tijani v. Secretary of Southern Nigeria, [1921] 2 A.C. 399 at pp 402-4. 
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definition to the content of Aboriginal title in Canada.139 The definition of Aboriginal title by the 
judicial committee of the Privy Council in St. Catharines Milling & Lumber Co. v R. as “a 
personal and usufructuary right” to land140 did not help in understanding the nature of Aboriginal 
title.  
When Calder was decided in 1973, it officially established that Aboriginal title existed, and it 
gave Indigenous peoples the legal standing to go before the courts and claim title to particular 
lands.141 Calder did not grant title to the Nisga’a claimants; rather, the SCC decided that “once 
Aboriginal title is established, it is presumed to continue until the contrary is proven.”142 This 
decision is also very significant because in 1973, the federal government introduced a new 
comprehensive claims policy, thereby heralding the first modern comprehensive land claim 
agreement in Canada, namely, the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement of 1975. 
This decision was followed by Guerin v The Queen which contextualized Aboriginal title within 
two aspects: its inalienable nature and the Crown’s fiduciary obligations to Indigenous peoples 
where land has been surrendered.143 This sui generis nature of Aboriginal title means that it 
cannot be sold or transferred to third parties; rather, it must first be surrendered to the Crown.144 
In Guerin, the Court suggested that the reasoning behind the principle of inalienability can be 
traced to the common law principle that settlers in colonies must derive their title from the 
                                                          
139 For further discussion on the development of the content of Aboriginal title in Canada, see Kent McNeil, 
Defining Aboriginal Title in the 90’s, supra note 122 at 9. 
140 St. Catharines, supra note 134 at para 54 
141 Sparrow, supra note 35 at para 51. The Court stated that Calder decision made the federal government Issue “a 
statement of policy” regarding Indian lands. The federal government’s decision had the effect of acknowledging 
the existence of Aboriginal title that they had denied for decades past. In fact, the statement showed the 
government’s willingness to negotiate treaties with Aboriginal leaders whereby compensation was offered to 
Aboriginal peoples where they can show that they had traditional interests in lands. 
142 Calder, supra note 131 at para 316. 
143 Guerin v The Queen, (1984) 2 SCR 335 at 382. 
144 Ibid., at 112. See, also para 81, where the Supreme Court traced the source of the fiduciary relationship that 
exist between the Crown and Indigenous people to the Royal Proclamation of 1763, and held that it means that 
they must first surrender their lands to the Crown first before they can transfer it to third parties. 
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Crown and not from Indigenous inhabitants of the land. Another reason is to protect Indigenous 
peoples from being disposed of the lands by fraudulent purchasers.145 
The decision in Delgamuukw brought legal precision as well as a clearer perspective to what 
Aboriginal title meant and how it can be proved. The SCC, while dismissing the argument that it 
was similar to a fee simple estate, acknowledged that Aboriginal title is not limited to the right to 
engage in specific activities on land; rather, it is a distinct legal entitlement that allows the title-
holding community the ability to use land for varied purposes that is not limited to their 
practices, customs or traditions.146 However, the SCC issued some restrictions on the use that 
Aboriginal title lands can be put to. One is that Aboriginal lands must not be used in a manner 
that makes it irreconcilable with the nature of the particular Aboriginal groups’ culture. An 
analogy was drawn between this principle and the concept of equitable waste at common law. 
Simply described, equitable waste is an act of wanton or extravagant destruction that should not 
be committed on the land.147  
After Delgamuukw, no other case has had a more resounding effect on Aboriginal title as the 
Supreme Court decision in Tsilhqot’in Nation. For the first time in Canadian history, the Court 
granted a declaration of Aboriginal title in land. Together with the decision in Calder, the 
Delgamuukw decision has informed several changes in existing government policies on 
consultation when dealing with Aboriginal title lands on the part of Indigenous peoples. In fact, 
it has been considered as “a victory for all First Nations.”148  
In the Tsilhqot’in Nation case, the Supreme Court confirmed most of its decision in Delgamuukw 
and stated that Aboriginal title flows from the sufficient, exclusive and continuous use of land by 
Indigenous claimants prior to the assertion of European sovereignty. However, the Court also 
provided more clarification to the meaning of “continuity” within this context and held that for 
                                                          
145 Delgamuukw, supra note 16 at 129. In Guerin v R., supra note 143 at 96, the Court further held that the reason 
why land must first be surrendered to the Crown serves the purpose of interposing the Crown between Indigenous 
peoples, and therefore, protect them from exploitation from prospective purchasers. 
146 Delgamuukw, supra note 16 at 111 & 117. 
147 Ibid., at 130. 
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Aboriginal title claimant to prove continuity, they need only show that the present occupation is 
grounded in pre-sovereign occupation.149 
Further, Aboriginal title-holders have full discretion about the use and benefits of their land but 
they cannot use it in a manner that would deprive future generations of the benefit of the land. 
Most importantly, the consent of Indigenous title-holders is mandated before an incursion on 
their land would be permitted under the Sparrow test.150 
 
2.1.2. Test for Aboriginal Title 
In Canada, the court is required to take both common law and Aboriginal law perspectives in 
proof of title. This means that if, for instance, there is the need to prove occupation, the court is 
required to take the physical fact of occupation in common law, as well as prove that the 
Aboriginal group(s) have also occupied the land in dispute pre-sovereignty.151 
The test for the proof of Aboriginal title was laid down in Delgamuukw and reaffirmed in 
Tsilhqot’in Nation.152  The Court in Tsilhqot’in Nation, however, stated that there is a need to 
exercise caution prior to applying this test in order not to “distort Aboriginal perspective by 
forcing ancestral practices into the square boxes of common law concepts.”153 Therefore, in 
order for an Aboriginal group to prove title to land, the following is required: 
                                                          
149 Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra note 3 at paras 25 & 47. 
150 Ibid., at para 74. 
151 Delgamuukw, supra note 16 at 147. 
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proof of occupation but unable to accurately delineate its boundaries, recognition should be given to title alone, 
and boundary demarcations should be negotiated between the group and the government.  
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i. The land must have been occupied prior to sovereignty; 
ii. Continuity of occupation between present and pre-sovereign occupation, if present 
occupation is relied on as proof of pre-sovereignty; and  
iii. Occupation must have been exclusive at sovereignty.154  
 
 
I. Sufficient Pre-Sovereign Occupation 
One distinguishing factor between Aboriginal title and a fee simple is that Aboriginal groups 
must prove that they occupied the land prior to the arrival of the Europeans and the assertion of 
sovereignty by the Crown. The court held that Aboriginal practices, customs or traditions that 
developed as a result of contacts with the Europeans do not meet the standard for recognition of 
rights necessary in determining pre-sovereignty contact and thus, occupation.155 Another 
difference between Aboriginal title and fee simple is that while the province has the fee simple 
jurisdiction, Aboriginal title confers jurisdiction as to how the land will be used. 
To establish occupation, the court will consider common law and Aboriginal perspectives 
because Aboriginal litigants need to show that its group recognizes the title claimed, as well as 
show that they possessed and physically occupied the land.156 In order to show that a group 
sufficiently occupied the land claimed, there must be physical evidence of occupation, such as 
regular use of the land claimed. The Aboriginal group must also chronicle its past use of the land 
in a manner that shows that they made it known to third parties that they used the land as their 
own.157 However, lack of physical evidence alone is not enough for a decision-maker to conclude 
that sufficient occupation is not proved.  
In Tsilhqot’in Nation, the Court stated that Aboriginal occupation of land need not be site-
specific where the land is a large expanse of territory not yet cultivated; rather, territorial 
occupation of land proved by acts of occupation such as fishing, hunting and gathering is enough 
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to show occupation of that land.158 However, a claim to title must evidence a “strong presence on 
or over the land claimed, manifesting itself in acts of occupation that could reasonably be 
interpreted as demonstrating that the land in question belonged to, was controlled by, or under 
the exclusive stewardship of the claimant group.”159 In essence, there is the need to consider 
several other factors such as manner of life of the claimants and the nature of land. 
II. Continuous Occupation 
In Delgamuukw, the Court acknowledged that it could be difficult for Aboriginal title litigants to 
provide proof of pre-contact occupation of land claimed before the Crown asserted sovereignty. 
Also, this test does not require litigants to show an “unbroken chain of continuity” between their 
present and pre-sovereignty customs and practices.160 In order to show continued occupation, it 
is sufficient if they can show evidence that they are presently occupying the land as proof that 
they had also occupied it before sovereignty.161 In recognizing that injustice might be 
perpetuated if strict proof of occupation is required, the Court further held that it is possible that 
there could be a variation between pre-sovereignty occupation and present occupation.162 
 
III. Exclusive Occupation at Sovereignty  
Exclusivity is a common law principle in proving title, and as such, Aboriginal perspectives 
should also be considered when proof of exclusive use of land is required163 because exclusivity 
at common law differs from exclusive use of land within different Aboriginal communities. 
According to the Court in Tsilhqot’in Nation, common law perspective requires a consideration 
of possession and control while under Aboriginal test for exclusive use of land; one must take 
into consideration “the groups’ size, manner of life, material resources and technological 
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abilities, and the character of the lands claimed.”164 They must also show that they had the 
intention and numbered capacity to retain exclusive control of the lands in dispute.165 The Court 
in Tsilhqot’in Nation further stated that “there must be evidence of a strong presence on or over 
the land claimed, manifesting itself in acts of occupation that could reasonably be interpreted as 
demonstrating that the land in question belonged to, was controlled by, or was under the 
exclusive stewardship of the claimant group.”166 
Further, per Kent McNeil, a consideration of local conditions by the Court is a way of showing 
that one occupation depends on broader principles such as the underlying relationship of 
Aboriginal groups and their lands.167 Under Aboriginal law, it is possible that an Aboriginal 
group could show exclusive use of land by showing that they consented to other groups’ use of 
their land as this would show control.168 
 
2.1.3. Infringement of Aboriginal Title 
Although protected under section 35(1) of the Constitution, Aboriginal title is not an absolute 
right; therefore, it is subject to infringement by the Crown if justified under the Sparrow test. 
This test was confirmed in Delgamuukw, and slightly modified in the Tsilhqot’in Nation case 
where the Court stated that to justify an infringement of Aboriginal title, the government must 
show that: 
1. It discharged its procedural duty to consult and accommodate;  
2. Its actions were backed by a compelling and substantial objective; and  
3. The governmental action is consistent with the Crown’s fiduciary obligation to the 
group.169 
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In assessing whether the infringement is consistent with the Crown’s fiduciary obligation, the 
following will be taken into consideration: 
a) Whether the process of resource allocation reflects the prior interest of Aboriginal title 
claimants; 
b) Whether there has been as little infringement as possible; 
c) Whether compensation was paid to the Aboriginal groups affected; and 
d) Whether the Aboriginal group were consulted.170 
Relevant to the discussion of how an Aboriginal right will be justifiably infringed is the issue of 
which arm of government has the jurisdiction to infringe an Aboriginal right or title. Although 
the lands disputed in Grassy Narrows First Nation v Ontario (Minister of Natural Resources), 
was in relations to treaty 3 lands, the Court having determined that Ontario had the power to take 
up lands in relation to matters that fall under sections 109, 92(a), and 92(c) of the Constitution 
Act, 1867, stated that the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity does not preclude provinces 
from infringing treaty rights as long as it meets the justified infringement test laid down in 
Sparrow. This means that irrespective of which arm of government is contemplating an 
infringement of Aboriginal lands or treaty lands, the honour of the Crown is invoked and the 
Sparrow test would be applicable. To better appreciate the role of the Crown as a fiduciary 
towards Indigenous people, it would be useful to delve briefly into a discussion of the Crown-
Aboriginal relationship in Canada, as well as, the constitutional mandate or duty to consult with 
Aboriginal peoples prior to a contemplated infringement of right or title. 
 
 
2.2. Aboriginal Title after Tsilhqot’in Nation, and the Role of Consent in 
Reconciliation  
Since the decision in Tsilhqot’in Nation, it has become inescapably necessary for adequate 
provisions to be made to usher in a new era of seeking and obtaining Aboriginal consent prior to 
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a Crown-contemplated action on Aboriginal title.  In Taku River, the Court stated that while 
waiting for settlement to occur, the honour of the Crown requires a just balancing of societal and 
Aboriginal interest, which in turn, facilitates reconciliation of Aboriginal and Crown 
sovereignty.171 As a means of reconciling Crown-Aboriginal sovereignties, consultation is likely 
to fail where even after engaging in good faith consultations, both parties fail to reach a 
consensus.172 Also, a strait-jacket approach to consultation is bound to fail to address the current 
legal regime heralded by Tsilhqot’in Nation decision largely because it is impossible for the law 
to make provisions for all cases due to the diversity within Aboriginal groups and communities.  
Although consultation ensures fair dealings with Aboriginal people and allows the Crown to 
fulfil its fiduciary duty, consultation is not designed to mandate that consent must be the 
outcome. According to the Court in Haida Nation, consultation allows the Crown to adjust its 
policies by accommodating Aboriginal interest.173 It was not designed as a medium through 
which Indigenous people could come to the negotiating table with the goal of dictating the 
outcome of a process by use of a veto power. For this reason alone, it is argued that consultation 
fails to address the substantive issues of consent requirement raised by Aboriginal groups in 
relations to a claimed territory.174 Indeed, what is now required is an adoption of the FPIC 
provisions or enactment of domestic laws, that will guide the Crown when dealing with 
Aboriginal title lands.  Until the place of consent is fully honoured in Crown dealings on 
Aboriginal title, the issue of sufficiency or lack of consultation will continue to come before the 
courts for adjudication.  
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UNDRIP provides a platform in which Canadian domestic laws can ensure that its existing 
consultation regimes are consistent with emerging international legal standards on consent in 
relation to Aboriginal title lands. UNDRIP’s concept for consent namely, FPIC, is clear 
regarding state obligations in dealing with Indigenous traditional territories.  
FPIC is described as the voluntarily given consent (absent of coercion, intimidation or 
manipulation) of an Indigenous community to a proposed project whereby information regarding 
the nature of the project is provided in advance to the collective decision makers of the right-
holding members of the affected community. In essence, it requires the government to seek 
Indigenous people’s consent prior to commencement of any projects affecting their lands.175  
In Dene Tha ’First Nation v Canada (Minister of Environment),176  the Court held that 
“[c]onsultation is not consultation absent the intent to consult.”177 If the Canadian government is 
serious about fulfilling reconciliatory objectives of section 35, consultation should begin with the 
outlook that an agreement is sought to be reached. Where there is a strong claim to title, reaching 
consensus should be the objective of negotiating parties from the outset. It will be a meaningless 
effort when parties have a mandate to obtain Indigenous consent only to have a mind-set of 
consultation from the outset. Where title has been declared, consultation alone will not suffice. 
What is required is the consent of Aboriginal title holders because they have the legal right to use 
and possess the land in a manner consistent with their rights. The Crown may only override this 
right upon satisfying that there is a compelling and substantial public purpose and, that it is 
consistent with its fiduciary obligations to Indigenous peoples.178 
Existing jurisprudence on consultation processes nation-wide continues to evolve throughout the 
courts similar to how the constitutional dialogue relationship operates between the Supreme 
Court and legislative bodies. The constitutional dialogue relationship between the court and 
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legislative bodies described here reflects how the government responds to decisions emanating 
from the courts. For example, when the Supreme Court struck down existing jurisprudence on 
Aboriginal title and confirmed the existence of Aboriginal title in Calder, federal and provincial 
governments responded by inviting Aboriginal title claimants to treaty-negotiating tables. Also, 
in Tsilhqot’in Nation, the government responded by showing more commitment to some of the 
provisions of UNDRIP. The law is still evolving regarding how UNDRIP provisions will be 
domesticized as this may involve an overhaul to existing consultation laws.179  
Often, when a pronouncement is made regarding insufficiency or lack of consultation by the 
Crown, consultation policies are amended to ensure that it is consistent with case law. The 
implication of Tsilhqot’in Nation decision to Canadian consultation regime is that it shows the 
shortcomings of existing consultation regimes and Indigenous peoples’ demand for their right to 
give consent to developments was significantly renewed. It also categorically spells out the 
extent of legal issues that could arise where after the Crown has justifiably infringed on a title 
land, an Aboriginal group becomes successful in proving title to land. According to the Court, 
once title is established, the Crown may be required to review its previous decisions and this may 
lead to cancellation and delays of projects.180 
 
2.2.1. Extinguishment of Aboriginal Title 
Prior to 1982, the provinces of Canada had no jurisdiction to extinguish Aboriginal title due to 
the provisions of section 91 of the Constitution Act, 1867, which confers matters arising from 
Indians, and lands reserved for the Indians unto the exclusive legislative authority of the 
Parliament.181 Although provincial laws of general application applied to Indigenous, and lands 
                                                          
179 Peter W. Hogg and Allison A. Bushell, “The Charter Dialogue between Courts and Legislatures (Or Perhaps, the 
Charter of Rights Isn’t Such a Bad Thing after All)” Osgoode Hall Law Journal 35.1 (1997) 75-124 at 79-81, online: 
<http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj/vol35/iss1/2>. 
180 Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra note 3 at para 92. 
181 Section 91(24) of the Constitution Act, (1867) 30 & 31 Victoria, c 3 (U.K); see also Delgamuukw, supra note 16 at 
174-8, where the Court made reference to the judgement of Lord Watson in St. Catharine’s Milling case and held 
that the implication of section 91(24) is also to leave the exclusive jurisdiction to extinguish Aboriginal title and 
reserve lands on the federal government. 
44 
 
reserved for Indigenous peoples, provincial laws could not extinguish Aboriginal rights.182 Also, 
before 1982, the only means of extinguishing Aboriginal title was by voluntary surrender or by a 
unilateral legislation.183 However, since 1982, the only means of extinguishing Aboriginal title is 
by surrender to the Crown through a treaty or land claims agreement, and by the infringement 
test laid down in Sparrow. In the absence of a voluntary surrender or a justified infringement by 
the Crown, the Crown cannot extinguish an Aboriginal right or title. 
In terms of proof, the burden of proof of Aboriginal title shifts from one party to another 
depending on the issue claimed. Where there is a claim of title, the burden rests on the party 
asserting title, which is often an Indigenous group. Once established, the onus of proof that an 
Aboriginal title has been extinguished shifts to the party opposing its existence.184 According to 
the Privy Council decision of Amodu Tijani, a party claiming that Aboriginal title has been 
extinguished must make it “clear and plain,” failing which it is presumed to still exist.185  
 
2.3. Conclusion 
In addition to the meaning, nature and contents of Aboriginal title, this chapter has traced the 
historical background and evolution of Aboriginal title in Canada. It also recounts the 
jurisprudential developments that culminate into the current understanding of Indigenous title, 
including the legal test to establish the title. The extenuating circumstances where infringement 
of Aboriginal title is justifiable as well as events that constitute extinguishment of the title were 
also discussed. These, all together, set the stage for our next discussion on the duty to consult and 
the role of Indigenous consent in resource development in chapters three and four. 
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In essence, the requirement that both Aboriginal and common law perspective must be 
considered in proof of title informs the interpretation of section 35 and the reconciliation goal of 
Canada. However, if reconciliation is to be achieved, it is argued that a keen consideration of 
Aboriginal perspectives should be the focus through which the government should direct its 
policies when a major development is contemplated on Indigenous territories.  Undoubtedly, 
consultation is an excellent process that has served in building Crown-Aboriginal relationships. 
However, obtaining the approval of Aboriginal title claimants by way of consent is a more 






















3. The Duty to Consult, and where Necessary, Accommodate on Claimed 
Title Lands 
Section 35(1) of the Constitution, as well as the decision in Guerin opened a new legal topic of 
national importance between the existing relationship between the Crown and Indigenous 
peoples. Prior to the SCC decision in Guerin, the Courts had generally characterized the 
relationship between the Crown and Indigenous peoples as a “political trust” or “trust in the 
higher sense.”186  However, in Guerin, the Court stated that the Crown’s obligation towards 
Indigenous people is unique or sui generis, but fiduciary in nature, and a breach of this duty is 
akin to a breach of trust relationship.187 
Because of the sacred and political nature of the relationship, and the dual role that the Crown 
occupies between Indigenous and non-Indigenous Canadians,188 this right and correlative duty is 
fully protected under section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, case law, and by other federal and 
provincial instruments. As a result of the Crown’s fiduciary role, the honour of the Crown is 
always at stake when dealing with Indigenous people. The doctrine of duty to consult therefore 
arises from the Crown’s legal obligation to deal honourably with Indigenous people, and where 
necessary, accommodate their interests.189 
For all levels of government to fully understand Indigenous concerns over proposed project 
developments on their traditional territories, they must fully engage in consultation with the title 
claimants, and where necessary, accommodate their interests. This means that the Crown must 
understand its consultation obligations to fully discharge it legal duties. When the duty to consult 
was first espoused in Sparrow, the Court was primarily concerned with laying out the conditions 
upon which the Crown could violate an Aboriginal or treaty right. However, the duty to consult 
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has fully evolved. For example, in Tsilhqot’in Nation, the Crown is now mandated to consider its 
duty to consult with Indigenous title-holders when justifying an infringement. 
The source of the modern duty to consult is grounded in the honour of the Crown, and according 
to the Court in R v Badger,190 “the honour of the Crown is always at stake in its dealing with 
Indian people.”191 Other recognized sources are the Royal Proclamation of 1763, and the 
reconciliation objective of Canada’s history with Aboriginal peoples.192 Appearing first in 
Sparrow, the Court recognized the government’s duty to consult with Indigenous peoples while 
justifying an infringement of a section 35 right. It was later traced and expanded in Delgamuukw, 
stating that the purpose of the duty to consult is the reconciliation of Crown-Indigenous 
societies.193 It was in the 2004/2005 trilogy decisions in Haida Nation; Taku River; and Mikisew 
Cree, that the duty to consult doctrine was fully fleshed out. 
 
3.1. Jurisprudential Analysis of the Duty to Consult 
The decision in Haida Nation is perhaps, the most instructive when it comes to understanding the 
depth and breadth of the Crown’s duty to consult, and where appropriate, accommodate 
Indigenous peoples. To summarize the facts of the case, the Haida people of Haida Gwaii in 
British Columbia brought legal action against the Province for approving the transfer of Tree 
Farm Licences (TFL) to Weyerhaeuser Company Limited (“Weyerhaeuser”) in 1999 without 
their consent. The main issue the Court was called to decide was whether or not the government 
was required to consult with the Haida claimants prior to making the decision to harvest the 
forests; and to accommodate their concerns prior to proof of title to Haida Gwaii lands.194 
In Haida Nation, the Court made several crucial delineations on the duty to consult doctrine 
which in turn has set the stage for consultation standards for both federal and provincial 
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government. Firstly, the Court held that the government of British Columbia had a legal duty to 
consult with the Haida people regarding its decisions to harvest the forests as well as to transfer 
the TFL. According to the Court, as a result of engaging in “good-faith” consultation, the need to 
accommodate Indigenous interests and concerns may be revealed.195  This led to a discussion of 
how much consultation is good enough, and when it should lead to consent. From the decision in 
Haida Nation, what is clear is that in British Columbia. where several land title claims are 
making their way to negotiation tables because treaties are yet to be concluded or because 
negotiation of treaties was never initiated, the honour of the Crown would require that 
government engage in deep consultations that would lead to “just settlement of Aboriginal 
claims.”196  
 
3.1.1. The Trigger for Consultation 
In Haida Nation, the Court provided answers to when the duty to consult is triggered and stated 
that title-claimants do not have to wait until proof is established to be entitled to consultation and 
accommodation of their rights. All that is needed to trigger consultation duties regarding 
Aboriginal rights and title is threefold: (1) that the Crown should have real or constructive 
knowledge of those rights or title;197 (2) that the Crown is contemplating a project on Aboriginal 
land; and (3) that the contemplated project may adversely affect Aboriginal claim or right on the 
land.198  
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What does real or constructive knowledge imply? The court in Hupacasath First Nation v 
Canada (Minister of Foreign Affairs)199 was tasked with deciding this issue and explaining the 
preconditions to trigger the duty to consult. In this case, the Hupacasath First Nation sought a 
declaration that Canada is required to engage in a process of consultation and accommodation 
with them prior to taking steps that would bind Canada under an international agreement with 
China. They argued that the agreement between both countries inhibits Canada's ability or 
willingness to take steps to regulate or prevent a breach in their rights from the use of lands and 
resources by Chinese investors. At the root of this allegation is the speculation that Canada will 
not want to incur an adverse monetary award and as such, it would likely avoid taking action 
barred by the agreement that would prevent infringements of Aboriginal rights. The Court held 
that the argument made by the claimants were, “pure guesswork”, and that the duty to consult is 
triggered not by imagination but with facts supported by evidence.200 Where a conduct is likely 
to adversely impact an Aboriginal right, the courts have held that government cannot dodge its 
constitutional duty to consult because title to land has not been established. Perhaps, one aspect 
of the duty to consult doctrine that is most referred to in Haida Nation is the area of recognizing 
the depth of consultation duties that is required of the Crown in each case.  
Several issues could emerge when determining the scope of the constitutional requirement of 
consultation when title to land is yet unproven, and one can appreciate the dilemma that the 
government faces when determining whether or not each case presented deserves the high-
spectrum consultation leading to consent or a low/middle-spectrum consultation that merely 
requires that concerns are aired and accommodations are discussed and implemented.201 The 
Court in Haida Nation however, states that this can be determined depending on the 
circumstances or the preliminary assessment of the strength of the rights of title claimants. Using 
the analogy of a spectrum, the Court fashions a sort of road-map that the government may follow 
in determining how to fulfil its constitutional duty to consult.  
The spectrum analogy envisages that when Indigenous claim to title is weak, their rights are 
limited and government is unlikely to infringe on their rights. In this situation, the Court stated 
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that very little is required from the Crown, such as, to provide notices, information and discuss 
issues.202 On the other hand, the other end of the spectrum envisages that when a strong title 
claim exists, deep consultation is demanded. A middle ground level of consultation also exists 
where the Crown must analyze on a case by case basis, the level of consultation that is most 
appropriate. In all three identified levels, the government may be required to accommodate 
Indigenous interests 
The problem with the “weak-level spectrum” analogy is that it does not conform to required 
standards of consultation and consent obligations of the government under international 
Indigenous rights instruments, which would be discussed later in this chapter. The fact is that 
Indigenous peoples have existing legal structures which should not be ignored. Government 
actions on Indigenous lands that are made without deferring to Indigenous laws disregard those 
laws as valid; however, non-application of a law does not make it invalid, and if continually 
ignored, the section 35 reconciliation goal would likely remain aspirational.   
Significantly, the decision in Haida Nation recognizes the need to accommodate Indigenous 
rights and interests in land. Also, the Court in Taku River stated that only through consultation 
with right holders/claimants can concerns regarding a contemplated project on claimed territories 
be revealed. In Taku River, the Court dismissed the Province common law duty of fair dealing as 
an “impoverished vision of the honour of the Crown and all that it implies” stating that the duty 
arises even prior to proof of asserted Aboriginal rights and title.203 This pronouncement is highly 
instructive if the government wishes to promote and ensure stability in resource development on 
Indigenous lands. For one reason, it manifests that even prior to proof of title, Indigenous title 
claimants have constitutional rights to be heard irrespective of whether or not the title claimed 
can be proved. In practice, this is similar to the role that the tests for interlocutory injunctions 
play in litigation.  
Accommodation of interests becomes even more imperative in unproven title cases where 
“irreparable harm” could occur if the Indigenous concerns are not addressed. According to the 
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SCC decision in RJR – MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General),204 irreparable harm refers 
to “harm which cannot be quantified in monetary terms or which cannot be cured.205 For 
example, if a contemplated pipeline project necessitates the building of pipelines along a route 
where salmons usually breed, it would, as a result of oil contamination and oxygen depletion, 
reduce the survival of salmon embryos and even adult salmons would suffocate.206 In such a 
situation, the government is constitutionally bound to take steps to preserve the group’s interest 
by accommodating their concerns; otherwise, it would have to justify any decisions made 
pursuant to its override powers in Sparrow. Also, should the pipeline project be approved, the 
government would have to justify the infringement of the Aboriginal right to fish. However, 
prior to justifying such, the government is bound to consider whether or not their right to fish for 
salmon at that location would be affected and if this would deny the right holders of the right to 
their preferred means of exercising that right.207 
The importance of preserving Indigenous rights through consultation and accommodation was 
further discussed in Taku River where the Court stated that the government may have to change 
its plans or policy in order to accommodate Indigenous concerns. According to the Court, 
Indigenous claimants should not have to prove their rights before government would consult 
with them, and thereafter, make a determination as to whether or not an infringement of such 
right would be justified when their concerns are not accommodated. Similarly, in Dene Tha’ 
First Nation v Canada (Minister of Environment), Justice Phelan stated that when a conduct is 
contemplated by the government, the duty to consult is triggered at the stage when regulatory 
and environmental review processes related to the project is being created.208 Failing which, 
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irreparable harm could be done, loss of faith in the consultation process could occur, and 
ultimately, the Crown’s role in the reconciliation process would be avoided.209 
 
3.2. Consent Obligations within the Scope of the Duty to Consult 
Preservation of land and resources is one of the most important issues that many Indigenous 
communities nationwide have struggled to achieve. For example, the Haudenosaunee or people 
of the longhouse, made up of the Six Nations of Mohawk, Oneida, Onondaga, Cayuga, Seneca 
and (in 1722), the Tuscarora, also called the Iroquois Confederacy, are united by the Great Law 
of Peace.210 Members of the Confederacy are raised to see themselves as stewards of their 
traditional territories, and they have the obligation to protect their environment for others up to 
the next seven generations.211 In fact, they are taught to live in such a manner that when they are 
gone, it would be as if they never used the land.212 This becomes impossible to achieve when 
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resource development takes place on their traditional territories because often, modern and 
western attitude to resource development is radically different from Indigenous spiritual views to 
nature and land.  
Generally, no climate can attain stability when there is a reliance on government’s ability to 
override consent whenever a deadlock is reached. As such, it will be easier for project 
proponents to comply with Indigenous consent models and devise government policies to reflect 
these models. In practice, these are the roles played by regulatory bodies, but it has become 
increasingly important to situate some of these monitoring roles within Indigenous decision-
makers, and these are examples of what accommodation can achieve. 
The SCC decision in Tsilhqot’in is clear that with establishment of title to land by a court 
declaration or agreement, title-holders have “the right to determine, subject to the inherent limits 
of group title, held for future generations, the uses to which the land is put and to enjoy its 
economic fruits.”213 In essence, government and third parties who wish to have dealings on 
Aboriginal title lands must first seek and obtain their consent prior to development on the land 
and nothing less would suffice.  
In effect, where a Crown-contemplated project is at the hatching stage, Indigenous title-holders 
would have the right to consent or withhold their consent from such project within the scope of 
consultation. Where their consent is withheld, the project can only see the light of day if the 
Crown can justify its actions under section 35 of the Constitution and there are a handful of 
reasons why this may not be the best recourse for the government. For example, where the court 
decides that an accommodation of rights exists and that the infringement is not justified, it could 
overturn or cancel the decision to operate, and award damages, injunctive reliefs and 
consultation and accommodation orders against the Crown. 
The degree of a requirement to obtain Indigenous consent is dependent on the strength of a claim 
to title. In Haida Nation, the Court stated that the scope of the duty to consult “is proportionate to 
a preliminary assessment of the strength of the case supporting the existence of the right or title, 
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and to the seriousness of the potentially adverse effect upon the right or title claimed.”214 
Correlatively, this scope is significantly expanded where title is established because the claiming 
groups are apparently title-holders and are no longer claiming title to land. Rather, at stake here 
is the determination of the extent in which the Crown-contemplated action will adversely affect 
their right or title. Further, the government cannot justify their failure to consult simply because 
they have assessed the strength of the claim according to the spectrum analysis and found that it 
falls within the low threshold. In Haida Nation, we understand that the scope of the duty does 
not only include “the strength of the case” but also, “the seriousness of the potentially adverse 
effect” on the Aboriginal right at stake. If therefore the adverse effect will deprive the right-
claimants the ability to exercise those rights, they are entitled to be consulted - period.215 
Where title to land is yet to be established, the Court in Tsilhqot’in Nation warns about the 
precariousness of being governed stricto sensu by the “scope analysis” established in Haida 
Nation in determining whether consultation alone suffices. It went on to say that “government 
and individuals proposing to use or exploit land, whether before or after a declaration of 
Aboriginal title, can avoid a charge of infringement or failure to adequately consult by obtaining 
the consent of the interested Aboriginal group.”216 Best practice should therefore dictate that 
parties, especially project proponents and the government should set consent-seeking as a 
consultation goal within the accommodation phase of the duty to consult. This will be discussed 
in the final chapter of this thesis. 
 
3.2.1. When the Duty to Consult Arises 
This section discusses a few instances where the duty to consult has been held to arise by the 
courts. However, the examples discussed in this section do not represent all established cases 
since there have been hundreds of decisions rendered on consultation obligations of the Crown 
since the decision in Sparrow. However, an attempt is made under this section to briefly 
highlight some of the instances where the duty does or does not arise. 
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In the Mikisew Cree case, the Court stated that the Crown’s duty to consult includes treaty 
negotiations,217 and that the honour of the Crown is at stake during the interpretation and 
application of the terms of a treaty, therefore, the Crown is constitutionally bound to consult with 
Indigenous peoples with regards to “taking up” of historic treaty lands under those treaties with a 
“taking up” clause. Further, the Court held that even where the honour of the Crown is not 
invoked, the fact that the Treaty 8 Nations paid a “hefty” price by surrendering land the size of 
France to the Crown was held to entitle them to “a distinct procedural” right to consultation with 
regards to the treaty lands.218 Likewise, with regards to modern treaties, the Court in Beckman v 
Little Salmons/Carmacks First Nation219 stated that the scope of consultation is determined by 
the consultation provisions embedded in the treaty, including the creation of environmental and 
review processes set up to regulate the projects on and off treaty lands,220 although it does not 
extend to contemplated changes in legislations that may affect treaty rights.221  
Consultation duties of the Crown is also invoked when the government is making “strategic, 
higher level decisions” that may adversely affect Aboriginal claims or rights. In Rio Tinto Alcan 
Inc. v. Carrier Sekani Tribal Council,222 the Court explained the range of government actions 
that will invoke the government’s duty to consult, for example, actions such as transfer of tree 
licences, approval of multi-year forest management plan for a large geographic area, and the 
establishment of a review process for a major gas pipeline. However, it left “for another day” the 
question of whether government conduct includes legislative action.    
 
3.3. Conclusion 
In December 2016, six years after the Rio Tinto Alcan Inc. decision, the Federal Court of Appeal 
in Canada (Governor General in Council) v Mikisew Cree First Nation finally had an 
opportunity to decide whether the Crown has a duty to consult with Indigenous groups when 
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contemplating changes to legislation that may adversely affect their treaty rights. The fact of the 
case is that in 2012, Bill C-38 (Jobs, Growth and Long-Term Prosperity Act) and Bill C-45 (Jobs 
and Growth Act), were introduced by the Minister of Finance. These bills resulted in the repeal 
of some other oversight legislations, for example, the British Columbia Environmental 
Assessment Act, as well as the amendment of several others, for example, the Fisheries Act and 
the Canadian Environmental Protection Act. The Mikisew Cree First Nation alleged that the 
omnibus bills may affect their treaty rights to hunt, fish and trap because these oversight 
legislations allowed them to voice their concerns over the exercise of their treaty rights. 
The Court held that there was no duty to consult with Indigenous peoples prior to the enactment 
of legislation. According to the court, the recognition of Canada’s unwritten constitutional 
principles of Parliamentary sovereignty and the separation of powers doctrine precludes the 
courts from meddling with the exercise of legislative functions. Therefore, because of the 
separation of powers doctrine, the courts are prevented from intervening in the law-making 
process of the Parliament; rather, it is within the powers of the courts to provide a remedy after a 
bill has been enacted.223 The implication of the restraints imposed by the separation of powers 
doctrine is that the courts are prevented from imposing on the executive arm of government, a 
duty to consult with Indigenous peoples during the legislative process of enacting a bill.224 
In essence, this decision can be interpreted as being a limitation on the constitutional right of 
Indigenous peoples to be consulted when a government action is likely to adversely affect their 
claims or rights. Where the Crown is aware, either by real or constructive notice, that a 
contemplated legislation will likely affect Aboriginal or treaty rights, does it owe a constitutional 
duty to invite the affected groups and stakeholders to a forum to discuss their concerns about the 
bill?  
The court in this case held that they are not entitled to such consultation obligations because “to 
come to the opposite conclusion would stifle parliamentary sovereignty and would cause undue 
delays in the legislative process” but that First Nations are not left without an option. They have 
the option to lobby government officials as well as parliamentarians in order to ensure that their 
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rights and concerns are appreciated and taken into consideration during the introduction of a 
bill.225 It is quite possible that they do not become aware of Parliamentary proceedings and the 
intention of the legislative arm of government to pass a law that may affect their rights; on the 
other hand, the government would.   
Further, the court stated that even though they are not owed any consultation obligations at this 
stage, it will be necessary to consult with Indigenous peoples after the law has become effective 
and it adversely impacts their treaty or Aboriginal rights.226 At this stage, the validity of the law 
could be determined and appropriate remedy could be administered. The apparent disadvantage 
of this is that it is an obvious waste of Parliamentary time and resources to first enact a statute 
and then more resources poured over court deliberation of its validity, and eventually, striking it 
down. It is like seeking a solution after the fact, which could have been cured through early 
consultations and where necessary, accommodation of concerns by removal or redrafting the 
invalid aspects of the proposed bill. The suggestion is not that consultations must be had 
regarding every legislation that may affect Indigenous claims or rights; but where such a law 
would totally eliminate the existence of that right, there should be an opportunity for the right 
holders to first, become aware of that bill and secondly, provide information as to how such a 
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4. Domestic Standards for Consultation: Federal Government and British 
Columbia 
4.1. Federal Consultation Structure 
Similar to how the judiciary avoids meddling in the affairs of the legislative arm of government, 
they also steer clear of dictating to the executive arm on how it should implement its 
constitutional duty to consult with Indigenous peoples. In response to the decisions of the Court 
in Haida, Taku River and Mikisew Cree, in 2008, Canada established the Consultation and 
Accommodation Unit (the “CAU”) within the Ministry of Aboriginal Affairs and Northern 
Development Canada (AANDC). The CAU began training officials nation-wide and they came 
up with first, an interim guideline on consultation with Indigenous peoples, and later in 2011, an 
Updated Guideline for Federal Officials to Fulfil the Duty to Consult (the “Updated Guideline”) 
which takes into consideration, more recent court decisions.227 
According to the Updated Guideline, Canada’s approach to consultation will take into account 
the differences in the history of Indigenous communities, their geography, governance structures, 
demographics and the differences in context; for example, whether Indigenous communities to 
be consulted are signatories to treaties, comprehensive land claim agreements or self-government 
agreements.228 Under Guiding Principle No. 6 of the Updated Guideline, existing provincial, 
territorial or industry mechanisms may be relied on in streamlining decision making. While it 
acknowledges Aboriginal groups as partners, and that information gathered during consultation 
with the groups could be used in meeting its consultation obligations (Guiding Principle No. 7), 
the Updated Guideline fails to incorporate existing Indigenous decision-making mechanisms 
within its consultation practices.229 Rather, it simply states that information gathered as a result 
                                                          
227 Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada, “Aboriginal Consultation and Accommodation, Updated Guidelines for 
Federal Officials to Fulfill the Duty to Consult, (March 2011), [the “Updated Guideline”], online: 
 < http://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/DAM/DAM-INTER-HQ/STAGING/texte-text/intgui_1100100014665_eng.pdf>. 
228 Ibid., at 8 
229 The First Nations Leadership Council, Advancing an Indigenous Framework for Consultation and Accommodation 




of consultation with the groups may be used in meeting its obligations, but nowhere in the 
guideline is Indigenous consensus style of decision-making incorporated in the document. This 
appears to be a reductionist approach to compliance with case law (if reconciliation remains its 
ultimate goal), considering that the consultation to be had in the first place is with those 
Indigenous communities. 
Further, the pre-consultation analysis and planning stage of the Updated Guideline requires a 
step-by-step analysis of whether or not a duty to consult exists, and if it does, what the strength 
of the claim is or the severity of adverse impacts on the claim.230 Government officials will have 
to first (1) describe the proposed Crown conduct, (2) identify whether it has an adverse impact 
on potential or established Aboriginal or Treaty rights, (3) identify and ascertain which 
Aboriginal groups are in the area and their respective potential or established Aboriginal or 
Treaty rights, and (4) determine whether a duty to consult exists. The fourth and final pre-
consultation analysis is the most crucial because it determines whether or not the Crown would 
be legally required to proceed with the consultation process. If after following the three-fold 
steps established in Haida Nation for determining when the duty is triggered and it is still 
uncertain as to whether or not a duty to consult exists, the government would meet with 
Aboriginal groups to verify its analysis. 
From the foregoing, it is unsure how neutrality is reflected by the Crown as a fiduciary when it 
meets with Indigenous groups to discuss the strength of their claim. If during the pre-
consultation stage it is determined that no adverse impact would be had to existing Aboriginal 
and Treaty rights, how would the government also achieve its objective at the “verification 
meeting” with the Aboriginal groups? The Updated Guideline states that “the nature and 
seriousness of potential adverse impacts of a proposed activity will become more apparent to 
officials as information is gathered” and that “the strength of a claim assessment is an historical 
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and anthropological analysis of the facts of a particular claim asserted by an Aboriginal group in 
the area of the proposed activity.”231  
What is clear from this approach is that where potential rights are claimed, it is the Crown who 
determines the following three crucial factors: (1) whether there would be a potential adverse 
impact on a contemplated project (unless Indigenous communities likely to be affected are 
invited to indicate their concerns after they have been provided with clear and relevant 
information regarding the proposed project and any potential adverse impact); (2) the strength of 
the claim of an adverse impact; and (3) the extent of accommodation that is required to cure the 
infringement of their Aboriginal or Treaty rights.232  
Some of the concerns raised by some Indigenous groups regarding the Updated Guideline are 
that there is no provision in it that allows them to determine the extent to which their rights have 
been adversely affected or how strongly their rights would be limited.233 They feel that by 
locating the proposed project on their lands, they, and not the government, should determine the 
gravity of the impact on their rights.234 Instead, the Updated Guideline states that the three 
crucial factors would be determined by government officials. This reflects a one-side approach 
towards the process, when in fact; consultation should be about sharing their respective views 
about how to resolve their concerns about the project. In essence, the Updated Guideline does 
not take into consideration the fact that the affected communities may have existing traditional 
consultation processes reflective of their laws and values in deciding whether or not their rights 
are likely to be adversely impacted and how strong their claim should be.235  
On the other hand, if it is determined that a duty to consult exists, the scope of the duty would be 
examined at stage 5 according to the spectrum analogy proposed by the SCC in Haida Nation. 
After skipping the hurdle of stage 4, this stage represents another major hedge that determines 
whether or not legal proceedings will ensue if the consultation process is not successful. At this 
stage, government officials would be making a quasi-judicial determination of whether or not 
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Indigenous claims to title or right is strong enough to warrant accommodation of any concerns 
that may arise from the proposed project. The officials would be required to wear two hats and 
determine firstly, whether or not the claimed Aboriginal and Treaty right is strong, weak or 
moderate; and secondly, whether their concerns would be accommodated. The apparent risk 
associated with the multi-role function of the government officials at this stage is that they 
become judges in a cause in which they have a high-interest stake, and this is likely to result in 
blurred decisions.236 
  
4.1.1. Determining Indigenous Decision-Makers under the Updated Guideline 
In Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, the Court stated that there is always a duty to consult 
because of the incidents of Aboriginal title, and that government officials are responsible for 
determining which group of Indigenous representatives to consult with.237 Indeed, this is a 
crucial task because failure to consult with the authorized decision-makers within the group 
could still lead to delays in the project. The Updated Guideline requires officials to verify 
authorized decision-makers by requesting a letter from their representative that confirms their 
community’s acceptance to be led by them.238 It also requires the officials to have knowledge of 
the issues within the community and region because it would assist in understanding how the 
proposed project is likely to affect their culture and traditional practices. 
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It is interesting to note that the Updated Guideline recognizes that several Indigenous groups 
have developed their own consultation policies that must be adhered to by the Crown. However, 
it mandates officials to follow the Updated Guidelines, but that “understanding the policies, 
guidelines or protocols of the Aboriginal group may become the starting point for a discussion in 
an effective and meaningful consultation process.”239 In essence, the Updated Guideline fails to 
incorporate Indigenous perspectives to the extent that it overrules any Indigenous consultation 
practices in areas where they conflict, especially when consent is requested by the affected 
groups. 
In 2013, First Nations Leadership Council (FNLC) charged a Working Group to gather and 
develop a framework that seeks to mirror First Nations standards for consultation and 
engagement consistent with Canadian jurisprudence and worldviews.240 As a result, the Working 
Group came up with a “Report on Key Findings of the B.C. First Nations Consultation and 
Accommodation Working Group,” (the “Report of the Working Group”), which recognizes the 
need to “bring life to the words of First Nations people,”241 and describes the Updated Guideline 
as falling short of meeting the high standards that First Nations have come to expect.242  Based 
on the large number of cases that have been litigated on the issues of consultation or lack thereof, 
there appears to be a huge conflict on the right approach to fulfilling the duty to consult between 
the Crown and its Indigenous partners. Several criticisms revolve around the Government of 
Canada’s inability to recognize and accept Indigenous legal orders as sovereign bodies able to 
decide for themselves how they wish to deal on their lands. The result is that the current 
approach under the Updated Guideline often hinders substantive reconciliation because it wholly 
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relies on rules and processes handed down by the courts as opposed to what really works for 
occupants of the lands.243 
 
4.2. British Columbia’s Consultation Process  
It is impossible to complete a historical sketch of treaty-making process in B.C. without a 
mention of the decision in Calder. Before the historic decision in Calder, British Columbia 
rejected Aboriginal claims to title and refused to negotiate treaties. The Province simply refused 
to accept the concept that Aboriginal title existed and that Aboriginal title claimants were entitled 
to special interests in land beyond and above other British Columbians.244 Harry Swain, a former 
deputy minister of Indian and Northern Affairs describes it frankly that the “Crown asserted title 
to all the territory, granted fee simple title to white settlers, sold off timber rights, granted 
mineral titles, flooded valleys central to traditional territories of the Indigenous peoples.”245  
However, the landscape of Indigenous titles and the Provinces approach to title claims 
significantly changed in 1973, when the SCC recognized in Calder that Aboriginal title existed 
as a concept in Canadian common law. 
The constitutional impetus to negotiate treaties heralded by the Calder and Haida Nation 
decisions conscripted the province into negotiating and consulting with Indigenous peoples of 
British Columbia.246 In Calder, the Court was divided in its decision. According to Judson J., 
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Martland and Ritchie JJ, the appellant Nisga’a Nation were outside the scope of the Royal 
Proclamation of 1763, therefore their claim to Aboriginal title could not be sustained. Hall J., 
Spence and Laskin JJ declared that their rights to possession of the land was not extinguished by 
the province,247 while Justice Pigeon held that the Court had no jurisdiction to make a declaration 
to title in the absence of a fiat of the Lieutenant-Governor of British Columbia, as such, the 
action failed on technical reasons.248  
In terms of results achieved in litigating Calder, one can conclude that it failed to achieve its goal 
of establishing title to lands claimed, but in practical sense, Calder is considered a huge success 
in the history of Aboriginal title in Canada. For example, as a result of the Calder decision, the 
Nisga’a Final Agreement was concluded in 2000. The Agreement is the first modern treaty in 
British Columbia and it negotiated both land claim settlement and self-government 
arrangements, which are both protected under the constitution.249 The same year that Calder was 
decided, the province created an Office of Native Claims within the Department of Indian and 
Northern Affairs (DIAND) and in 1995, Aboriginal rights policy was developed and the 
governments of Canada and British Columbia began initiating negotiation of modern treaties 
with Indigenous peoples through the British Columbia Treaty Commission process.250 
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at 7, online: < http://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/environment/natural-resource-stewardship/consulting-with-
first-nations>  at 3 [the “Updated Procedure”]. The British Columbia consultation policy identifies court decisions 
and commitment to building new relationships (due to court decisions) as the reasons why they are in compliance 
with the constitutional duty to consult. These are some of the issues identified by the Working Group as what 
plagues the consultation process in B.C., See Report of the Working group, supra, note 229 at 16. Further, the 
Report faults the Updated Guideline because it was developed as a result of litigation, and not from the 
government’s political will or its desire to foster relationships with Indigenous peoples.  
247 Calder, supra note 35 at para 183 
248 Ibid., at para 192 
249 Nisga’a Lisims Government “Understanding the Treaty” online: <http://www.nisgaanation.ca/understanding-
treaty > 
250 In 1993, the British Columbia Treaty Commission (“BCTC”) was established with a mandate to oversee the 
negotiation of claims in British Columbia. The BCTC process is different from all other processes in Canada mainly 
because the government recognized that most of the province is encumbered with Aboriginal rights. Also, in 1973, 
the Office of Native Claims (“ONC”) was established but it was wrought with complaints and criticisms because of 
the dual role it was mandated to carry out in reviewing claims arising from the failure of the government to 
discharge its duties. As a result of continued complaints of conflict of interest in the ONC’s mandate, the Penner 




Before 1982, there was no constitutional protection of Indigenous rights and title, however, by 
virtue of section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, “existing Aboriginal and treaty rights of the 
Aboriginal peoples of Canada became recognized and affirmed.” Also, the Royal Proclamation 
of 1763 and the reconciliation objectives of Canada contributed to a constitutional desideratum 
to consult with Indigenous peoples which in turn necessitated the formulation of policies to serve 
as guidelines. However, there have been several criticisms against the provinces approach to 
fulfilling its constitutional duty to consult, chiefly, that the measure of consultation deployed 
appears to be a continuation of its previous pattern whereby it refused to negotiate and reach 
agreements with Indigenous peoples. Another criticism is that most of its past polices are not 
self-proposed polices birthed as a result of the provinces’ desire to build lasting relationships; 
rather, they are formulated in response to court decisions.251 Further, the approach taken by the 
province fails to recognize Indigenous cultural practices, tradition and Indigenous peoples’ 
approach to governance.252    
British Columbia has developed several guides to help proponents appreciate the legal 
framework of doing business within the province.253 Some of these guides also aim to ensure that 
lasting and respectful relationships are fostered with First Nations. For example, the Building 
Relationships with First Nations: Respecting Rights and Doing Good Business guide highlights 
the importance of building good relationships with Indigenous peoples such as, ensuring 
certainty of process, access to a labour force, service and local knowledge, marketing and social 
responsibility and support for government consultation.254 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Policy-Specific Claims resolution model should be replaced with an independent body. As a result, the Specific 
Claims Resolution Act was introduced in 2002 to speed up the settlement of specific claims in Canada. For more on 
the history of specific claims resolution models in British Columbia, see Specific Claims Tribunal Canada, online: 
http://www.sct-trp.ca/hist/hist_e.htm>.  
251 For more on other B.C.’s consultation policies, see “A Short History of British Columbia Policies on Consultation 
and Accommodation with First Nations” in Report of the Working Group, supra note 229 at 91.  
252 Joanne Barnaby, “Indigenous decision making process: what can we learn from traditional governance?”(2009) 
pdf available online <http://www.arcticgovernance.org/indigenous-decision-making-processes-what-can-we-learn-
from-traditional-governance.4667318-142902.html>. 
253 British Columbia, “Guides to Consulting with First Nations”. Online: 
http://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/environment/natural-resource-stewardship/consulting-with-first-nations>.  
254 British Columbia, “Building Relationships with First Nations: Respecting Rights and Doing Good Business” at 6. 
Online: <http://www.bcbc.com/content/594/WorkingWithFirstNations_v02.pdf> [the “Proponent Guide”].  
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4.2.1. British Columbia’s Consultation Guides and Policies 
The principal guideline used by B.C. Government officials when consulting with Indigenous 
peoples is the Updated Procedures for Meeting Legal Obligations when Consulting First Nations 
(the “Updated Procedures”).255 According to the Updated Procedures, the goal of the province is 
to ensure (1) respect for Aboriginal and treaty rights, (2) improved relationship between the 
province and First Nations, (3) predictable and transparent process, and (4) reconciliation of 
rights and interests.256  
The consultation process under the Updated Procedures in B.C. is divided into four phases, with 
each phase having sub-tasks to be achieved. The phases are: (1) Preparation, (2) Engagement, (3) 
Accommodation, and (4) Decision and Follow-up. The process of identifying Indigenous 
decision-makers is not clearly stated, however, the Updated Procedures provide that the province 
prefers to consult with bands (elected under the Indian Act), or the larger community groups.257  
Further, in complying with the spectrum analogy in Haida Nation for the purpose of determining 
what level of consultation is required, the Updated Procedures describes each spectrum as 
ranging from “notification” to “deep”, with “normal” being on the average spectrum. For 
example, where a major project that requires multiple permits like the Trans Mountain Pipeline 
project is proposed, the Updated Procedures recognizes the need for a more extensive process 
requiring deep consultation.258  
There are also other policies which guide proponents in doing business in B.C. These include the 
guide to Building Relationships with First Nations: Respecting Rights and Doing Good Business, 
the Guide to Involving Proponents when Consulting First Nations and other sector-specific 
operational guidelines such as the Proponents Guide to First Nations Consultation in the 
                                                          
255 The Updated Procedures for Meeting Legal Obligations when Consulting First Nations (Interim) has been 
identified by the Province as the main guideline that informs its consultation process. However, according to the 
Report on the Working Group, there are two more documents which serves as a guide to government officials but 
has not been shared with Indigenous peoples because it is covered by solicitor-client privilege, see, Report of the 
Working Group, supra note 229 at 17. 
256 The Updated Procedures supra note 246 at 7. 
257 Ibid., at 9. 
258 Ibid.,  
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Environment Assessment Process and the Clean Energy Production in B.C: An Interagency 
Guide Book for Proponents.259 It would be impossible to review and discuss within this thesis, 
the detailed contents of these guides and how they incorporate Indigenous perspectives on 
consent. However, in order to compare Indigenous perspectives on consultation, including that of 
the Gitxsan peoples, with British Columbia’s approach to consultation, a brief discussion of 
these guides and policies would be undertaken.  
The Building Relationships with First Nations: Respecting Rights and Doing Good Business [the 
“Proponent Guide”] is a specific guide to project proponents that provides an understanding of 
the legal framework of Aboriginal rights issues in British Columbia. Even though the courts have 
held that there is no legal duty on third parties to consult with Indigenous peoples,260 the purpose 
of the Proponent Guide is to ensure that they are aware of these rights, and are able to build 
lasting and respectful business relations with the rights-holders. Therefore, proponents are 
enjoined to follow this guide as well as, have a thorough understanding of consultation processes 
specified under the Updated Procedures, which is the government’s primary consultation guide.  
Under the Proponent Guide, four approaches are identified by the province as the approaches 
taken in building relationships and resolving Aboriginal rights issues in British Columbia. They 
are: (1) consulting with First Nations interim to resolution of the Aboriginal rights question, (2) 
negotiating treaties for long term reconciliation of Provincial and Aboriginal interests, (3) 
negotiating agreements interim to resolution of the Aboriginal rights question and (4) improving 
socio-economic conditions of First Nation People.261  
Under the first approach, the government assigns some procedural aspect of consultation to 
project proponents because they are in the best position to know the details of their proposed 
project. They are further encouraged to engage First Nations at the early stages of the project 
even before the government begins its consultation processes. During consultation, proponents 
                                                          
259British Columbia, “Consulting with First Nations”, online: 
<http://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/environment/natural-resource-stewardship/consulting-with-first-nations>  
260 Haida Nation, supra note 9 at 56. 
261 The “Proponent Guide”, supra note 225 at 4-6. The benefits of adhering to the provisions of the Proponent 
Guide have been identified as ensuring certainty for processes; access to labour force, services and local 
knowledge, support for government consultation and fulfilment of proponent’s social responsibility. See also, 
Report of the Working Group, supra note 229 at 96-9. 
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are encouraged to participate in meetings, share detailed information and modify previous plans 
to ensure that Indigenous concerns are addressed.  
The second approach includes treaty negotiation process under the British Columbia Treaty 
Process discussed above, while the stated objective of the third approach by the Province is to 
apply a “flexible approach” towards entering into interim agreements which “seeks to balance 
the legal and non-legal interests of First Nations and the Province until full and final 
reconciliation is achieved.”262 The fourth and final approach is when agreements such as Impact 
and Benefit Agreements (IBAs) are entered into between affected Indigenous communities and 
third party project proponents.263 
Finally, B.C. also has its ways of resolving land claims made by two or more Indigenous groups 
according to case law. Where there are overlapping claims between two or more Indigenous 
groups, the B.C. government takes the approach of negotiating the issues between Indigenous 
nations as suggested by the Delgamuukw Court.264 As such, the Province resolves such 
overlapping claims through negotiation committees consisting of Indigenous community leaders 
and elders. Funding is also provided for neutral mediation where the parties are unable to reach 
an agreement after negotiation. In situations where all efforts at negotiation and neutral 
mediation fails, non-derogation language is enlisted to provide that the agreements reached are 
without prejudice to the rights of the Indigenous parties with the overlapping claims.265  
This method of resolving overlapping claims has been criticized by some authors who suggest 
that the current negotiation and consultation schemes should be reformed to allow parties the 
opportunity to submit issues before independent claims tribunals for a binding decision or to seek 
                                                          
262 Ibid., at 5. 
263 Ibid. 
264 Delgamuukw supra, note 16 at paras 185-186. 
265 Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada, “Resolving Aboriginal Claims -  A practical Guide to Canadian 
Experiences” (Ottawa: 2003), online:  http://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1100100014174/1100100014179>. 
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judicial intervention. This, it is argued, would ensure that resolutions reached by the tribunal or 
court are binding on all parties.266 
 
4.2.2. Criticism of British Columbia’s Consultation Process 
There is no doubt that it is quite impossible for a legislation or policy to be perfect and to satisfy 
all the gaps it was enacted to fill, and this is true of the B.C. consultation guidelines and 
procedures. For instance, certain aspects of consultation guides and procedures in British 
Columbia have been criticized by different groups and Indigenous partners as being impractical 
and full of processes. The result is that projects are delayed as Indigenous groups continue to 
assert their title rights, and investors are unable to obtain a social licence to operate within 
Indigenous lands.   
Firstly, in determining whether an Aboriginal group is owed a duty to consult within the 
“normal” range of the spectrum, the Updated Procedures provide that consultation and 
accommodation will be triggered where there is a “likely impact on a reasonable claim or a 
reasonable probability of an infringement of a proven aboriginal right or title.”267 The Court in 
Tsilhqot’in Nation is clear on this point: where title is proved, consent is mandated; where there 
is a strong claim to title but it is unproven, it is highly recommended.268 The words “reasonable” 
or “likely” used in the Updated Procedures can be subjective, and the province, wearing multiple 
hats of responsibilities to different groups of its citizens, may not be in the best position to 
determine when a claim is reasonable or likely to be impacted.   
Further, the Updated Procedures identifies that the goal of phase two engagement with 
Indigenous peoples is to “substantially address and accommodate their interests where 
required.”269 The problem with this engagement approach is that it is a “take it or leave it” 
                                                          
266 For more on overlapping claims, see Christopher Devlin and Tim Thielmann, “Overlapping Claims: In Search of 
“A Solid Constitutional Base” (Paper for the CBA Aboriginal Law Section’s Annual CLE), (June 12 and 13, 2009) 
Victoria, B.C. online: http://www.dgwlaw.ca/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/Overlapping_Claims.pdf>. 
267 The Updated Procedure, supra note 255 at 11. 
268 Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra note 3 at para 97. 
269 The Updated Procedures supra note 255 at 14. 
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approach which Indigenous peoples are not prepared to settle for. Also, the Updated Procedures 
mandates that where after sending requests to Aboriginal groups who may be adversely affected 
by the project, to provide further information about their concerns and they do not respond, the 
government officials should proceed to decision and follow-up stage of the consultation 
process.270 
Several other issues have also been discovered by the FNLC’s Report of the Working Group 
regarding the approaches taken by the governments of Canada and British Columbia to 
consultation. Some of them are that the Guidelines and Procedures “are not driven to achieve 
reconciliation”, and that the provincial policy on consultation focuses on the procedural aspect of 
the duty as opposed to the substantive aspect which makes it “reductionist” and not achieving the 
goals identified by case law.271  This is consistent with the view held by Harry Swain; that the 
government’s emphasis on process and procedures do not allow official negotiators to be flexible 
and creative in finding timely solutions to Indigenous concerns. This in turn leads to delays in 
fashioning solutions and finalizing agreements. Further, Swain is of the view that it is becoming 
increasingly clear that during negotiations, government representatives sent to the tables are 
unable to make final decisions because they always have to go back to consult with their “string-
pullers” in Ottawa, which shows utmost disrespect to Indigenous parties across the table.272 
 
4.3. Indigenous Governance Structures and Consultation Processes 
Canadian jurisprudence recognizes Indigenous peoples’ special rights in land and natural 
resources. After several decades of litigating Indigenous rights, the SCC declared in Tsilhqot’in 
Nation that the claiming group had established title to land. The decision in Tsilhqot’in makes it 
                                                          
270 Ibid., at 16-20. The officials are required at all stages, to maintain detailed records documenting their actions 
and outcomes at each step for future reference. The Updated Procedures provides that where deep to normal 
consultation is required, the officials should “consider articulating the reasons for decisions, including what 
accommodation, if any, has been deemed appropriate.” The approach and language of the decision stage again, 
reflects a “leave it or take it” stance. It does not provide Indigenous claimants with deep consultation rights 
stemming from strong or proven claims to title with an opportunity to make the final decisions based on 
accommodation, considering their unique right-holder perspectives.  
271 Report of the Working Group, supra note 229 at 17 & 93-101. 
272 Swain, “Paths to reconciliation in the post-Tsilhqot’in world, supra note 209 at 5.  
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clear that Indigenous title-holders have a right to give or withhold their consent to any 
development or actions that affect their lands. This section will examine consent from 
Indigenous peoples’ perspectives, and will problematize how consent may be obtained from 
authorized decision-makers within affected Indigenous communities. 
In providing answers to the aforementioned problem, this section pivots around the following 
issues: Which institution should dictate the forms in which consultation with Indigenous groups 
should take - the government, the courts or Indigenous title-holders/decision-makers? This 
question will foreground my discussion on the consultation duties of the Crown leading to 
consent from title-holders/claimants in resource development.  
An examination of the decision-making process and political structure of the Gitxsan nation of 
British Columbia will be undertaken. Further, a consideration of how their cultural practices may 
be instrumental in fashioning consultation policies on consultation leading to consent will be 
discussed. Since Delgamuukw, an action instituted by the Gitxsan and Wet’suwet’en 
communities, the Gitxsan Nation has developed and implemented a more regimented political 
structure which reflects their historical practices as well as infuses modern political regime. 
These infused governance structures, although not without their problems, will highlight how 
generally, consensus is achieved within Indigenous communities. 
Consultation policies in British Columbia will also be examined and compared with the Gitxsan 
peoples’ decision-making processes. British Columbia’s policies were primarily drafted by 
government officials taking cues from court decisions, with minimal consideration of traditional 
Indigenous perspectives on consultation. Rather than addressing the apparent inconsistency in its 
laws, the Court in Sparrow devised the “override provision” which allows the Crown to proceed 
with development on title lands without the consent of Indigenous title holders, as long as the 
conditions set out in Sparrow are met.273 The implication of Crown exercise of this power 
translates to a lack of approval from Indigenous groups. 
                                                          
273 Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra note 3 at para 76, the Court held that “if the Aboriginal group does not consent to the 
use, the government’s only recourse is to establish that the proposed incursion on the land is justified under s. 35 





4.3.1. Indigenous Perspectives on Consent  
Indigenous laws and perspectives on consent are different from the common law perspective, 
largely because Indigenous peoples have their own distinct legal and cultural practices. This does 
not necessarily mean that they have an easier means of reaching consensus. In fact, Indigenous 
peoples have distinct traditions that come together to form a unique body of law in Canada. 
According to Maria Battiste and James (Sa’ke’j) Youngblood Henderson, these Indigenous laws 
can be intricate and heterogeneous.274  
There are more than 1.4 million Indigenous people in Canada; this is equivalent to about 4.3 
percent of Canada’s total population. According to the National Household Survey of 2011, 
60.8% identified as First Nations; 32.3% identified as Metis; while 4.2% identified as Inuit.275 
Because they are from distinct cultural traditions, it becomes impossible to cover all the 
Indigenous groups within the scope of this thesis. However, the meaning of consent from the 
view point of the Gitxsan Nation in B.C. would be examined. There are several reasons for 
choosing to examine the Gitxsan Nation in B.C. As of 2011, 16% of Indigenous peoples in 
Canada (or 232,290 people) live in B.C.,276and the province also records the greatest diversity of 
cultures in Canada.277 Moreover, since 1973, landmark rulings on Aboriginal rights and title, 
consultation obligations and treaty rights have originated from B.C., including Tsilhqot’in 
Nation, mostly because in B.C., past governments had refused to negotiate treaties with 
Indigenous communities.278 Further, the Gitxsan peoples of British Columbia are highly 
informed due to their involvements in past litigations as well as the significant scholarly works 
on its legal traditions.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
reclaimed Indigenous right to consent by qualifying its parameters. 
274 Marie Battiste & James (Sa’ke’j) Youngblood Henderson, Protecting Indigenous Knowledge and Heritage: a 
Global Challenge (Saskatoon: Purich Publishing, 2000) at 71. 
275 Statistics Canada, Aboriginal Peoples in Canada: First Nations People, Metis and Inuit, online: 
<https://www12.statcan.gc.ca/nhs-enm/2011/as-sa/99-011-x/99-011-x2011001-eng.cfm>.  
276 Ibid., 
277Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada, online:  <https://www.aadnc-
aandc.gc.ca/eng/1100100021009/1314809450456>.  
278 To mention just a few landmark SCC cases that have originated from British Columbia and have helped in 
shaping Aboriginal law in Canada. See, Calder, supra note 131; Guerin v The Queen, supra note 143; R v Sparrow, 
supra note 35; R v Vanderpeet, supra note 183; Delgamuukw, supra note 16; and Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra note 3. 
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 Notwithstanding, resource development on Indigenous traditional territories remains hotly 
contested while pipeline projects continue to be approved within Indigenous territories.279 Today, 
many Indigenous groups demand that their consent must be sought before any major 
development can take place on their lands. 
What then is consent from Indigenous peoples’ perspective? According to Jeremy Webber, 
“consent is concerned with the relationship between members’ subjectivity and political 
authority.”280 For example, consenting Indigenous groups may only be able to provide consent to 
a project if they have the political and legitimate power to consent within the framework of their 
inherent obligations to the land. However, like Aboriginal title, the issue of consent is best 
understood from an Indigenous perspective. This outlook appears logical because consent in 
itself connotes approval or assent to an action or event, and it would be highly ironic not to 
understand consent in this context from an Indigenous perspective. It is therefore imperative to 
provide Indigenous traditions the opportunity to breathe life into matters that affects their lives 
and culture. This is consistent with the Court’s decision in R v Marshall; R v Bernard,281 where it 
was stated that “it would be wrong to look for indicia of Aboriginal title in deeds or Euro-centric 
assertions of ownership. Rather, we must look for the equivalent in the Aboriginal culture at 
issue”.282 In effect, jurisprudential recognition of the need for consent from title-holders 
correlatively entails that such consent should be dictated by Indigenous people, according to their 
terms, and in accordance with their existing legal order. 
Indigenous people demand a higher level of consultation leading to consent prior to the 
commencement of resource development on their traditional lands. Some Indigenous groups are 
not opposed to resource development but they want it done on their terms through adequate 
consultation and in some cases, consent.283 Projects approved by government without Indigenous 
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consent are likely to face turbulent set-backs along the way. For instance, when the Trans 
Mountain project was approved in late 2016, Indigenous leaders vowed to intensify their struggle 
not to agree to the project saying that the standard of consent is one of consensus amongst their 
people.284  Clearly, industry, government and other stakeholders stand to greatly benefit from 
projects having the approval of affected Indigenous communities in the form of their freely 
obtained consent.  
 
4.4. Indigenous Law and Decision-Making Process  
When it comes to making decisions regarding their people and territories, Indigenous peoples are 
guided by their laws.285 These laws have existed prior to their contact with European settlers, and 
have continued to exist irrespective of whether or not their laws are recognized by the 
government.286 As a result, Indigenous decision-making processes are different from non-
Indigenous governance structures. While Indigenous process can function in the general 
Canadian system, the Canadian system has not been designed to function within Indigenous 
traditional systems.287  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
acee. gc.ca/050/documents/p17520/93388E.pdf> at 73-81. At page 80, the Saugeen Ojibway Nation submitted 
that “the level of accommodation required demands that the project not proceed unless and until SON has given 
its consent to the construction of the DGR in SON Territory.” 
284 Bruce Cheadle, supra note 279. According to Grand Chief Derek Nepinak of the Assembly of Manitoba Chiefs, 
even though the federal government had approved the Kinder Morgan Trans Mountain pipeline project to be built 
from Alberta to B.C., the government did not have “their blessings” to commence the project and they will be 
opposing the project as it can destroy their lands and water. 
285 Unlike the popular mainstream view that Indigenous peoples are lawless and without any structured rules living 
wide and roaming free, many Indigenous groups had “self-complete, non-state systems of social ordering that 
were successful enough for them to continue as societies for tens of thousands of years.” See, Val Napoleon and 
Hadley Friedland, Indigenous Legal Traditions: Roots to Renaissance, in The Oxford Handbook of Criminal Law at 3, 
Markus D. Dubber & Tatjana Hornle, eds. (Oxford University Press, 2014). 
286 Van der Peet, supra note 183 at paras 35-43. 
287 J.E. Michael Kew & Bruce G. Miller, “Locating Aboriginal Government in the Political” in Michael Healey, ed. 
Landscape in Seeking Sustainability in the Lower Fraser Basin: Issues and Choices, (Vancouver BC: Institute for 
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Several Indigenous groups live communally and many practice consensus-based decision 
making. For example, the Iroquois Great Law of Peace288 envisions human beings as 
interconnected with one another, and instead of celebrating individualism like some non-
Indigenous peoples do, it situates people within a clan and membership dictates one’s main 
identity.289 So unlike non-Indigenous property ownership in fee simple title,290 clans owned 
property and right to land as a group. In fact, clan membership was not distinguished based on 
membership of the Five Nations of the Iroquoian Confederacy of - Mohawk, Seneca, Cayuga, 
Oneida, and Onondaga - rather, all nations were deemed relatives and members of the same clan. 
This meant that all resources and land was controlled and shared by all members of the clan. This 
same ideology also informs their political system of radical democracy. 
According to Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe,291 radical democracy “supposes the existence 
of equal rights for others,” and the notion in which “democratic rights must be understood.” 
Laclau and Mouffe said that radical democracy “will always be a question of rights which 
involve other subjects who participate in the same social relation” and that it must be infused by 
a State practicing liberal and deliberative democracy, because in their attempts to build a 
consensus, they oppress different opinions, races, classes and worldviews.292 Similarly, this 
concept of radical democracy also ensures that the elected Chiefs or Sachem does not become 
autocratic; rather, it may guarantee that elected chiefs are responsible and can properly represent 
their clan failing which, they could be dismissed. For example, the highly vexing and divisive 
issue of identifying authorized Indigenous decision-makers became exacerbated when in August 
2016, two Haida house chiefs, Carmen Goertzen and Francis Ingram were stripped of their 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
often unanimously arrived at; and it is flexible because of the need to adapt to new changes within mainstream 
society. 
288 The Great Law of Peace is an orally handed down law that has been passed from generation to generation and 
is usually recited with the aid of the Wampum. It is a living document that applies to Iroquoians till date. 
Haudenosaunee Iroquois Confederacy, Great Law of Peace, Online: <http://haudenosaunee.ca/5.html>.  
289 David Bedford and W. Thom Workman, supra note 211 at 25-41. 
290 Musqueam Indian Band v British Columbia (Minister of Sustainable Resource Management), 2005 BCCA 128 at 
64. The Court held that Aboriginal title is not equivalent to fee simple and that it is merely close to an estate where 
exclusive possession could be derived at common law. 
291 Laclau, E and Mouffe, C. Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics, at 185, 
(London: Verso, 2001). 
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hereditary titles during what has been called a “shaming feast” because they voiced their support 
for the Enbridge project and wrote to the National Energy Board (the “NEB”). This bold act has 
several very grave implications akin to an impeachment from office, and it indicates how far 
Indigenous nations will go to protect their governance structure.293  
Elected Chiefs are enjoined to act while having as priority, the rights of all members of the clan 
up to seven generations yet unborn.294 Decision-making was made together by all clan members 
and then reported to the national or confederate councils, who would only take action if 
unanimous support is received.295  
Similarly, for the Sto:lo Nation of British Columbia, decision-making within its political 
structure is described as neo-traditional because they are able to fuse their ancestral traditional 
practices with modern day governance structures to meet with the changing times and the 
community needs.296 As a result, it is almost impossible to discuss how generally, Indigenous 
people reach decisions affecting their lands and people. However, because laws, customs and 
traditions are what determine every individual’s right to self-determination, it would be 
reasonable to look into Indigenous laws and customs in identifying each group’s authorized 
decision-makers.  
From the foregoing, it is safe to conclude that one of the most complex issues facing Indigenous 
nations today is the problem of identifying Indigenous decision-makers within the community. 
For example, this problem presented itself in Spookw v Gitxsan Treaty Society.297 The brief fact 
of the case is that the plaintiffs, some of whom were hereditary chiefs, challenged the right of the 
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online:<http://www.theprovince.com/news/politics/northern+gateway+exposes+divides+first+nations+governanc
e/12136012/story.html>.   
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defendant, the Gitxsan Treaty Society (the “GTS”), to negotiate on their behalf with the Crown. 
They claimed that they were excluded from making decisions, and in fact, 68% of the Gitxsan 
hereditary chiefs were unaware that they had an agreement with Enbridge. The court dismissed 
their application to wind up the GTS and held that they were not the “proper persons” to advance 
a claim for winding up. According to Justice McEwan, the plaintiffs had the opportunity to seek 
relief within the GTS; however, they chose not to be members of the GTS. Further, the court 
stated that self-government does not guarantee good government. At best, what they termed as 
community dissent should be resolved within the GTS in line with the spirit of self-government, 
and not turned over to the federal or provincial government, or the courts.298 
In many other instances, decision-makers are easily identified because members of the group will 
have elected representatives who are authorized to make decisions that will be binding on the 
rest of the community. In such situations, members of the group have had to redefine their 
internal governing structure in compliance with section 74 of the Indian Act (which provides for 
the election of band councillors), or resulting from court decisions which have necessitated a 
more formal approach to Indigenous governance.299  However, in most cases, Indigenous groups 
have maintained and managed their traditional lawmaking process. For example, the Gitxsan 
Nation is an example of a B.C. Indigenous group that still maintains most of its traditional 
consensus-based decision-making style. The next section of this thesis will provide an insight 
into how some Indigenous groups govern themselves and make decisions that affect their lands, 
people and traditional practices and culture.  
 
                                                          
298 Ibid., at 125-139 
299 The Nisga’a Lisims Government (NLG) in British Columbia is a great example of a modern Indigenous decision-
making governing structure that emerged in response to the landmark decision in Calder. After Calder, the Nisga’a 
Nation started negotiating a comprehensive land claims policy with the federal government and on May 11, 2000, 
the NLG came into effect after having been granted Royal Assent. The NLG has powers to pass laws and practices a 
democratic form of government comprised of the NLG, the four Nisga’a village governments and three urban 
locals. In addition, they have a 36-member legislative body which considers and passes Nisga’a Lisims Government 
laws while the elders provide guidance and oversight to the legislative arm of the NLG. Although the Nisga’a 
Nation continues to maintain its traditional laws and practices, the NLG officials are now appointed according to 




4.4.1. Decision-Making amongst the Gitxsan Nation 
Amongst the hundreds of Indigenous groups in Canada, the Gitxsan Nation in British Columbia 
is chosen for study in this research because of their participation in the Delgamuukw decision, as 
well as other reasons referenced above. The SCC decision in Delgamuukw was released in 1997, 
and its importance to modern Aboriginal right and title in Canada cannot be overemphasized. 
Another reason for choosing to study the Gitxsan, as will be evinced from further discussion, is 
the Gitxsan peoples’ well developed legal reasoning process and their legal order, which enables 
them to make decisions in concert. Perhaps, their tenacity for justice explains their quest to 
litigate their rights in courts and how for the first time, the issues of consultation and 
accommodation, the weight to be accorded to oral history in Indigenous litigation, as well as the 
meaning, content and scope of Aboriginal title in Canada was addressed by the 
Gitxsan/Wet’suwet’en Delgamuukw decision. Today, several Indigenous leaders agree that if the 
section 35 goal of reconciliation is to be achieved, government must acknowledge Indigenous 
laws beyond jurisprudential analysis and incorporate Indigenous decision-making processes 
within its consultation frameworks.300 
In examining the political structure of the Gitxsan people, it becomes apparent that Indigenous 
laws are old but highly structured; they are flexible but not weak, and importantly, these political 
structures have endured over several centuries and can still exist in the new world with little 
modifications. It becomes imperative that consultations should be carried out in a manner that 
recognizes Indigenous legal orders in order to foster relationships, recognize Indigenous rights, 
and reconcile Crown-Indigenous sovereignties.  
 
 
                                                          
300 Report of the Working Group, supra note 229 at 44. The Report states that the mandate of the government in 
the negotiation of treaties does not foster the recognition of Aboriginal title. Rather, the results of these treaties 
tend to extinguish Aboriginal title. As such, the First Nations Summit, the Union of BC Indian Chiefs, and the BC 
Assembly of First Nations perceived the need for Indigenous peoples nationwide to canvass for the incorporation 
of their legal orders within Crown consultation policies so that they can resist the approach taken at negotiating 
their rights and title. 
79 
 
4.5. Gitxsan Governance Structure  
I. The Wilp 
“If one is to show respect to the Gitxsan culture, it is important to know about the 
adaawk and the ant’imalhlasxw. This is essential in order to respect the property 
of others. The adaawk of the Gitxsan are very important to the culture and 
society. The adaawk are personal bloodline histories of the Gitxsan. They tell 
about the house group, whose members are descended through a line of women; 
adaawk involve their stories, their crest and their territories. They tell of the past 
and of identity.”301 
 
The Gitxsan (People of the River Mist) in British Columbia have a long history of protecting 
their traditional territories, which spans over 33,000 square kilometres of traditional territories, 
(lax yip), more than the size of Belgium. They speak Gitxsanimx with Sim’algax being its 
linguistic basis.302 They claim the north and central Skeena, Nass and Babine rivers and their 
tributaries,303 and their institutions are founded on natural law and respect for one another. In 
fact, part of the evidence admitted before Chief Justice McEachern in the Delgamuukw decision 
states that scientists believe that their ancestors migrated from Asia, possibly before or after the 
last great ice age, and they spread out south and west in search of liveable lands.304 
The most important unit of society for the Gitxsan people is called the “Wilp”. The Wilp or 
House is based on kinship traced through the mother’s side; hence, inheritance of property is 
matrilineal since every person born of a Gitxsan is automatically a member of his or her mother’s 
                                                          
301 M. Jane Smith, Placing Gitxsan Stories in Text: Returning the Feathers. Guuxs Mak’am Mik’Aax (Ph.D. 
Dissertation, UBC Faculty of Education, 2004) at 50 [unpublished] [Smith]. 
302 Ibid., at 174. According to Smith, the Gitxsan people have two main dialects; the western and the northern 
dialects; citing The Sim’algax Working Group, 1998, she said that the language could go extinct in 50 years if 
precautions are not made to preserve and transfer the knowledge of the language.  
303 Delgamuukw, supra note 16 at 83. 
304 Ibid., at 138. 
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House and clan. The father’s side (wilxsi’witxw) also have significant roles to play in the society 
and each person has the right (amnigwootxw) to use a father’s House lands for certain periods.305  
The structural organization of the House locates Wilp as belonging to one of the four clans: Lax 
Gibuu (Wolf), Lax Seel/Ganeda (Frog), Gisgahast (Fireweed), and Lax Skiik (Eagle), and they 
are entrusted with the responsibility of protecting its power relationship (daxgyet). The stated 
purpose of the Gitxsan governance system is the internal management of their collective rights 
and they have expressed their preference to be governed by their hereditary chiefs as opposed to 
band councils imposed under the Indian Act.306 
Importantly, the Wilp serves as the political unit for each house and they are represented by 
hereditary chiefs, (Simgiigyet) who though holding the highest authority within the society, are 
still subject to other “lesser” chiefs (also known as “wings of the chief”) within the Wilp who 
hold equal powers as well as members composed of children and adults. This arrangement acts 
as a sort of check and balance to the exercise of the Wilp’s powers because as the spokesperson 
for other members, the Wilp controls the lands. Political decisions are legitimately arrived at 
within the feast hall. The head chief of a House is selected in a flexible process by elders of the 
house, and sometimes, by the head chiefs of the other Houses of the Clan.307 When a House 
becomes too large or small to complete its Feast (yukw),308 it merges or divides in order to create 
an amalgamated or new House. In order to ensure that they have females or sometimes, males to 
populate the House, new members are often adopted.309 As custodians of the names, crests310 and 
                                                          
305 Ibid., at 246-7. 
306 Richard Daly & Val Napoleon, “A Dialogue on the Effects of Aboriginal Rights Litigation and Activism on 
Aboriginal Communities in Northwestern British Columbia” (2003) 47:3 Social Analysis, the International Journal of 
Cultural and Social Practice 108. See also, The Gitxsan Alternative Governance Model at page 6, online: 
<http://www.gitxsan.com/old/images/stories/agmv_4.pdf>. 
307 Ibid., at 254. 
308 Richard Overstall, “Encountering the Spirit in the Land: “Property in a Kinship-Based Legal Order,” at 28 in John 
McLaren, Andrew R. Buck & Nancy E. Wright, eds., Despotic Dominion: Property Rights in British Settler Societies 
(Vancouver: UBC Press, 2004), [Overstall], Encountering the Spirit in the Land]. Also called the Potlatch, the yukw is 
where a lineage conducts the business of organizing or formalizing their socio-political and legal affairs.  
309 Bedford & Workman, supra note 211 at 36. Wampum 68 of the Iroquoian Great Law of Peace also provides for 
how members of other clans can also be adopted. In fact, members of various nations can also be adopted and 
according to Francis Jennings, one half of the ethnic composition of the Iroquois is from adopted peoples. See also, 




territories of the Houses, the head chiefs have taken actions to assert title over their lands through 
legal actions, blockades, and now negotiation with the Crown for centuries.311When a head chief 
dies, he is replaced by a new chief who is usually a family member such as a nephew, niece, 
brother or sister. When no suitable successor is found, a caretaker chief from another house takes 
the chiefly name in trust, until a new chief is appointed.312 
As evidenced from the political structure of the Gitxsan people, they practice group-based, 
decision making, and the power to give consent is vested not in the Huwilp alone, but in the 
collective society. Their governance structure is highly decentralized but having a “very formal 
aspect of customary law nonetheless.”313 This means they do not rely on any centralized system 
for enforcing their laws. They have different types of laws and formal ancient collectively owned 
oral history called adaawk314 that governs them, and prior to making any decisions that affect 
that land and people, the entire community or a majority must consent to the action.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
into a House is also practiced by the Gitxsan people as means of protecting the House crest, alongside with other 
practices.  
310 Val Napoleon, “Living Together: Gitksan Legal Reasoning as a Foundation for Consent” in Jeremy Webber and 
Colin M. Macleod, eds., Between Consenting Peoples: Political Community and the Meaning of Consent 
(Vancouver: UBC Press 2010) [Napoleon: Living together]. According to Napoleon, the crest or ayuuk is a part of 
the Gitksan cultural foundation and is “a specific named power or privilege drawn from the adaawk that may be 
represented on poles, robes, regalia, headdresses, or other objects.” See also, Margaret Anderson & Marjorie 
Halpin, eds., Potlatch at Gitsegukla: William Beynon’s 1945 Field Notes (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2000) [Anderson & 
Halpin] at 17, cited in Napoleon: Living together, that the crest is so important that when Houses become smaller 
in size or their crests is not well taken care of; other Houses could disregard or even annex their rights. Further, 
according to Susan Marsden, “Defending the Mouth of the Skeena: Perspectives on Tsimshian Tlingit Relations” in 
Jerome S. Cybulski, ed., Perspectives on Northern Northwest Coast Prehistory (Hull: Canadian Museum of 
Civilization, 2001) 61 at 62-63. The adaawk connects Houses and their territories and it also defines their lands and 
resources. 
311 Historica Canada, online:< http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/gitksan/>. One of the first 
recorded territorial dispute by the Gitxsan people was in 1872 during the Skeena Rebellion in British Columbia. 
They blockaded the Skeena River where traders and miners in Gitsegukla had destroyed eleven village longhouses 
and thirteen totem poles. Through their chiefs, they attempted to negotiate compensation for the affected 
families and met with Lieutenant-Governor Joseph Trutch. They also met with Prime Minister Wilfrid-Laurier in 
1908 to discuss their title claims to their traditional territories in northwestern B.C.  
312 Delgamuukw, supra note 16 at para 273. 
313 Napoleon: Living together, supra note 310 at 16. 
314 Smith, supra note 301 at 50. According to Smith, one cannot write or talk about the adaawk of another house 
because they are personal properties of each house group. This means that the use of ayuxws (crests) of another 
house by an artist can only be permitted by the chief who owns the story. 
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Individuals represent each house and actions taken by any individual are the collective 
responsibilities of the house to which he belongs.315 This does not mean that each and every 
member must consent to an action or political decision because in every community, there would 
almost always be a minority dissent and membership disputes.316 However, the Gitxsan people 
are able to come to a decision through deliberation in a non-coercive form whereby no single 
person has the final power to make the final decision.317 
Since time immemorial, the Gitxsan people have managed themselves and resolved disputes 
within and outside houses, as well as litigated cases to protect and preserve their culture and 
territories. Delgamuukw is one of the most successful results of how the Gitxsan peoples have 
asserted title over their ancestral lands. Though they were not granted title to the 58,000 square 
kilometres of total claimed ancestral territory (including the Wet’suwet’en claimed area), the 
decision is highly significant to all Indigenous peoples in Canada. Relying on the conclusions 
made from the doctoral thesis work of Indigenous legal scholar Val Napoleon, her review of 
about twenty Gitxsan legal cases reveals that there are five stages of managing disputes. They 
are: 
1) Sort out the relationships and the breadth of history of each relationship (personal, 
political, legal and economic); 
2) Engage in horizontal consultations with Houses that have an interest in the outcome of 
the dispute, and where necessary, with a neutral House; 
3) Figure out precedents for similar disputes; 
4) Develop an agreement among those involved with the dispute and those consulted; and 
                                                          
315 Napoleon: Living together, supra note 310 at 13.  
316 Ash Kelly & Brielle Morgan, “Divide and Conquer: The Threatened Community at the Heart of the PNW LNG 
project”, DesmogCanada (July 6, 2016) online: <https://www.desmog.ca/2016/07/06/divide-and-conquer-
threatened-community-heart-pnw-lng-project> Often, disputes arise when some minority members do not agree 
with the group’s collective decisions, and often, non-Indigenous governments will take that advantage to deal with 
those dissenting minority. For example, as a result of the Pacific NorthWest LNG project on Lelu Island in B.C., 
some members of the Lax Kw’alaams group have received threatening messages because they disapproved or 
approved the project. One house leader, Murray Smith, of the Gitwilgyoots Tribe also says that the PNW LNG 
proponents have taken advantage of the internal disputes to coerce them into signing agreements that will give 
them money in exchange for their consents. 
317 Napoleon: Living together, supra note 310 at 45. 
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5) Explain the process publicly, usually at a Feast.318 
Since these steps have proven to work over time, government and third parties wishing to do 
business with Gitxsan nation should take these steps into consideration, alongside any 
consultation policies in the use and management of resources on their traditional territories. The 
suggestion is not that these steps will apply to all Indigenous groups nationwide; however, if it 
has successfully worked for some groups, it may be highly reflective of other Indigenous groups’ 
dispute resolution mechanisms. 
 
II. The Band Council 
Section 74 of the Indian Act319 establishes the Band Council, which has seen some resistance by 
some Indigenous groups as an intrusion on their right to self-government.320 With regards to the 
Gitxsan peoples, they have challenged the application of the Act as an imposition on their 
                                                          
318 Valerie Ruth Napoleon, “Ayook: Gitksan Legal Order, Law, and Legal Theory” (Ph.D. Dissertation, UVic Faculty of 
Law, 2009, [Val Napoleon: Ayook, Unpublished]. Napoleon said that the reasons why outsiders as well as Gitxsan 
peoples undermine the Gitxsan conflict management mechanisms is due to their colonial history, which is best 
understood within the power relationships between the Gitxsan peoples and Canadian government.  
319 The Indian Act, R.S., c. 1-6. First enacted in 1876, the Indian Act sought to regulate every aspect of the day to 
day life of Indigenous peoples. In 1969, the federal white paper called for the repeal of the Indian Act but this was 
resisted by Indigenous peoples not because they approved of the provisions of the Act, but because it purported to 
end the special privileges that were accorded to them. In 1982, section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, came into 
force guaranteeing the “existing Aboriginal and treaty rights” of Aboriginal peoples of Canada. This constitutional 
provision, alongside the Inherent Right Policy, 1995, recognizes that Aboriginal peoples have special rights to title 
and self-government. For more, see Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada, online: <http://www.aadnc-
aandc.gc.ca/eng/1100100014174/1100100014179>.   
320 The Gitxsan Alternative Governance Model, supra note 306 at 5. This model was devised to serve as a Gitxsan-
specific approach to future negotiations with the federal and provincial government when little progress was 
realised after more than a decade of negotiation. At page 3, the Gitxsan say they are not interested in a “parallel 
status” and that they want an end to the application of the Indian Act including the Band governance structure 
imposed upon them under section 74 of the Act. The Gitxsan people believe that the Act has made the Gitxsan 
villages dependent and impoverished. See also, David Schulze, “Comparative Governance Structures among 




existing governance structure which they assert has served them for generations, and they want it 
eradicated completely.321 
The band council system is irreconcilable with Indigenous systems of government because it 
subjects the powers of the elected councillors to the Minister of Indian affairs.322 For example, 
the Indian Act imposes the keeping of a register for membership and elections to determine band 
leaders. As a result, instead of the band council imposed by the Act, the Gitxsan peoples have 
suggested that “an elected group of observers” should be created to oversee their hereditary 
chiefs.323  Usually, hereditary chiefs are elected to become members of the band council, but this 
is often not the case.  
In terms of composition of the band, the Act provides that a band council shall consist of one 
chief and one councillor for every one hundred members of the band, but not less than two or 
more than twelve.324 It also states that no band shall have more than one chief. The band councils 
are akin to elected public officials who govern day to day functions such as health, education and 
welfare of its members. Today, the band council has been replaced with the Gitxsan-
Wet’suwet’en Education Society and the Gitxsan-Wet’suwet’en Government Commission. 
 
4.5.1. The Gitxsan Legal Traditions as an Example for Seeking Indigenous 
Consent  
Aside from the right to make decisions regarding their lands and resources, another right that is 
equally dear to many Indigenous groups worldwide is the right to participate in formulating 
policies and laws that govern their lands and culture. Before the assertion of Crown sovereignty 
in 1846, the Gitxsan peoples governed themselves according to their laws and traditions, and 
they continue to do so.325 After 1846, Indigenous peoples in Canada became introduced to 
                                                          
321 Gitxsan, “Gitxsan History of Resistance”, online: <http://www.gitxsan.com/culture/culture-history/gitxsan-
history-of-resistance/>  
322 Ibid.,  
323 Ibid., at 6. 
324 See section 74(2) of the Indian Act. 
325 Delgamuukw, supra note 16 at para 63. 
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foreign body of laws and legal procedures, and as such, are required to make arduous claims to 
prove their existing rights based on foreign court rules and law. The same goes for existing 
consultation laws.  
Several past and present consultation policies have been fashioned without taking Indigenous 
legal traditions on decision making into perspectives. The result is that negotiation becomes 
prolonged and often ends up impasse. Unfortunately, the courts are not left out of this nuanced 
crunch. Because most Canadian judges are not trained in Indigenous laws and customs, they are 
unable to comprehend the complex nature of the laws and this also results in erroneous 
decisions.326 Indeed, this and several other issues form the very bane and threat to the existence 
of Indigenous legal traditions and laws in Canada such that every time a right is claimed, the 
courts are tasked with the role of evaluating the claimed right in light of pre-sovereignty practice 
and then translate that practice into modern legal right.327  
Further, because of the historical domination of settler societies in Canada, Indigenous laws have 
become almost invisible in mainstream societies, and it is highly debatable that a full recovery 
from the incidents of colonization could occur.328 For instance, in British Columbia, Aboriginal 
title was said to be extinct, yet, Indigenous peoples remained on the same lands they have been 
for over 10,000 years and retained their cultural practices.329 What is the way forward?  
The courts have said it is reconciliation. Education also plays an important role in enlightening 
non-Indigenous people. For instance, it should be understood that previous habitants or dwellers 
had their laws and ways of governing their resources and people, and that those laws still exist 
today and should be highly instrumental in determining how others may encroach on Aboriginal 
title lands. Indeed, when Indigenous peoples’ right to self-government is respected, the freedom 
to use their land and to consent to third party’s use of same will not be as debatable as it is today. 
                                                          
326 Napoleon: Living together, supra note 310 at 23. Citing Lax Kw’alaams v Minister of Forests &West Fraser Mills 
(2004), B.C.S.C. 420 that the court was unable to appreciate the political and legal institutions of the Tsimshian 
peoples and their claims.  
327 R v Marshall; R v Bernard, supra note 183 at 48. The SCC held that aside from considering the pre-sovereignty 
practice from Aboriginal perspectives, it must also consider European perspectives in deciding whether Aboriginal 
practices correspond to the legal rights claimed.  
328 Ibid. at 5. 
329 Kew & Miller, supra note 287 at 51. 
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The fact that it is even debatable is a very vexing issue to some Indigenous groups in Canada, 
and the new legal order in which they have been forced to live and abide with, is not voluntarily 
as of choice. This is supported by the skeptical view of David Hume where he writes that 
“almost all the governments which exist at present…have been founded originally, either on 
usurpation or conquest, or both, without any pretence of a fair consent or voluntary subjection of 
the people.”330 
The Gitxsan Nation is an example of a people who are able to manage themselves effectively as 
a decentralized, non-state people,331 and the Delgamuukw decision is an example of one of their 
many successes. Where Indigenous groups have demonstrated the capacity to govern themselves 
as they have done successfully from time immemorial, governments or third parties wanting to 
develop projects on their lands should look to their laws and traditions and consult with them 
according to these laws.332 That is the very nature of democratic principle of a sovereign nation, 
and Indigenous nations are a sovereign nation living within another nation. 
 
4.5.2. The Problem of Identifying Indigenous (Gitxsan) Decision-Makers 
Some Indigenous governance structures, for example, the Gitxsan governance structure, are 
designed such that outsiders not privy to its cultural practices will find it complex or difficult to 
assess the interactions between each of its organizations. One reason might be to avoid a chief or 
band councillor becoming dictatorial.333 However, some Indigenous groups have elected 
representatives, elders or hereditary chiefs who have been democratically elected or who have 
                                                          
330 David Hume, “Of the Original Contract” in David Hume, Essays: Moral, Political and Literary (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1963) 452 at 457, 458, 460, cited in Jeremy Weber, “The Meaning of Consent” in Jeremy Webber 
and Colin M. Macleod, eds., Between Consenting Peoples: Political Community and the Meaning of Consent 
(Vancouver: UBC Press 2010) at 3. 
331 Napoleon: Ayook, supra note 318. 
332 Smith, supra note 301 at 45-7. A prominent Gitxsan educator and story-teller, the author warns against 
“orientalism.”  According to Smith, orientalism is when outside researchers report on Gitxsan laws as if they were 
the authority on the culture without having the understanding that comes from the language. Likewise, it is easy 
for government and third parties to become orientalists if consultation policies are formulated without Indigenous 
perspective on negotiation and decision making. 
333 Gitxsan Nation, “the Wilp”, online: <http://www.gitxsan.com/about/our-way/the-wilp/>. 
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traditionally represented the group from time immemorial. For example, the Métis Nation of 
Ontario clearly mandates that consultation should only be carried out through their 
democratically elected representatives.  
The problem of identifying Indigenous decision-makers can also be seen in case law. For 
example, in Delgamuukw, the Crown raised objections regarding the proper parties to commence 
legal action on behalf of the groups. Reluctantly, the Court held that the defect in pleading 
caused the Crown to suffer some prejudice, and that this necessitated a new trial due to the 
importance of the case.334 Also, in Tsilhqot’in Nation, a similar issue arose regarding how 
authorized decision-makers within a claiming group may be recognized for the purposes of 
knowing whether or not they were acting on behalf of themselves or the nation. The Court held 
that the nation holds the collective interest in the land, therefore, all hereditary chiefs must 
authorize the action. It is suggested that these issues can be avoided if decision-makers are 
formally identified as persons having the authority to make decisions regarding land and other 
related matters on behalf of a community or nation. The Indian Act for instance, makes 
provisions for how chiefs and councillors may be elected.335 
In response to the leadership problem evident in the Delgamuukw decision, the Gitxsan Treaty 
Society (the “GTS”) was formed with a mandate to represent the Gitxsan nation in negotiation of 
treaties with the Crown and benefits agreements with developers. However, the GTS has 
suffered several setbacks and internal divisions because some hereditary chiefs (the United 
Gitxsan Chiefs) have voiced their oppositions to the activities of the GTS, saying that they do not 
recognize them as their authorized decision-makers.336 The issue became so contentious that it 
led to protesters seizing the office of Chief Elmer Derrick who was to endorse the Enbridge 
                                                          
334 Delgamuukw, supra note 16 at paras 73-77. 
335 See section 74(3) of the Indian Act. The problem with locating Indigenous leaders within the Act is that 
sometimes, government would often refuse to negotiate or initiate consultations with Indigenous leaders who are 
not band councillors. This is a deep disrespect to Indigenous peoples and their rights to self-government. In fact, 
Harry Swain joins his voice with that of most Indigenous bands nationwide to advocate for alternatives to the 
Indian Act. Harry Swain, “Paths to reconciliation in the post-Tsilhqot’in world”, supra note 209 at 7-8. 
336 Spookw v Gitxsan Treaty Society, supra note 297. See also, Gordon Hoekstra, “Gitxsan displeased with pipeline 





Project, for eight months until the court ordered him restored back in office.337 The drastic steps 
taken in this case sends a clear message to government and third parties wishing to deal with 
Indigenous leaders that they must consult directly with the community members because elected 
officials holding political offices may not necessarily be the authorized decision makers for the 
community.  
The Gitxsan nation’s model of governance is an example out of several other Indigenous groups 
that is highly structured and established in terms of decision-making for its people. It becomes 
imperative for third parties wishing to do business on Indigenous title lands to endear themselves 
to the particular groups’ cultural practices with the goal of aligning their consultation policies 
with the Indigenous groups’ existing cultural practices. In the end, it is only through negotiated 
agreement (in the form of consent) that settlement of issues over Aboriginal lands can be 
reached.  
 
4.6. Forging Ahead as Shared Decision-Makers: Government and 
Indigenous Leaders 
Many Indigenous leaders nationwide agree that in order to achieve reconciliation, new 
relationships must be forged with the Governments of Canada. On September 10, 2015, the 
Government of British Columbia reaffirmed its promise to advance reconciliation with 
Indigenous peoples through a proposed joint work plan with the First Nations Leadership 
Council.  This is in furtherance of ongoing commitments heralded by the decisions in Haida 
Nation, Taku River, and Mikisew Cree FN, whereby the government committed to a new 
relationship in 2005 based on the following three principles: 
 Respect, recognition and accommodation of Aboriginal title rights; 
 Respect for each other’s laws and responsibilities; and 
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 The recognition of Aboriginal and Crown titles and jurisdictions.338 
According to the B.C. government, the New Relationship accord is reflective of SCC decisions 
and envisions principles that will allow for “improved government-to-government relations with 
First Nations.” It is hoped that the initiative will foster “reconciliation of Aboriginal and Crown 
titles and jurisdictions”339, as well as improve the lives of Indigenous peoples within the 
province.340 In order to achieve the goal of a new relationship, both parties recognized that it is 
important to include Indigenous groups in decision-making on issues that will affect their rights 
and communities.  
In 2009, a “Discussion Paper on Instructions for Implementing the New Relationship” (the 
“Discussion Paper”) was issued whereby parties agreed that shared decision-making is an 
incident of the recognition of the existence of aboriginal title and the right to self-government. 
As such, the New Relationship vision envisages initiatives and legislative enactment of 
regulations that will promote shared decision-making between the two governments.341 
According to the Discussion Paper, shared decision-making will include Indigenous peoples in 
making decisions that affect their land and resources which in turn will harmonize the two 
governments and foster relationships based on trust by righting historical wrongs. For example, 
while fulfilling its duty to consult, the Province cannot unilaterally impose processes for making 
decisions or reaching agreements that will only allow Indigenous peoples to fit into its existing 
policies and legislations. The Province must also acknowledge that Indigenous peoples have 
their own laws and ways of making decisions that affect their land and resources which in turn 
                                                          
338 Government of British Columbia, “New Relationship” (2005), online: 
http://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/governments/aboriginal-people/new-relationship>. See also, Government of 
British Columbia, “Proposed Commitment Document 2015”, online: 
<http://www2.gov.bc.ca/gov/content/environment/natural-resource-stewardship/consulting-with-first-
nations/first-nations-negotiations/reconciliation-other-agreements>.  
339 Ibid., at 4. 
340 Ibid. According to the B.C. government, the New Relationship accord has yielded some positive fruits, which 
shows the contributions that a positive and healthy relationship can produce. Some of the positive outcomes that 
have been recorded as of July 2013 include: completion of 8 final treaty agreements; partnering with First Nations 
government on joint land-use agreements, revenue-sharing, and economic benefit agreements; and the 
introduction of Incremental Treaty Agreements.  
341 Discussion paper on Instructions for Implementing the New Relationship. [The “Discussion Paper]. 
90 
 
must be included in the provincial consultation laws. If existing laws do not reflect this, as the 
Guideline shows, then changes must be made in order to reflect the parties’ goal of building new 
relationships through shared decision-making,342 and this should include providing funding to 
Indigenous governments where necessary.  
Further, the discussion paper suggests some models of shared decision-making for both parties to 
follow to ensure smooth project execution. Since many stakeholders believe that not knowing the 
precise nature of their accommodation duties is “one of the most vexing dimensions of the duty 
to consult doctrine,”343 it is only logical to become familiar with Indigenous decision-making 
systems in order to meaningfully reach an agreed decision. When properly executed, shared 
decision-making can ensure stability and certainty in land and resource development projects 
within the province because Indigenous perspectives will have been considered and their 
approval of such projects will have been sought and obtained during the process.344  
A new relationship that evinces respect for Indigenous peoples will mean that agreements 
reached at negotiation are fully implemented and not entered under coerced atmosphere. It is 
almost impossible to build new relationships and achieve certainty in resource development 
when new methods are devised in obtaining old, renounced results. The rights of Indigenous 
peoples who refuse to cede or surrender their title to land or enter into any form of benefits 
agreements should be respected. Because of the more recent demands for the recognition of their 
rights to give or withhold their consent to major developments on their lands, Indigenous peoples 
are no longer satisfied with mere relinquishment of some rights in land in exchange for modern 
treaty agreements. They want a declaration of title to their lands which will enable them enjoy 
the full incidents of Aboriginal title. To Indigenous peoples of Canada, consent is the new 
standard for fulfilling the duty to consult; it has become more realistic since the Tsilhqot’in 
Nation decision, and it will reflect a genuine step on the part of the government towards 
reconciliation.345  
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4.7. FPIC as a Standard for Meaningful Consultation 
Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) is an international Indigenous right principle 
referenced throughout the UNDRIP but clearly elaborated under Article 32(2).346 On many 
views, FPIC can be traced to the International Labour Organization (ILO) Convention 
Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries.347 Marcus Colchester and 
Fergus MacKay348 have argued that the concept of FPIC can actually be traced to the 17th 
century as an integral element of negotiated settlements.349 In any event, it was later adopted by 
the U.N. General Assembly in 2007 in the UNDRIP, which safeguards the rights of Indigenous 
peoples all over the world and guarantees that signatory States protect the collective rights of 
Indigenous peoples in addition to its domestic legislations, treaties and agreements.  
According to Frank Vanclay and Ana Maria Esteves350 FPIC can be described as: 
 Free: “that there must be no coercion, intimidation or manipulation by companies or 
governments, and that should a community say ‘no’ there must be no retaliation” 
 Prior: “that consent should be sought and received before any activity on community 
land is commenced and that sufficient time is provided for adequate consideration by any 
affected communities” 
 Informed: “that there is full disclosure by project developers of their plans in the 
language acceptable to the affected communities, and that each community has enough 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Dialogue Session, May 9-10, 2013) (June 26, 2013), online: <http://www.afn.ca/uploads/files/sc/comp_-
_bcafn_chiefs_ccp_discussion_guide_-_revised_july_16_2013_(final).pdf>.   
346 UNDRIP, supra note 2. 
347 See Articles 6 & 16 (2) of the International Labour Organization (ILO) Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention: 
C169. (1989), Geneva: 76TH ILC session. 
348 Marcus Colchester and Fergus Mackay, “In search of the Middle Ground: Indigenous Peoples, Collective 
Representation and the Right to Free, Prior and Informed Consent” at 8 (August, 2004), paper presented to the 
10th Conference of the International Association for the Study of Common Property Oaxaca, online: 
<http://www.forestpeoples.org/sites/default/files/publication/2010/08/fpicipsaug04eng.pdf> . 
349 Ibid., at 3, where the Middle Ground was said to have been “created because both parties (Indigenous peoples 
and colonial entrepreneurs of the 17th and 18th centuries) wanted to trade, neither had a monopoly on power, and 
they had to find mutually intelligible and acceptable means of dealing with each other.” 
350 Frank Vanclay and Ana Maria Esteves, “Current issues and trends in social impact assessment” in New directions 
in social impact assessment: conceptual and methodological advances, (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar Publishing: 
2011) at 6-7. 
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information to have a reasonable understanding of what those plans will likely mean for 
them, including of the social impacts they will experience” and 
 Consent: that communities have a real choice, that they can say yes if there is a good 
flow of benefits and development opportunities to them, or they can say no if they are not 
satisfied with the deal, and that there is a workable mechanism for determining whether 
there is widespread consent in the community as a whole and not just a small elite group 
within the community.”351 
Notwithstanding the above definition, the implication of FPIC principles is still shrouded in 
ambiguities when it comes to its nature, interpretation and scope, and some have interpreted 
FPIC as vesting veto power in Indigenous groups.352 It could be argued that the right to FPIC is 
synonymous to a veto, but in Canada, the SCC is clear that the process of consultation and 
accommodation does not translate to giving Aboriginal groups a veto over what can be done with 
land pending final proof of the claim. More specifically, the court held that “the Aboriginal 
consent spoken of in Delgamuukw is appropriate only in cases of established rights, and then by 
no means in every case. Rather, what is required is a process of balancing interests, of give and 
take.” 
Different views have been proffered by several scholars with regards to the interpretation of 
FPIC. However, this thesis takes the view that FPIC would fail to achieve its purpose if it is 
boxed up as a veto power reposed to Indigenous groups. It is suggested that FPIC should be 
liberally interpreted to allow for the emergence of the literal meanings of what each word 
connotes as defined by Vanclay and Esteves above. This view is consistent with that of several 
writers, including Sébastien Grammond, who opines that FPIC should be pursued as a goal rather 
than perceived as a “veto power” reposed in Indigenous peoples.353 Consistent with the views of 
                                                          
351 Philippe Hanna and Frank Vanclay, “Human rights, Indigenous peoples and the concept of Free, Prior and 
Informed Consent,” (2013) Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal, Vol. 31, No. 2, 146–157, (Hanna and Vanclay) 
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Grammond, this thesis argues that FPIC should be approached as an overarching goal of 
consultation.354  
The views of Dwight Newman with regards to UNDRIP, including the FPIC concept is that it is 
possible for Canadian courts to gradually accept the provisions of the Declaration if treated as an 
aspirational document.355 However, some writers have taken the position that FPIC should be 
viewed more as a philosophy than a legal procedure and that where a resource project is likely to 
affect Indigenous groups, “their views should be considered and respected, regardless of the 
national legislation requirements.”356 The problem with this view is that it still does not 
guarantee that Indigenous consent would be obtained prior to proceeding with resource 
developments on their lands.  
Further, Hanna and Vanclay’s philosophical view of FPIC appear to be the current state of law in 
Canada since FPIC remains an aspirational philosophy that has not been legislated by 
Parliament. When it comes to applicability, FPIC is not binding in Canada; however, its legal 
status has been discussed in some court decisions. For example, in Sackaney v. R,357 the court 
held that because UNDRIP is yet to be ratified by Parliament, it does not give rise to any 
substantive rights in Canada.358 As such, in the absence of any national legislative requirement of 
FPIC, the Crown is bound only by the constitutional duty to consult, which remains the valid law 
when dealing with Indigenous peoples. 
Notwithstanding FPIC’ss non-binding status in Canada, some proponents have been consulting 
with Indigenous groups for the purpose of seeking their consent to proposed projects on their 
lands.359 According to Martin Papillon and Thierry Rodon, the approach taken by these project 
proponents has many advantages, notably in helping to facilitate stable, substantial relationships 
between proponents and communities.  They also suggest that this approach “offers a truncated 
                                                          
354Ibid,. 
355 Newman, “Revisiting the Duty to Consult”, supra note 5 at 151. 
356 Hanna and Vanclay, supra note 351 at 152. 
357 Sackaney v. R, supra note 18. 
358 Ibid, at 35. 
359 Martin Papillon and Thierry Rodon, “Proponent-Indigenous agreements and the implementation of the right to 
free, prior and informed consent in Canada,” Environmental Impact Assessment Review 62 (2017) 216–224 at 216. 
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version of FPIC from the perspective of the communities involved.”360 This last statement is 
partly supported by this thesis in light of the view that through impact and benefits agreements, 
Indigenous approval to projects is sought and obtained in the form of a contractual agreement. 
However, this thesis argues that FPIC principles is different from the types of contractual 
agreements entered into with Indigenous communities because by definition, FPIC entails the 
right to freely give or withhold from consenting to a project, while in some cases, the law would 
mandate that IBAs must be negotiated. Further, IBAs and FPIC have different goals in that IBAs 
focuses more on issues related to economic compensations while FPIC’s focus is much broader, 
ranging from economic, cultural, spiritual and traditions values of the affected groups.361  
Due to the serious implications of FPIC to Indigenous peoples’ rights, many Indigenous group 
leaders now demand that both the federal, provincial and territorial governments legislate the 
UNDRIP principles “as the new norm” in Canada’s consultation policies and guides.362 This has 
been done by some countries, for example, the Philippines and Venezuela, where consent has 
been legislated as a domestic law.363 These steps are commendable and should be emulated by 
other signatory States; however, legislating consent is merely formalizing Indigenous peoples’ 
rights. It is more important to the right-holders that consent is implemented through observance 
of the rule of law as opposed to what has been described as a “box-ticking” procedure.364 
According to Joji Carino, although consent has been legislated in the Philippines,365 the issue of 
Indigenous peoples’ consent has been the subject of bribery or coercion and tension continues to 
mount around mining sites all over the country, thereby leading to increased military presence in 
order to secure mining sites.366 Carino concludes that these issues are indicative of the failure of 
project proponents to obtain the FPIC of the affected Indigenous communities, thereby rendering 
                                                          
360Ibid., 
361 Ibid., at 217 and 220.  
362 Ibid., at 20. 
363 Sasha Boutilier, “Free, Prior and Informed Consent and Reconciliation in Canada: Proposals to Implement 
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the true meaning of consent redundant. Therefore, in order to realize the objectives of FPIC, 
“surface level change”367 is not sufficient; States must commit to ensuring that when locally 
legislated, the goals of FPIC is achieved through adherence to their laws. While waiting on the 
government to change its approach to consulting with them, Indigenous peoples have now 
recognized the need to develop their own policies based on the UNDRIP principles.368 
 
4.7.1. FPIC and Consent Issues in Canada 
The provision of UNDRIP that best articulates the FPIC principle is found in Article 32(2), 
which states that: 
“States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the Indigenous peoples 
concerned through their own representative institutions in order to obtain their 
free and informed consent prior to the approval of any project affecting their lands 
or territories and other resources, particularly in connection with the development, 
utilization or exploitation of mineral, water or other resources.”369 
Article 32(2) has been interpreted in several ways including that it provides Indigenous peoples 
with a right to veto a project before it can successfully take-off. Unfortunately, this interpretation 
is misleading while resulting in the very opposite of what the UNDRIP instrument was fashioned 
to achieve.370 In Little Salmon/Carmacks First Nation, the court held that the First Nation did not 
have a veto over the approval process” because “no such substantive right is found in the treaty 
or in the general law, constitutional or otherwise.”371 As such, where carefully interpreted, FPIC 
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368 The Simpcw First Nation Heritage Policy, (September 2015), online at: 
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implies informed consent obtained through Indigenous people’s representative government or 
leadership, and it has been suggested by Grand Chief Edward John that this should be the 
Canadian standard for meaningful consultation.372  
Another misconception about FPIC is that it is incompatible with Canadian law namely, the 
constitutional duty to consult, and that it creates a special right for Indigenous peoples in Canada, 
especially considering the existence of treaties nationwide. According to Sasha Boutilier, and 
consistent with this thesis’ position, and that of Anaya, this should not be a hindrance to 
implementing FPIC.373 Rather, government should focus more on the impact of consent as the 
standard for consultation with Indigenous communities, as opposed to focusing on the 
interpretation of these treaties and how they affect implementation of consent.374 Further, the 
argument that consent or FPIC grants special rights to Indigenous peoples is not factual because 
FPIC is not a special right. Rather, FPIC should be recognized as a human right of Indigenous 
peoples due to the recognition that they first occupied the lands prior to the arrival of European 
settlers in Canada. Further, Anaya suggests that Indigenous peoples’ right should include the 
right to have access to all relevant information in order to make their independent decision free 
of threat, intimidation and duress.375 
Canadian jurisprudence provides that the fundamental objective of the modern law of Aboriginal 
and treaty rights (including the government’s duty to consult) is the reconciliation of Crown and 
Aboriginal claims, interests and ambitions.376 Implicitly, when reconciliation is the main goal of 
negotiating parties during consultation, it is easy to reach consensual agreements. As a primary 
goal of consultation, reconciliation should acknowledge Indigenous rights to freely consent to 
any developments on their lands. It should be the goal of every consultation participant, and the 
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government should recognize and respect the constitutional rights of Indigenous peoples by 
sending negotiators who are able to make decisions that build relationships.377 Importantly, 
consultation with consent in mind should be flexible and must acknowledge existing Indigenous 
decision-making processes and allow them to contribute their knowledge towards the 
consultation process. 
The instances where consent is required have been broadly described in greater detail in chapter 
one of this thesis, however, for the purposes of giving more clarity to the relationship of consent 
as it relates to title lands, it will be discussed briefly in this section.  
Consent is legally required in lands where title has been declared. Even when title is not 
established, good faith consultation should promote as a goal, the model of reaching consensual 
agreements in the form of consent. According to the Court in Delgamuukw, in some cases, 
“consultation may even require the full consent of an Aboriginal nation.”378 For meaningful 
consultation leading to consent to occur; it must have been freely commenced and negotiated at 
the early stages of the project, and government and proponents must have provided the affected 
Indigenous communities with detailed information.379 Article 19 of the UNDRIP requires that: 
“States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the Indigenous peoples 
concerned through their own representative institutions in order to obtain their 
free, prior and informed consent before adopting and implementing legislative or 
administrative measures that may affect them.” 
From the foregoing, some distinct keywords are used in reinstating the importance of consent 
from authorised Indigenous decision-makers during consultation. For consent in consultation to 
be free, elements of coercion or force must be absent;380 it must have been sought at the incipient 
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stage of the project, and the Indigenous community members affected by the proposed project 
must have been fully informed about the project. 
The concept of FPIC is also required when entering into legally binding agreements between 
Indigenous peoples and project proponents, such as an Impact and Benefit Agreement (IBA), 
modern treaties or self-government agreements, which are often the results of consultation and 
accommodation of rights. As a fundamental goal of consultation, reconciliation between Crown-
Indigenous governments would trigger the need for the Crown to consult with Indigenous 
groups, which in turn would necessitate entering into contractual agreements such as IBAs, 
before the commencement of any project that may adversely affect Aboriginal and treaty rights. 
IBAs are advantageous and highly strategic in ensuring that Indigenous groups are included in 
resource development taking place on their lands. They also guarantee that the industry engage 
in consultation with Aboriginal communities and are able to accommodate their concerns 
regarding a project. This in turn ensures that the right environment that fosters strong 
relationship between the Crown and Indigenous groups is given the opportunity to thrive. 
  
4.7.2. The Application of FPIC in Canada 
The current status of UNDRIP in Canada is that it is a non-binding international instrument since 
no legislative action has been taken by the Parliament.381 However, it is possible to legislate 
UNDRIP and the FPIC principles if the government intends to implement its provisions 
nationally. This is consistent with the views of Sasha Boutilier, that government can implement 
the FPIC standard for Environmental Assessment processes through legislation which can be 
achieved by use of the federal government’s legislative authority over Aboriginals peoples under 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
devoid of monetary inducements unless it is mutually agreed upon. See also, Christopher Donville & Rebecca 
Penty, “B.C. First Nation reject $1.15 billion Petronas-led LNG deal: ‘This is not a money issue’, in Financial Post, 
(May 13, 2015) online: <http://business.financialpost.com/news/energy/b-c-first-nation-rejects-1-15-billion-
petronas-led-lng-deal-this-is-not-a-money-issue>.  See further, MintPress News Desk, “Canadian First Nation 
People Reject $960 Million from Big Oil” in MintPress News, (May 19, 2015) 
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section 91 (24) of the Constitution Act, 1867.382 This section provides for the powers of the 
Parliament and subsection 24 reserves exclusive legislative power with regards to “Indians and 
Lands reserved for the Indians.”383  
Another way to ensure the legal validity of the UNDRIP provisions is to interpret its provisions 
as customary international. However, this can only be made possible if the courts and 
government were to adopt practices that will reflect FPIC or consent principles and are bound by 
those practices. According to existing jurisprudence, the closest we have to consent in Canadian 
law is the duty to consult. It is only when a rule or pattern of behaviour has acquired the 
prominence of state practice that it becomes customary international law.384  
According to the provisions of Article 38(1) (b) of the Statutes of the International Court of 
Justice, the Court applies international custom “as evidence of a general practice accepted as 
law.”385 James Anaya is of the view that a rule is said to be customary international law when a 
state reflects a pattern of behaviour that conforms to that rule and consents to be bound by it.386 
As such, customary international laws are reflections of domestic laws and vice versa. By 
implication, for UNDRIP provisions to be classified as customary international law in Canada, 
State practices and behaviours must reflect the principles declared in the instrument. The 
relationship between Canada’s domestic law and international principle was discussed in detail 
by the SCC in R v Hape, which provides some clarification as to the applicability of UNDRIP in 
Canada.  
In Hape, the Court stated that common law jurisdictions take the adoptionist approach to the 
reception of customary international law, and this allows such prohibitive rules to be 
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incorporated directly into domestic law without the need for legislative actions.387  This means 
that rules of customary international law are equated to common law rules so long as there is no 
valid domestic law that conflicts with the rules.388 When applied to UNDRIP, this means that if 
the provisions of the UNDRIP are considered rules of customary international law, it would have 
direct application in Canada through the adoptionist approach, and should be equated to common 
law rules in Canada. In essence, Indigenous rights advocates of the principles enunciated under 
the UNDRIP must show that according to state practice, the duty to consult doctrine extends to a 
duty to obtain consent from Indigenous peoples when contemplating or approving projects on 
their traditional territories.  By arguing that the government owes a duty to seek and obtain their 
free, prior and informed consent, Indigenous rights holders can demonstrate that the provisions 
of UNDRIP which talks about FPIC of Indigenous groups when contemplating any major 
dealings on their traditional territories, have become customary international law in Canada. 
In 2010, the federal government issued a statement endorsing UNDRIP in a manner that is 
consistent with Canada’s constitutional laws.389 The statement of support that was issued came 
with a caveat - that the federal government’s endorsement does not change Canadian laws; 
rather, where any UNDRIP principle, such as the FPIC principle, is inconsistent with Canadian 
jurisprudence, it would be void to the extent of the inconsistency. In effect, the position of the 
government is that Canadian jurisprudence on the duty to consult with Indigenous peoples was 
the law, and there was no duty to consent or reach an agreement.  
Canada’s position on UNDRIP changed significantly in 2016 when the Minister of Indigenous 
and Northern Affairs, Honourable Carolyn Bennett, announced the government’s full support of 
the UNDRIP principles without qualifications.390 Further, while attending the UN Permanent 
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Forum on Indigenous Issues in 2016, Minister Bennett explained that “implementing UNDRIP 
should not be scary” since already, modern treaties and self-government agreements have FPIC 
undertones.391  
Minister Bennett’s statement appears to be inconsistent with the SCC decision on the 
interpretation of modern treaties. In First Nation of Nacho Nyak Dun v Yukon, the Court made it 
clear that the role of modern treaties in advancing reconciliation is to address land claims 
dispute, which in turn, would create “the legal basis to foster a positive long-term 
relationship.”392 Further, the Court stated that treaties must be interpreted “in light of the treaty 
texts as a whole and the treaty’s objectives,”393 which in turn is anchored on the constitutional 
duty of the Crown to deal with honourably with Indigenous peoples. From the foregoing, it is 
clear that unlike the Minister’s statement, modern treaties do not have “consent undertones.” 
Except where explicitly stated, modern treaties must be interpreted according to the treaty texts 
and objectives only. Because obtaining consent is not a stated objective of modern treaty 
negotiations, Minister Bennett’s statement appears to be problematic and misleading. 
Further, a progressive stage requiring consent from Indigenous claiming groups was laid by the 
SCC where there is a strong claim to title.  According to the Court, where the government 
intends to use Indigenous land for resource development, it can avoid a charge of infringement 
by obtaining the consent of title-claimants.394 This statement serves as a caveat to the 
government because the implication of discarding the warning when title is eventually 
established is that the project may be cancelled.395 This part of the Tsilhqot’in Nation decision is 
being put to test in the Kinder Morgan Trans Mountain pipeline project in British Columbia. 
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In 2016, the Government of Canada approved the Kinder Morgan Trans Mountain Pipeline 
(TMPL) Expansion Project.396 The TMPL is a $6.8 billion construction project that would 
increase the pipeline’s capacity from 300,000 to 890,000 barrels of oil per day, and add an 
approximate 980km of new pipeline. Most of the pipeline routes would be constructed on lands 
where Indigenous title is claimed. As such, the project has faced several oppositions from health 
and environmental activists, as well as from Indigenous groups who have filed judicial reviews 
of the government’s decision at the Federal Court of Appeal in B.C.397  
In approving the TMPL project, the government exercised its executive powers in deciding that 
there was no infringement because adequate consultation was undertaken in line with its 
commitment to renew the relationship with Indigenous peoples. Further, the federal government 
stated that in approving the TMPL, it remains committed to reconciliation while working in 
partnership to address issues that are important to Indigenous communities.398 This test allows 
the government to override Aboriginal rights as long as there is a valid legislative objective that 
is exercised in line with its fiduciary obligations to Indigenous peoples. One of the conditions to 
                                                          
396 Alex Boutilier and Bruce Campion-Smith, “Liberals approve Trans Mountain pipeline, reject Northern Gateway 
Plan” in The Star. (November 29, 2016), online: <https://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2016/11/29/liberals-
approve-trans-mountain-line-3-pipeline-projects.html>.  
397 The existing pipeline crosses Treaty 6 & 8 territories, as well as Metis Nation of Alberta (Zone 4) in Alberta. In 
B.C., it crosses several traditional territories and 15 Reserve lands. Some of the affected Indigenous communities in 
B.C. are yet to enter agreements giving their consent to the project. For example, representatives of the Coldwater 
Indian Band, the Tsleil-Waututh Nation, and the Squamish Nation have filed lawsuits in the Federal Court of Appeal 
to oppose the government’s approval of the TMPL. Central to the issues raised against the TMPL Expansion Project 
is that it constitutes environmental and health hazards to everyone affected, as well as that the Crown has failed 
to fully discharge its duty to consult with them. Before the government’s approval in November 2016, several 
Indigenous groups had signed mutual benefit agreements that would transfer over $400 million to them, and 
several more have signed similar agreements since approval of the project.  
See further, Ian Bailey, “B.C. First Nations unite in fight against Trans Mountain pipeline” in The Globe and Mail, 
(January 17, 2017) online: <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/british-columbia/bc-first-nations-unite-in-
fight-against-trans-mountain-pipeline/article33653315/>.  
398 In Sparrow, the SCC laid out a test for how government may be justified in infringing existing Aboriginal and 
Treaty rights that are protected under section 35 of the Constitution. Under the test, an infringement might be 
justified if 1.) It serves a valid legislative objective; and 2) the government’s actions must be consistent with its 
fiduciary duty towards Aboriginal peoples. Where the government decided that a valid legislative objective exists, 
it is required to further ensure that a) there has been as little infringement as possible; b) fair compensation has 
been paid in the case of expropriation of lands, and c) the affected Aboriginal groups were consulted. See also, 




be met in establishing a valid legislative objective is to ensure that affected Indigenous groups 
have been fairly compensated. Within the context of the TMPL project, this compensation came 
in the form of some Indigenous groups’ approval to the project, whereby Mutual Benefit 
Agreements (“MBAs”) was signed between affected Indigenous groups and Kinder Morgan.399  
Since the government’s approval of the project in November 2016, more Indigenous groups have 
signed onto the MBA while others have not; instead, they have resorted to the courts to litigate 
their rights. It is important to note the use of the term “approval” in the context of what forms the 
basis of this approval. Of note, some of the Indigenous groups that signed the MBA made the 
decision to sign simply because they were afraid that if approved, the TMPL project would 
commence on their lands and they would lose out completely from benefiting from the economic 
gains or the opportunity to monitor the project, like other groups would.400 This raises the issue 
of the legal validity of contracts entered into by Indigenous peoples and project proponents, in 
terms of whether they were coerced into signing it. This topic is much broader and deserves 
further discussion and research, with a full treatment being large enough to be another thesis.  
However, it will be germane to briefly discuss the common law perspectives on parties’ rights 
and free will to enter into contractual agreements.  
                                                          
399 Mutual Benefit Agreements, MBAs, are agreements that define the relationship between parties that may 
include provisions on education, training, job skills, enhancement of community services or infrastructure, business 
opportunities and other benefits. See, Trans Mountain “Aboriginal Project Benefits online: 
<https://www.transmountain.com/aboriginal-project-benefits>.   
400 Report of the Working Group, supra note 229 at 56. Indigenous leaders in B.C. have expressed their concerns 
about monetary inducements unless it is mutually agreed upon, hence the use of MBAs.  In order to avoid being in 
a position where their only option is to take a deal or lose out completely on jobs and profits, they have decided to 
make their own consultation policies. For example, speaking on Kinder Morgan’s monetary offers in return for 
their consent/approvals, the Chief of Lower Nicola Indian Band in B.C. expressed his fears that even though some 
of the Band’s members were opposed to the project, they were worried that if they did not sign an agreement, the 
government would approve the project and they would lose out completely from benefiting from it like their 
neighboring groups would.  
See also, Tracy Johnson “First Nations still wary of supporting Trans Mountain expansion” in CBC Business, 
(November 28, 2016) online <http://www.cbc.ca/news/business/transmountain-first-nations-support-1.3866324>.   
See further, Amy Smart, “Better in than out: Why nine Vancouver Island First Nations signed on with Kinder 




Generally, consent under the common law is a derivative of the “consensus” or “will” theory 
which propounds that contractual obligations are by definition, self-imposed and those factors 
that indicate an absence of consent are fatal to the existence of a contract. For example, contracts 
are differentiated based on whether there is “true consensus” of the parties or whether consent is 
lacking altogether and the courts are simply called upon to decide upon agreements reached by 
the courts.401 As a result, parties’ “will” and individualism is stressed as opposed to state 
impositions as to individual engagement in contracts.  
Under common law, the concept that individuals are free to contract with one another governs 
the modern rules of contract. This is captured in the statement by Sir George Jessel in Printing 
and Numerical Registering Co v Sampson402 where he held that contracts entered into freely and 
voluntarily would be held sacred and valid by the courts. Further, P.S. Atiyah expounds the will 
theory in relation to classical contract law which argues that parties have the autonomy to make 
their own contracts based on their “free choice” and “will” and that the courts are only 
summoned to ensure that the agreements reached are adhered to.403 However, there are key 
elements that the courts would consider in determining whether or not a contract is valid. They 
are: offer and acceptance, consideration and the intention to create legal relations. Most relevant 
to our discussion is the parties’ intention to enter into binding legal relations as it relates to the 
individuals will to consent to be bound by a mutually agreed contract.  
 Indigenous groups that have not signed MBAs with the TMPL proponents are either questioning 
the implications of the effect of the project on their natural habitats and lands, or the limitation of 
their rights under the MBA. Others have sought legal remedies because they simply do not want 
their consent bought by huge monetary inducements; they prefer to be properly consulted about 
the project and be given the right to either consent or withhold from consenting to the project.404  
                                                          
401 M. P. Furmston, “Cheshire, Fifoot and Furmston’s Law of Contract” (2012: Oxford University Press) at 15. 
402 Ibid., cited at 13 as Printing and Numerical Registering Co v Sampson (1875) LR 19 Eq. 462 
403 P.S. Atiyah, “Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract” (1979: Oxford University Press) at 408. 
404 To further send home the message of their opposition to the TMPL project, the Coastal First Nations raised a 
totem pole on Tsleil-Waututh territory in 2013, saying the TMPL will never be built. Totem poles are carvings made 
from wood that signify hope, healing and protection for the people. The raised totem pole overlooks the Burrard 
inlet to the holding tanks at Westridge Terminal site where the Kinder Morgan TMPL loads onto tankers. The 
totem pole has been given the name “Kwel hoy”, meaning “We draw the line.” See, Tsleil-Waututh territory Sacred 




It will be interesting to see the outcome of these lawsuits in terms of the extent of rights held by 
the aggrieved Indigenous groups, especially since title to the territories in which the pipeline 
would run has not been established. It is safe to speculate that any decision(s) reached by the 
courts will greatly affect the status of UNDRIP in Canada’s jurisprudence and the requirement of 
FPIC in resource development on Indigenous lands. 
 
4.8. Conclusion 
It is becoming imminently imperative for the Government of Canada to take a firm and robust 
stand on the status of UNDRIP in Canada. Since the passing of UNDRIP in 2007, and up to the 
Government of Canada’s unqualified support for its principles in 2016, it is becoming 
increasingly necessary for all levels of government to conduct a revamp of their consultation 
policies to align them with international standards of obtaining consent within consultation. 
This will not come easy, but the journey towards a fuller embrace of the UNDRIP principles 
within consultation practices in Canada has been heralded by the 2014 Tsilhqot’in decision. 
There is no doubt that implementing UNDRIP domestically and in our courts, will not happen in 
a flash or overnight.405 However, if the pattern of judicial dialogue in Canada between the courts 
and Parliament is to be taken into account, the bulk of the work is left to the courts for judicial 
interpretation.406 In the next and final chapter, several policy recommendations would be made 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
(September 23, 2013), online: <http://twnsacredtrust.ca/we-draw-the-line-why-the-tsleil-waututh-nation-is-
raising-a-totem-pole-in-our-territories/>.  
405 When UNDRIP was passed in 2007, Canada, alongside with Australia, New Zealand and the United States were 
the only four countries who opposed the vote while 144 other countries signed on. Today, the Government has 
not only ratified it, but has further removed its objector status and stated its unqualified support for the UNDRIP 
principles. This to me is the kind of progress which sheds more hope that section 35 reconciliation objectives 
articulated in landmark Delgamuukw decision can be achieved. For more on the acceptance of UNDRIP in Canada, 
see, Mieke Coppes, “Canada’s Acceptance of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: 
Implications for the Inuit” (August 9, 2016) in the Arctic Institute, online: 
http://www.thearcticinstitute.org/canadas-acceptance-declaration-rights-Indigenous-peoples/  
406 John Ivison, “First Nations hear hard truth that UN Indigenous rights declaration is “unworkable” as law” in the 
National Post, (July 14, 2016), online: http://news.nationalpost.com/full-comment/john-ivison-first-nations-hear-




on how the UNDRIP principles can be adapted to fit within the current consultation laws in 
Canada. It is hoped that these recommendations would make implementing UNDRIP less 
“scary”, and would provide answers to its opponent misconstrued understanding of the FPIC 
















                                                                                                                                                                                           
have said in a similar vein, that the “future legislation will determine whether UNDRIP differs significantly from 





This thesis has attempted to articulate, in the first and introductory chapter, the legal standards 
for consent in resource development in Canada. In chapter two, this thesis undertook a 
jurisprudential analysis of Aboriginal title in Canada. A firm grasp of the doctrine of Aboriginal 
title in Canada is necessary in order to fully understand the discussion on consent in chapter three 
and four. Chapter three of this thesis went on to articulate the existing jurisprudence on the duty 
to consult as it engages resource development. In chapter four, consultation processes of the 
federal government, the province of British Columbia, as well as, an examination of the 
decision-making process of an Indigenous group in British Columbia was undertaken. Also, in 
chapter four, a case was made for free, prior and informed consent as articulated under the 
UNDRIP to be a pre-requisite to ensuring the smooth execution of resource development 
projects in Canada’s natural resources industry. Chapter four provides some suggestions on how 
to avoid the delays identified during consultations. The research finds that Indigenous consent 
should not be a concession from the government whereby the decision on whether or not to adopt 
the principles enshrined in UNDRIP is dependent on a political party’s manifesto or campaign 
rhetoric. Rather, it concludes that Indigenous consent is sacrosanct and unassailable in achieving 
peaceful project execution. Finally, this concluding chapter makes several recommendations, 
foremost being that free, prior and informed consent of Indigenous peoples, and from their 
perspectives, should be made the goal of consultation when contemplating any major 
infringements on their traditional lands.  
 
Indigenous consent serves as a strong weapon for the protection of Indigenous peoples’ rights, 
culture and laws in relation to every aspect of their traditional practices on their traditional 
territories. As long as resource development continues to take place in Indigenous territories, 
there will continue to be resistance from Indigenous title claimants who insist that consent must 
be obtained during consultation. Likewise, the government may continue to face opposition 
forcing the Crown to use its “Sparrow-privileges” in overruling Indigenous consent rights. It is 
hoped that some of the policy suggestions made under this chapter will proffer some solutions 




If any development is to be sustainable, the suggestions made in this chapter should be given 
enough time to germinate and grow. Because it has taken over a hundred years of litigating rights 
to arrive at the Tsilhqot’in Nation jurisprudence in Canada, it is unrealistic to expect that every 
provincial and federal policy on consultation will be revamped in favour of consent overnight. 
However, it is hoped that with the adoption of the UNDRIP principles in Canada, the doctrine of 
FPIC will be a great catalyst towards achieving Indigenous consent in resource development in 
Canada.  
 
5.1. Recommendations to Actors in Resource Development on Indigenous 
Lands 
Undoubtedly, the duty to consult doctrine has proved to be one of the most instrumental tools 
that have enabled Indigenous peoples in Canada to put across their concerns arising from any 
restrictions on the exercise of their constitutionally enshrined rights. Without consultation and 
negotiation of agreements, it is safe to say that the relationship between the two nations may 
have collapsed. Today, several scholars, stakeholders and Indigenous and Government sponsored 
reports confirm that the foundation of a healthy relationship between the Crown and Indigenous 
nations is hinged on its ability to forge ahead on a platform based on respect for existing 
Indigenous government, recognition of their rights, and reconciliation of past wrongs meted out 
to the latter. Where faithfully observed, respect, recognition and reconciliation are capable of 
driving all players to their preferred relationship.  
Several of the suggestions and recommendation to be made under this section have been 
advanced in other works or reports hence, they are not new.407 However, what is novel about 
these suggestions is their application in terms of situating them as consultation goals of 
negotiating parties. In addition to Impact or Mutual Benefit Agreements, and all other modern 
forms of achieving consensus via legal contracts, these recommendations, where aptly 
considered, aims to drive all levels of government in achieving the section 35 goal of 
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reconciliation with Indigenous peoples. For clarity, these recommendations are made in threefold 
to reflect the roles that all negotiating parties should assume in terms of goals to be attained 
when the government is fulfilling its constitutional consultation duties. 
 
5.1.1 The Role of the Government 
UNDRIP provisions usher in a dramatic change for the international recognition and protection 
of Indigenous peoples’ rights worldwide. In particular, the FPIC principle affords Indigenous 
peoples the avenue to stand firmly whilst united under one unique platform, and to speak 
regarding how they want third parties to deal on their traditional territories. On the part of the 
government, embracing the principles enunciated by the FPIC doctrine is the surest way of 
achieving reconciliation with Indigenous peoples.  
 
In Chapter four, this research examined the Gitxsan Nation’s consultation process in British 
Columbia in some detail, and how as with several other Indigenous communities discussed more 
briefly, decisions are arrived at consensually. Consensual decision-making makes Indigenous 
communities markedly different from mainstream society such that they are able to arrive at a 
decision after considering the overall benefit of the proposed action to not only themselves but, 
according to some Indigenous groups, to future generations of the community as well. This 
ability to decide consensually allows authorized decision-makers to project the views of the rest 
of the community members, through its negotiating team. As a derivative of their right to self-
determination, Indigenous peoples are able to enter into agreements that reflect their views, as 
well as, exercise their right to give free, prior and informed consent to a project on their lands.408 
 
Where upheld and respected, the right to self-determination promotes reconciliation of Crown-
Indigenous government. This research suggests that when Indigenous groups are allowed to 
make important social, cultural and political decisions that affect their community, including a 
right to consent to a project on their lands, then the two nations can begin to actualize true 
reconciliation. In essence, in order to achieve a lasting solution to the increasingly high demands 
for the exercise of their FPIC rights, government must find a way to implement the principles of 
UNDRIP to fit within existing Canadian laws on consultation. 
 
                                                          
408 Ward, supra note 2 at 55. 
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Another important matter that needs immediate attention is that upon full ratification, it is 
incumbent upon the government to play its role in ensuring that the UNDRIP principles are 
workable within the Canadian jurisprudence on the duty to consult. It is not enough for the 
government to make affirmative statements on its implementation, there is an immediate need to 
clarify and design a step by step plan on how policy makers should incorporate the UNDRIP 
provisions within existing legal regimes. In 2016, a private member’s bill, Bill C-262, was 
introduced in Parliament to require the Government of Canada to take all necessary measures to 
ensure that the laws of Canada are consistent with the UNDRIP.409 
 
For example, Favel and Coates in two separate papers, addressed the issues raised by the 
problems of implementing UNDRIP and FPIC in Canada, and opined that the present approach 
by the Government whereby the Declaration is viewed as merely aspirational “could produce 
discord and negativity rather than providing the basis for further reconciliation.”410 The scholars 
were of the view that in order to make UNDRIP workable within the framework of the duty to 
consult, it will be preferable to approach UNDRIP as a guideline for addressing the needs and 
aspirations of Indigenous peoples. 
 
This thesis is supportive of this last view, and adds that the preferable approach is for 
government to fully adopt the principles of FPIC in a manner that allows for all parties to set 
consent-seeking as a goal during consultation. Undoubtedly, it will be impossible to obtain 
consent every time consultation takes place, and as such, full accommodation should be made to 
address all the concerns raised by Indigenous land owners or claimants. Indeed, every time the 
government exercises its ability to infringe Aboriginal rights by means of its Sparrow powers, 
the message being sent home to its Indigenous citizens is that it can literally force its ways 
                                                          
409 Bill C-262 was introduced by Romeo Saganash on April 21, 2016, and is currently at the stage of “Introduction 
and First Reading in the House of Commons.” If passed into law, it would require the Canadian Government to  
ensure that its laws is consistent with the UNDRIP principles. See Parliament of Canada online < 
http://www.parl.gc.ca/LegisInfo/BillDetails.aspx?Language=E&Mode=1&Bill=C262&Parl=42&Ses=1>.  
410 For more discussion on the obstacles to implementing UNDRIP in Canada, see Blaine Favel and Ken S. Coates, 
“Understanding UNDRIP; Choosing action on priorities over sweeping claims about the United Nations Declaration 
of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples”, (May 2016), Macdonald-Laurier Institute Publication, at 1 [Favel and Coates]. 
See also, Ken S. Coates and Blaine Favel, “Understanding FPIC: From assertion and assumption on ‘free, prior and 
informed consent’ to a new model for Indigenous engagement on resource development” supra note 6. 
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through their homes when after knocking, they refuse to open their doors. Without a doubt, this 
was not the type of reconciliation envisioned by Chief Justice Lamer in Delgamuukw when he 
stated that “let us face it, we are all here to stay.”411 In truth, staying reconciled with Indigenous 
peoples cannot be achieved by force, coercion or use of state power. 
 
Liberally translated, FPIC provides for wide-ranging rights of Indigenous peoples to self-
determination, freedom from discrimination and a right to make culturally-informed decisions 
for the protection of their lands and environment.412 In order to assure the actualization of FPIC 
rights, government must ensure that there is increased participation of Indigenous peoples on 
matters that affect their lives, culture and traditional territories. For example, where a pipeline is 
purposed to be built on Indigenous territory, communities likely to be impacted by the project 
should at the inception, be informed about the project, its economic benefits and likely impact of 
the project to the environment. Further, this initial informational session should not only provide 
Indigenous communities with full knowledge of the project, but it should also envisage obtaining 
their views and assuring them that project proponents intend to seek and obtain their approvals to 
the project through a detailed accommodation of their concerns. Indeed, this approach is more 
likely to ensure that a social licence to the project is obtained as it lays bare, the economic 
benefits of the project as well as, reflects genuine respect for their territories as a nation. 
 
Another means of achieving consent in resource development is by providing funding to 
Indigenous groups in order to allow them to participate meaningfully in consultation.413 This is 
an issue that has been identified by case law and scholarly writings. Many reports have also 
identified lack of funding for consultation to have led to what is termed “process fatigue” which 
is a major barrier for Indigenous groups’ participation in project assessments and reviews.414  
 
                                                          
411 Delgamuukw, supra note 16 at para 186. Justice Lamer clarified that section 35 goal of reconciliation can 
ultimately be achieved “through negotiated settlements, with good faith and give and take on all sides”. 
412Agnes Portalewska, “Free, Prior and Informed Consent: Protecting Indigenous Peoples’ right to self-
determination, participation and decision-making” Cultural Survival Quarterly Magazine, 36-4 (December 2014) 
online: <https://www.culturalsurvival.org/publications/cultural-survival-quarterly/free-prior-and-informed-
consent-protecting-indigenous>.  
413 Platinex, supra note 236 at paras 3 and 97. 
414 Fort McKay First Nation v Alberta (Minister of Environment and Sustainable Resource Development), 2014 ABQB 
393 at 150, 581 AR 134. See also, Douglas R. Eyford, Forging Partnerships, Building Relationships: Aboriginal 
Canadians and Energy Development, Report to the Prime Minister (November 29 2013) at 8, [Eyford Report]. 
112 
 
Consultation has several advantages, including the provision of information about a proposed 
project. Where Indigenous groups are well-funded and able to conduct independent research into 
the impacts of a proposed project to their lands and natural resources, they are better equipped 
with facts and information that will guide them in either approving the projects or making 
recommendations on how to address any concerns that they might have.415 
 
 
5.1.2 The Role of Industry 
Before the decision in Haida Nation¸ it was unclear who was primarily responsible for fulfilling 
the duty to consult, but the Court stated that although third parties are encouraged to initiate 
consultation with Indigenous groups, “ultimately, the legal responsibility for consultation and 
accommodation rests with the Crown.”416 However, the Court went on to clarify that the fact that 
third parties are not under any legal duty to consult does not translate to their inability to incur 
liabilities. Where proponents act negligently or breach their contracts with Indigenous groups, 
they may incur legal liability.417  
 
On this premise, industry or project proponents are well-advised to ensure that strategies are put 
in place to avoid breaching their contractual obligations or duty of care owed to Indigenous 
groups, and one assured means of achieving this is to strategically hire Indigenous leaders or 
informed and skilled members within their organizations.418 Hiring skilled and informed 
Indigenous staff will obviate some of the problems encountered by project proponents, for 
example, the inability to communicate with Indigenous leaders, failure to appreciate Indigenous 
laws, values and culture as well as a lack of robust appreciation of their deep connections to their 
lands.419 
 
                                                          
415 Nunatukavut, supra note 5 at para 150. 
416 Haida Nation, supra note 9 at para 53. 
417 Ibid., at para 56. 
418Michael J. Bryant, The Case for an Aboriginal Veto in From Recognition to Reconciliation: Essays on the 
Constitutional Entrenchment of Aboriginal Treaty Rights, eds. Patrick Macklem and Douglas Sanderson (University 
of Toronto Press: 2016) at page 223. 
419 Coates and Favel, supra note 6 at 6. 
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Indeed, Canada is far ahead of most other countries in the world when it comes to the 
entrenchment of Indigenous rights within its constitutional framework. Further, the duty to 
consult doctrine is highly unique to Canada and it flows from the Crown’s honour to Indigenous 
peoples. However, the government also has a duty to other non-Indigenous Canadians to manage 
land and resources in a manner that ensures fair distribution of wealth within the society. In 
essence, the Government of Canada wears two hats in deciding how best to foster a vibrant 
economy by approving projects that will ensure financial growth within its natural resource 
industry, and how best to uphold its honour in terms of its fiduciary duties to Indigenous 
peoples.420  
 
With these complexities in mind, project developers become wary of investing in resource 
development projects in Canada due to the likelihood of disruptions and litigations or protests 
from Indigenous land owners/claimants. Impact or Mutual Benefit Agreements have been highly 
instrumental in circumnavigating these problems but Indigenous leaders are beginning to see the 
monetary benefit offers as bribes or lures into entering into contractual obligations that they view 
to be in conflict with their conscience and the duty they have to protect their territories. An 
example is the Pacific NorthWest Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) project by Petronas. This project 
has experienced extended delays because the proposed site on Lelu Island is next to a Flora Bank 
and sandy eelgrass bed which is a vital habitat for juvenile salmon, steelhead and shellfish within 
the Skeena system in British Columbia. As a result, the Lax Kw’alaams Band rejected Petronas 
offer of approximately $267,000 per person and unanimously voted against the project.421 In 
addition, several lawsuits have being launched to challenge the federal government’s approval of 
the project.422 This project, and several others across Canada, drives home the need for 
                                                          
420  Guerin, supra note 143 at para 79. 
421 Martin Lukacs, “By rejecting $1bn for a pipeline, a First Nation has put Trudeau’s climate plan on trial” 
theguardian, (March 20, 2016), online: <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/true-north/2016/mar/20/by-
rejecting-1-billion-for-a-pipeline-a-first-nation-has-put-justin-trudeaus-climate-plan-on-trial> . 
422 Luutkudziiwus, a Gitxsan Nation House Group is one of the groups that have launched formal actions to oppose 
the NorthWest LNG project on Lelu Island for lack of consultation and approval. Totally opposed to the project, 
they demand that since they were not consulted, the project would be stopped. See Andrea Palframan, 
“Luutkudziiwus and Gwininitxw file judicial review to save the wild salmon of the Skeena –and stop the Petronas 





proponents to not only obtain government approval for a project, but also, to obtain consent from 
the community in order to peacefully execute the projects on their traditional territories. 
 
How can industry obtain Indigenous consent to projects such as the NorthWest LNG project 
where there has been close to consistent and unanimous rejection and opposition? From the 
Haida Nation premise that third parties could be liable in damages for negligent actions towards 
Indigenous peoples, best practices should promote the consideration of Indigenous interests at 
the outset of project proposals and up to approval stages from the government and other 
regulators. In fact, Coates and Favel are of the view that Indigenous decision-making process 
should be the foundation of the review process of obtaining support for a project.423  Where 
Indigenous perspectives are considered not only by the government, but also by project 
proponents, affected Indigenous groups are more likely to work with industry in utilizing their 
traditional knowledge of the lands in designing means of protecting their concerns over the 
project.  
 
This might entail ensuring that expert negotiators are employed to deal with the legal aspect of 
negotiating agreements e.g. IBAs, in order to yield optimum results.  It is left to parties wishing 
to deal with Indigenous people to ensure that they acquire the expertise and skills that they need 
to deal with title claimants and to make concrete commitments to negotiating Indigenous consent 
to a proposed project as early as possible. Further, early engagement of Indigenous communities 
by industry is more likely to build a lasting trust and solid relationships. Again, industry can best 




5.1.3 Role of Indigenous Communities and their Leaders 
Litigation is very expensive and it could go on for years. In several instances, the desired 
outcome is often not achieved. However, the solace is that litigation, though exhausting, has been 
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highly successful in advancing Indigenous rights whilst also driving it to the current legal 
discussion in Canada. Much credit for these advancements go to Indigenous leaders who, 
frustrated with the imbalance in economic and social status between Indigenous and non-
Indigenous Canadians pioneered legal actions. There have been several recorded successes, 
including the Tsilhqot’in Nation decision, and several more could be achieved where concerted 
efforts are optimized. 
FPIC is perhaps, the most hotly debated topic within Indigenous communities in Canada. 
Indigenous groups want to be meaningfully consulted and in addition, they want to be able to 
give their consent to projects before it is approved by the government. However, achieving 
Indigenous consent prior to approvals and commencement of projects can only be achieved by 
the concerted efforts of all negotiating parties. Indigenous groups in particular, have a reciprocal 
duty to participate in consultation processes in good faith. As such, where the government is 
committed to fulfilling its constitutional duty to consult and accommodate, as well as, achieving 
its reconciliation goal, it is incumbent upon Indigenous groups to be flexible on their stance in a 
manner that ensures progress is made during consultation and negotiation.425 Holding fast to a 
position after all possible mitigating provisions have been made will not allow parties to reach 
any form of agreement or accommodation of concerns. 
Another means of achieving consent is by understanding every stakeholder’s concerns. 
Ultimately, the goal for project proponents is to execute a successful and profitable project, while 
governments seek to provide citizens with security, jobs, social amenities, safe environment and 
much more. For Indigenous groups, many have stated that they are not opposed to resource 
development, rather, they view the land “as a sacred legacy given to them by the creator to 
manage and protect”,426 and as a result, they want any project carried out on the land to be done 
on their terms and with their consent. Flowing from the foregoing, several Indigenous 
organizations have undertaken the task of developing their own consultation guidelines for 
industry and government wishing to do business on their lands.427 Concurrently, where consent is 
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required, it is suggested that Indigenous leaders have a role in making sure that there are 
guidelines to assist proponents in mapping out a route to obtaining their consent for the project. 
There are many advantages of having a guideline for obtaining Indigenous consent. Firstly, 
unlike provincial consultation guidelines, consent guidelines emanate from Indigenous 
perspectives and ensure that provisions are made for addressing the interests and concerns of 
affected groups. Secondly, it allows third parties dealing on Indigenous lands to have a 
reasonable expectation of how to relate with the people, acknowledge their laws and respect their 
traditional beliefs; and thirdly, and perhaps, most relevant to proponents, is that it is more likely 
to ensure that approvals for projects are secured in a timely and efficient manner. More than 
signaling respect for Indigenous rights, consultation channelled at consent-seeking makes it 
easier to obtain approvals on project in a manner that ensures that high-priority concerns have 
been addressed. 
As historical keepers of the land, Indigenous peoples have the key to unlocking the resource 
potentials of the land, as well as the ability to dictate how best it should be used for development 
and social growth. As such, where community consent is sought on a project, affected 
Indigenous groups have an obligation to participate in the established consultation process in 
order to discuss their concerns and lay out conditions for approval. More importantly, these 
consent guidelines should provide proponents with answers on how to address the issues of 
initial and continued consent where applicable, Indigenous monitory roles, financial benefits and 
dispute resolution mechanisms outside of the court rooms. 
 
5.2 Conclusion 
The last two decades since the Delgamuukw decision have seen tremendous evolution in the laws 
protecting Indigenous peoples’ rights to land. This decision remains the starting point for a 
renewed hope for a declaration of Indigenous title to land in Canada, however, the struggle for 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
for Government and Third Parties, 2009”, “Horse Lake First Nation Consultation Policy, February 1, 2007” and 
“Federation of Saskatchewan Indian Nations Consultation Policy, 2006.” See Christian Aboriginal Infrastructure 
Developments online: <http://caid.ca/consult.html>   
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emancipation and total freedom from the shackles of colonization and the effects of the assertion 
of Crown sovereignty continues. Heralded by the Gitxsan and Wet’suwet’en in Delgamuukw, for 
the first time in over 100 years of Indigenous rights litigation in Canada, the Tsilhqot’in people 
of B.C. successfully instituted an action for a declaration of Indigenous title to land in Canada.  
In chapter one of this research, the legal standards for consent in resource development in 
Canada was discussed. This discussion revealed the instances when consent will be required 
from Aboriginal title claimants prior to any resource development proceeding. Accommodation 
of Aboriginal peoples’ rights in land through the process of consultation was also discussed 
which revealed the uncertainties that could arise in resource development. 
 
In chapter two, the meaning, content and nature of Aboriginal title in Canada was examined. 
Through scholarly articles, texts and case law, the doctrine of Aboriginal title was analyzed 
culminating in the SCC Tsilhqot’in Nation decision in 2014. This decision greatly informs the 
overarching goal of this thesis work which suggests that where fully embraced, consent should 
be viewed as a tool in ensuring that the government meets its obligations to Indigenous peoples 
when resource development is proposed on their lands. Further, chapter two reveals the 
importance of making consent the goal of consultation which ultimately, will lead to 
reconciliation of Crown-Aboriginal sovereignty mentioned in the landmark decision in 
Delgamuukw. This theme was further discussed in chapter three where the doctrine of the 
Crown’s duty to consult was examined and the shortcomings of consultation that fails to obtain 
Indigenous consent was discussed. 
 
The Delgamuukw decision is highly important to chapter four because it informs the consultation 
practices of the federal government, the province of British Columbia and a select Indigenous 
group discussed in the chapter. By looking at how the Gitxsan people of British Columbia make 
decisions as a group, an examining of their traditional laws, political structure and decision-
making process was undertaken. The overall goal of chapter four was to show how Indigenous 
decision-making can be instrumental in fashioning new consultation policies aimed at obtaining 
Aboriginal consent in resource development in Canada. It is safe to say that without the 
foundational holdings in the Delgamuukw case, Aboriginal people may still be hotly litigating, 




Finally, chapter five concludes with several suggestions to the government, project proponents 
and Indigenous people on how to move forward in ensuring that Indigenous peoples’ 
perspectives are considered prior to the commencement of projects on their lands. It is 
anticipated that the next few years will usher in several developments, notably, in the 
interpretation of the FPIC doctrine and its applicability to existing laws and policies on 
consultation with Aboriginal title claimants.  It is hoped that government, project proponents and 
Indigenous people nationwide will make concerted efforts to fashion out solutions to 
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